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The power to amend the constitution is a fundamental political power; it is
the essence of sovereignty.'
INTRODUCTION
Illinois's state constitutional individual rights law, at least in re-
cent times, has undergone relatively little expansion or growth. This
research began as an attempt to understand why this is so' and
whether it is, for some reason, appropriate or not. In the process,
however, it became evident that the Illinois experience may usefully
serve to demonstrate why most states, at least in the modern era,
have not experienced growth in individual rights jurisprudence
under their respective state constitutions. In fact, it may be that
most states, for similar legitimate reasons, will never participate to
any great extent in what has come to be called the "new judicial
federalism. '"
This is because a close correlation seems to exist between the ease
or difficulty with which a state constitution can be amended, and the
onset and growth of independent - and usually expansive4 - state
1. JOHN AUSTIN. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAw 261
(London, Clowes & Sons 1885).
2. Some time ago, while engaged in conversation at a conference on state constitutionalism and
the "new federalism," a colleague of mine casually remarked to one of those in the group who was
writing a book on his state's constitution: "I'll bet a book on Illinois state constitutional law might
be interesting and useful." "Yes," the author said, "and easy to write too, at only three pages."
The element of truth in such hyperbole was amusing then, and even today that casual remark
remains a trenchant insight into the limited development of independent state constitutional law in
Illinois with regard to the protection of individual rights.
3. For a definition and discussion of the "new judicial federalism," see infra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
4. Several commentators have suggested that there are sound reasons for initially engaging in
state constitutional interpretation independent of the federal law. See, e.g., People ex rel. Daley v.
Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 880 (11. 1988) (Clark, J., concurring); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on
State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14-15
(1981) [hereinafter Collins, Reliance]; Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383, 392 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things
First]; Note, Developments - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1324, 1362-64 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Developments]. Independent interpretation occa-
sionally results in opinions which are not expansive of rights. See, e.g., State v. Florence, 527 P.2d
1202 (Or. 1974) (accepting the rule in federal cases regarding custodial searches under the Ore-
gon Constitution); see also State v. Smith, 725 P.2d 844 (Or. 1986) (finding that the Oregon
Constitution does not require Miranda-style warnings before interrogation); State v. Roth, 471
A.2d 270, 375 (N.J. 1984) (holding that a state double jeopardy provision provided less protection
than the federal provision, so the court applied the federal rule); State v. Sparklin, 672 P.2d 1182,
1184 (Or. 1983) (declaring that the benefit of a "single [Miranda] test exceeds any gain from
improving that test"); State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (1984) (expressing a similar concern);
John Gruhl, State Supreme Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 886 (1981) (discussing whether state courts may have helped to dimin-
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constitutional interpretation by state courts. More important, con-
servative approaches toward interpretation seem to correlate closely
with state constitutional inflexibility (and probably should do so)
when these conditions reflect a negative popular will on the issue of
fundamental constitutional change, which is itself a bias in response
to contemporaneous political culture in a given state.5
For example, in the name of political peace and economic stabil-
ity, the citizens of Illinois have traditionally limited their capacity to
effectuate fundamental change in their scheme of government by
enacting numerous, often unnecessary restrictions on the constitu-
tional amendment process. The result of this tradition, inter alia, is
an inflexible judicial article in the state constitution with regard to
antiquated methods of judicial selection, which leads to a significant
lack of judicial independence and a corollary diminution in the his-
toric development of individual rights protection under state consti-
tutions. The reason for this is that in Illinois, as in many states, the
local political culture is disunified, individualistic, and often fac-
tious. Since this tenuous state of affairs cautions against allowing
for fundamental change through "simple majorities,"6 the popular
inclination in these states has been to make difficult the process of
constitutional amendment. Reflecting this popular caution and being
familiar, of course, with these local self-imposed limits on constitu-
tional revision, 7 state courts apparently feel justified in providing lit-
tle if any compensatory protection for individual rights, especially if
ish the rights of defendants to a degree greater than the Burger Court).
Nevertheless, it would hardly seem worthwhile for a state court to forego easy reliance on feder-
ally-mandated requirements when evaluating challenged state action. Doing so risks either rever-
sal or being brought to account politically for providing potentially unpopular state constitutional
protection for criminal offenders. Thus, expansive interpretation would seem unwise unless the
judge was convinced that a level of protection greater than the federal minimum was clearly
required and was acceptable to the public and the judge's fellow partisans. Otherwise, the greater
percentage lies in obscuring judgments on individual rights behind the argot and requirements of
federal constitutional law. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Com-
mon Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 1291, 1364-65 (1986) (arguing that the doctrine
"permits state courts to hide behind federal law to frustrate their accountability and it forbids
federal lawmaking through federal court review to enhance the role of the state polity to oversee
its own courts").
5. It is assumed that, by definition, constitutional change is "fundamental" change, even though
some potential changes in a constitution would not be regarded by most citizens as relatively
fundamental.
6. See, e.g.. infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing the politics of fear of
change).
7. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing state court familiarity with com-
mon law and traditions of state).
1994]
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doing so could be viewed as a "nonformal" amendment to a consti-
tution which the framers ("the people") intended to see amended
only infrequently.
This article suggests that popularly imposed limitations on consti-
tutional amendment or revision amount to an appropriate political
compromise under certain historical and demographic circum-
stances. In fact, a tradition of constitutional inflexibility in response
to a divisive local political culture should serve presumptively as a
principled basis for conservatism on the part of state courts in the
face of demands for expansive construction of state bills of rights.
The study of the legal history of constitutional amendment in a par-
ticular state, here Illinois, not only illuminates the political culture
responsible for a given degree of constitutional flexibility in that
state, but appears to provide an explanation for the extent of state
judicial independence and the degree of expansive constitutional in-
terpretation found in that state as well. A state court's approach
toward the interpretation of its individual rights provisions, in other
words, is defensible because it maintains democratic accountability
when consistent with the sovereign will. That sovereign will, in the
form of a popular attitude toward constitutional change within the
state, is explicitly manifested in the relative rigidity of the amending
provisions; and state judges are especially inclined to comply with
the popular will if a rigid constitution makes reform of judicial se-
lection, and thus judicial independence, seemingly impossible. It is
one thing to continually argue, as has been the case in recent years, 8
that state courts have the general power to participate in the "new
judicial federalism"; it is another to explain to a given state court
why it should exercise that power. It may be, under some circum-
stances, that it should not.
Part I of the article reflects on the distinctiveness of state consti-
tutions and how this relates to the interpretation of those docu-
ments. Part I then articulates the present view of what is likely to
encourage independent, expansive state constitutional interpretation
(that is, the "new judicial federalism"). Part II suggests the specific
"mix" of local political characteristics that might be expected to re-
8. E.g., People v. Diguida, 576 N.E.2d 126 (111. 1990) (amicus curie brief from the Illinois
State Bar Association); Phylis S. Bamberger, Methodology for Raising State Constitutional Is-
sues, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287 (1985); Robert F. Utter &
Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Tech-
nique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635 (1987); Robert F. Utter, Advancing State Constitutions in Court,
TRIAL MAG.. October, 1991, at 41 (hereinafter Utter, Advancing State Constitutions].
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suit in, or account for, the lack of independent interpretation in any
given state. Part II then proposes the legal history of state constitu-
tional "self-amendment" 9 as a body of material most reflective of
and responsive to this "mix" (which includes the evolving political
culture'0 of a state) and thus indicative of the popular attitude to-
ward constitutional change in that state. Part II also points out that
constitutional inflexibility inhibits judicial independence by convey-
ing a negative popular attitude toward change, thus provoking con-
servative constitutional interpretation by state courts.
Part III focuses on Illinois as a state in which to profitably ex-
plore the interrelationship between independent interpretation, con-
stitutional flexibility, and local political culture; it is one of the few
states with an often-noted record of unusually limited use of inde-
pendent judicial analysis. Part III relates in a general fashion: (1)
the origins and nature of Illinois's political culture; (2) the related
traditional inflexibility of Illinois's state constitution as compared to
state constitutions nationally; and (3) the historical lack of judicial
independence in Illinois which has followed from such inflexibility
- all of which have contributed to and are politically consistent
with Illinois's present, narrow "lock-step" approach to constitutional
analysis in the area of individual 'rights.
Part IV presents the legal history of Illinois constitutional conven-
'tions in the context of the historical development in Illinois of a dis-
unified and individualistic political culture. It discusses the scholar-
ship concerning that culture and the restrictions on amending in the
Illinois provisions, and then relates this material to the legal history
of American state constitutional conventions in general. Part V en-
gages in the same effort with regard to the Illinois provisions for
constitutional amendment initiated by the legislature."
9. This term, coined by Professor Peter Suber in his invaluable and erudite book, refers to the
process by which amending provisions are used to amend themselves. See PETER SUBER, THE
PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC. LAW. OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
10. For a definition and discussion of "political culture," see infra notes 87-94 and accompany-
ing text.
11. There is also an Illinois constitutional provision for limited constitutional change through
popular initiative. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 3. Eighteen states, including Illinois, presently
allow constitutional amendment in some form through popular initiative. Janice C. May, Consti-
tutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987, at 153,
177. The Illinois provision was adopted quite late in the history of popular initiative generally, and
is limited both textually and by interpretation to quite narrow circumstances. Because the Illinois
provision has been in existence only since 1970, is clearly of such limited use, and is a narrow and
atypical provision relative to other states, popular initiative is not profitably treated in this work.
See id. ("[T]he constitutional initiative is not the typical amending process, having been adopted
1994]
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The body of material in Parts IV and V establishes that the evolv-
ing Illinois political culture has produced negative popular attitudes
toward constitutional change, and that this has been traditionally
reflected in the relative inflexibility of the state constitutional
amendment process. This material relates not only how this popular
and textual resistance to constitutional change developed in Illinois,
but suggests two further ramifications of such conservative develop-
ments. First, that such constitutional inflexibility, resulting as it has
in a low level of judicial independence (in part, a corollary of judi-
cial selection methods unchanged since the Jacksonian era and com-
pounded by the popular message implicit in an inflexible document),
may explain the relative reluctance of Illinois state courts to engage
in independent and expansive constitutional interpretation. Second,
the degree of constitutional inflexibility in Illinois actually may be
greater than required to preserve political stability or protect minor-
ity factions. This unnecessary rigidity operates to the political and
social detriment of the whole state. For example, although there has
been continuing consensus for most of the modern era that regard-
less of the form it takes, fundamental reform is needed in the areas
of judicial selection and educational financing, reform has been vir-
tually impossible.
This Article finishes by reaching several tentative conclusions.
First, a state court's conservative approach toward non-formal (judi-
cial) constitutional amendment reflects, as in Illinois, the relative
difficulty of formal textual amendment and the resulting lack of ju-
dicial independence. Second, the state court's approach is justified
because it is consistent with manifested (constitutionally integrated)
popular resistance to fundamental change based on appropriate con-
cessions to local stability in light of local political culture, i.e., it is
fully consistent with notions of democratic accountability appropri-
ate in state courts. If this is so, it then becomes less clear why a
state court's conservative approach toward interpretation should be
changed notwithstanding the thrust of current scholarship which im-
in only seventeen states and used frequently in only eight. ... ). Popular initiative as a means
of constitutional change is also fundamentally different from legislative amendment or the consti-
tutional convention. Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or. How Many
Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) > 26; (C) 26; (D) All
of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409, 416-17 (1991) (noting that popular initiative is more
like "revolution" than "amendment" in a constitutional government). The wisdom and appropri-
ateness of expanding popular initiative in Illinois and other states is the subject of a separate
work-in-progress.
[Vol. 43:269
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plies that judicial philosophy, with regard to the interpretation of
individual rights in a state like Illinois, can be "organized" -
through litigation12 or otherwise - to change significantly.
On the other hand, even though there may be little potential for
encouraging "new judicial federalism" in the majority of conserva-
tive states, either through litigation or scholarship, there may still be
sufficiently unnecessary rigidities inherent in the present system for
constitutional amending. These unnecessary rigidities might prop-
erly be addressed by those interested in signaling the judiciary that
excessive restraint in matters of independent interpretation is no
longer required.
A third tentative conclusion reached by this Article is that even
without easing the restrictiveness in the amendatory provisions of
the constitutions of conservative states like Illinois (again, to induce
expansive judicial constitutional interpretation), the existing law of
textual or formal constitutional amendment may already provide a
means for resolving problems such as accomplishing reform of judi-
cial selection and educational financing, seemingly intractable
problems in states like Illinois. There is ample precedent for the
convening of a constitutional convention for the explicitly limited
purpose of amending, and hopefully reforming, the judicial, educa-
tion, and amending articles of the state constitution.' 3 There would
be undeniable political benefits for legislators who act to put to the
voters the question of convening a limited convention. The delegates
specially chosen to develop reforms in these properly limited areas
will be free to craft and submit comprehensive and effective amend-
atory proposals to the people who elected them. By the same token,
the legislature, by proposing a limited convention call, removes itself
from political retribution for individual positions on these long-
standing, divisive, and controversial issues, while maintaining its in-
stitutional and political interests through fellow partisans at the
Convention.
I.
The United States Constitution establishes the institutions and
structure of governance and defines the intended political and social
12. See generally supra note 8 (citing support for the notion that state courts have the power to
participate in the "new judicial federalism").
13. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, arts. VI, X, XIV.
1994]
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contract 14 within a relatively spare document. State constitutions, 15
14. "[Flundamental laws [constitutions] are expressions of the sovereign will in relation to the
structure of the government, the extent and distribution of its powers, the modes and principles of
its operation, and the apparatus of checks and balances proper to insure its integrity and contin-
ued existence." JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR His-
TORY. POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 84 (Chicago, Calaghan & Co. 1887) [hereinafter
JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS]. There have also been many other thoughtful charac-
terizations of constitutions over the years. E.g., Gordon V. Levine, The Constitutional Initiative
and the Structure and Procedures of the General Assembly, 11 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC.
387, 389 n.10 (1978) (citing State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689, 694 (Mo. 1910));
Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Win-
ter 1982, at 27, 32 [hereinafter Lutz, Purposes]. James Madison believed that constitutions could
be defined as embodying values that "counteract the impulses of interest and passion." Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in II THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295, 298-99 (U. Va. Press 1977). Constitutions embody such values because they are
"the outcome of a process of deliberation meant to identify matters of fundamental importance to
the people and to place those matters in a constitution specifically to protect them from the quo-
tidian predations of pluralistic power struggles." James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 821 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Dis-
course]. One scholar has noted:
State constitutions [perhaps even more so than the federal document] are documents
of aspiration as well as of government. They reflect historic and contemporary debates
over great issues. They allow the people to articulate and refine a theory of self-gov-
ernment, to decide what values they hold most dear, to fashion protection for individ-
ual rights,. and, in the final analysis, to act responsibly for themselves and their
posterity.
A. E. "Dick" Howard, Introduction: A Frequent Recurrence To Fundamental Principles, in DE-
VELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW XXiii (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) [hereinafter
Howard, Introduction].
15. State constitutions are often discussed collectively as they do not really differ significantly
from one another. See Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 941 (1988) [hereinafter Grad, Function and Form] (stating that an
examination of the fifty state constitutions alone would almost convince one that the states are
fungible when, of course, they are not). This basic similarity has always been present; the original
state constitutions simply summarized the political ideas which then prevailed. See generally
WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1-3 (1910) [here-
inafter DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT] (discussing the first state constitutional conventions as
embodying the framers' political institutions); see also ALLAN NEVINS. THE AMERICAN STATES
DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 1775-1789 (1924); David Fellman, What Should a State
Constitution Contain?, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 137 (W.
Brooke Graves ed., 1960); William C. Morey, The First State Constitutions, in 4 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SoC. SCI. 201, 201 (1893); W.C. Webster, A Comparative Study of the State
Constitutions of the American Revolution, in 9 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. Soi. 380, 389
(1894). Nevertheless, in political science literature there are occasional attempts to distinguish or
categorize state constitutions, for example, into six "constitutional patterns": (1) commonwealth;
(2) commercial republic; (3) Southern contractual; (4) civil code; (5) frame of government; and
(6) managerial. Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions,
12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1982, at 11, 18-22 [hereinafter Elazar, State Constitutions];
see also JAMES Q. DEALEY. GROWTH OF AMERICA'S STATE CONSTITUTIONS, FROM 1776 TO THE
END OF THE YEAR 1914, 118-19 (1915) (explaining that the state constitutions which existed in
1915 represent four distinct periods of political development). Such distinctions are rooted in the
early settlers' differing conceptions of constitutionalism, and in "differences among the types and
goals of pioneers who first settled the New World." Elazar, State Constitutions, supra, at 18-20.
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on the other hand - at least since the early to mid-nineteenth cen-
tury - have tended to be quite lengthy and much more detailed.
They include substantially more areas of concern than the federal
document. 6 There is a greater elaboration on the structure, pur-
poses, operation, and financing of state and local government; often
exhaustive descriptions of the power and duties of public entities,
agencies, and officials; and, usually, a broad, expanded, state-specific
expression of individual rights.
The greater length and detail of these state documents result
from one of the most distinctive characteristics of state constitutions
- they are considerably easier to amend or revise than the federal
constitution and are therefore amended quite often.'" Accordingly,
As will become pertinent below, "commercial republican" constitutions prevailed in the middle
states like Illinois. Such constitutions became quite lengthy because they were built on "a series of
compromises required by the conflict of ethnic and commercial interests and ideals created by the
flow of various streams of migrants into their territories, and the early development of commercial
cities." Id.
16. There are at least three unavoidable and legitimate reasons - none of which are directly
pertinent to this discussion - why state constitutions are relatively longer than the federal docu-
ment: (1) these documents must spend some time discussing local and county government; (2)
the.re are numerous areas of local public concern to which these documents must respond as part
of the Tenth Amendment residuary power (e.g., the ordinary mechanics of voting); and (3) it has
always been essentially up to state constitutions to describe and exalt a "way of life." Lutz, Pur-
poses, supra note 14, at 41; see also Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 818-19. Still,
the constitutions framed between 1861 and 1886 were about three times as long as those written
during the Revolutionary period. John F. Jameson, Introduction to the Constitutional and Politi-
cal History of Individual States, in MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND LAND TENURE 14 (H.B. Ad-
ams ed.) (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 1886). This was apparently:
[D]ue to a desire to include in the constitution a mention of everything from the name
of God, often dragged in an inappropriate and even silly manner, down to barbed
fence wire, city alley-ways, and historic paintings in state houses. [This tendency to-
ward "comprehensiveness"] is one of the most striking facts in the history of Ameri-
can constitutions and [was thought to be] most deplorable. For when we introduce
minor details into such an instrument, we [necessitate frequent amendments and
eventually] impair the reverence with which constitutions ought to be regarded [and
introduce] undesirable instability.
Id.; see also DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 249 (supporting the proposition
that constitutions resemble legislative codes); Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 818-19
(explaining that state constitutions often contain detailed or lengthy provisions about concerns
which are handled by the legislature at the federal level and are not found in the U.S. Constitu-
tion); Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legisla-
tive Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1473, 1510 (1987)
(noting that many "state constitutions are almost indistinguishable from statutory codes in their
length, scope and subject matter").
17. By 1987, there had been over 230 state constitutional conventions in the United States.
May, supra note 11, at 164. In addition, "A tally of all amendments to state constitutions cur-
rently in force [yielded] a total of 8,279 submitted to the voters in forty-nine states, 5,083 ap-
proved by the voters in forty-nine states, and 5,198 adopted in the fifty states." Id. at 162.
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state constitutions have been expanded over the years by the addi-
tion of numerous popular and legislative amendments resulting from
transient political or social concerns arising at one time or another
in a state's history.18 The resulting prolixity reflects several impor-
tant political advantages gained from easily amended state constitu-
tions. One valuable benefit is that states may act as "local laborato-
ries" in the federal system of government. State constitutions have
always expressed regional ideals in a creative way, facilitated exper-
imentation in government, and provided unique views of the social
contract or innovative solutions to local problems." Local needs, as-
pirations, and official responses to historical or economic dilemmas
18. For this reason, almost all state constitutions contain extraordinary amounts of detail which
seem absurd or superfluous. W. Brooke Graves, Use of the Amending Procedure, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 140-46 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960); see
Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 16 (citing numerous examples from throughout
history); Colantuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1510 (providing examples which include provi-
sions for free rail transport, requiring the teaching of home economics in public schools, and defin-
ing the "durable hard surface" required of those constructing a public street); see also ARIZ.
CONST. art. XXVI, §1 (enumerating the kinds of documents real estate brokers can sign); CAL.
CONST. art. 13, § 10 (describing the way taxes are to be assessed on golf courses); ORE. CONST.
art. IX, § 8 (regulating the purchase of stationery used in state offices); TEX CONST. art. 16, § 16
(providing for "unmanned teller machines"). The New York Constitution specifies the width of
ski trails in the Adirondack State Park (N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1), and because of problems
inherited from the early Dutch settlements, it also regulates feudal land tenure.
19. In the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
had earlier referred to "social experiments ... in the insulated chambers afforded by the several
States .... " Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "incorpora-
tion" under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause "must be tempered to allow states
more elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems"). Justice Lewis Powell has argued that
the Brandeis tradition in economic and social reform might even bring about "valuable innova-
tion" in criminal procedure. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972); see also A. E.
"Dick" Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA.
L REV. 873, 940 (1976) [hereinafter Howard, Burger Court] (discussing Justice Brandeis's notion
of experimentation within the states). This is because:
[The] experimental function [that federalism allows and encourages in the states]
need not be confined to state legislatures or executive branches. State courts also
could assist each other in the development of state constitutional law just as in the
past they have experimented and learned from each other in common law.
Dennis NettikSimmons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 261, 281-82 (1985); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions:
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42 (1985) [hereinafter
Abrahamson, Criminal Law] (discussing the application of the "Brandeis laboratory metaphor");
Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for An Anchor in a Rough Sea,
61 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 431, 434 n.17 (1987) (noting that state courts have been recognized as
laboratories for "experimentation").
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(even those dilemmas common to other states) will differ among sis-
ter states or from those of the nation. Because of the potentially
useful influence of such experiments on other states and on the na-
tion, state-specific experimental provisions in state constitutions are
valuable to our federal system of government.2 0
Another reason for lengthy state constitutions is that citizens uni-
versally have come to develop an intense, but usually well-deserved,
mistrust of state legislatures, bodies which control many of the de-
tails of their everyday lives. There are substantial prejudices against
executive power as well. Popular attitudes of this sort developed
quite early, resulting from both colonial and nineteenth-century
abuses.2 Fortunately, easily-amended state constitutions tradition-
20. State constitutions strengthen federalism when states "articulate, and live by, standards
that suit their different needs." Colantuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1474 (citing Hans A.
Linde, E. Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 193-200
(1984) [hereinafter Linde, E. Pluribus]). Local experimentation with the social compact is justi-
fied because:
[T]here exists a wide range of issues in which the dominant interests in any state can
act as if they had statewide consensus behind them. These include some substantive
issues in which the welfare or interests of the bulk of a state's citizenry are clearly
involved ... , certain fundamental procedural issues that are important because they
concern the maintenance of the state itself..., and at least a few issues which, while
not necessarily reflecting a "state" interest as such, do reflect the opinions of a solid
majority of the state's citizens [e.g., anti-government prejudice in the West] ....
[Moreover, there are] a wide variety of ways in which each state, as a reasonably
autonomous civil society, can capitalize on its potential for internal unity . . . . [The]
extent to which a state possesses internal unity [may vary] from issue to issue ....
[Nevertheless, the] particular issues that unite the states internally are deeply rooted
in their respective geographic and historical settings [even] when the meaning of
those patterns [of common traditions needs and interests] is not readily understood by
the state's citizenry.
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 10-11, 12, 21 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM]. But see generally Gardner, Failed Dis-
course, supra note 14 (arguing that there is a general similarity in "values" held by citizens in all
states in the modern era). It is also unclear whether state by state diversity will turn out to be an
asset in the former Soviet Union.
21. The early state constitutions "were short . . . [but] instituted annual elections and other
mechanisms for avoiding the abuse of governmental authority and ensuring responsiveness to pop-
ular sentiments." G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Porter, Introduction. State Constitutionalism
and State Constitutional Law, 17 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Tarr
& Porter, Introduction] (citing DONALD S. LUTZ. POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL:
WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980) [hereinafter LUTZ, POPU-
LAR CONSENT]). Most of the growth of provisions limiting the powers of government occurred
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Id.; see also ELLIS P. OBERHOLTZER, THE REF-
ERENDUM IN AMERICA 78-98 (1912); W. Brooke Graves et al., Forward to MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION v-vi (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The
Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637, 659 n.126 (1980). The
cause of this growth was primarily distrust of the increasing exercise of legislative favoritism
through special legislation, a distrust aggravated by the early economic crash of 1837. See, e.g.,
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ally have been available to limit the otherwise plenary power of
states to make laws and govern themselves.2" Drafters and revisers
of state constitutions, therefore, have increasingly tended to supply
specific limitations on governmental power in order to better articu-
late the "framers' " intent and guide judicial review when assertions
of official power are challenged.23
Of course, while all this state constitutional amending has great
political value, at the same time, the ensuing prolixity has important
ramifications for effective governance. First, state officials cannot
govern flexibly in response to modern circumstances under an old
G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J.
841, 860-61 (1991) (discussing constitutional limits on legislative grants of special privileges and
immunities). This was the experience in Illinois as well. See People v. Meech, 101 Ill. 200, 209
(1881) (referring to the "great wrongs, oppression, and the most disastrous results of special legis-
lation that had obtained under the Constitution of 1848, and the fact that such legislation con-
ferred special privileges and exemptions on the few to the injury of the many"); see generally
JAMES W. HURST. THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW-MAKERS (1950) (noting periods
of distrust of and loss of legitimacy in both the state legislatures and Congress). This abuse in
Illinois led to a constitutional prohibition on the power of the legislature to enact such special laws
upon a long "laundry list" of twenty-two classes of subjects. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22
(amended 1970).
22. Such limitation is unnecessary with regard to the federal Constitution because, by contrast,
it is a grant of specifically enumerated powers upon which all presumably limited exercises of
federal power are to be based. THOMAS M. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMI-
TATIONS 173 (1868); JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 86-88; Howard,
Introduction, supra note 14, at 935. As James Madison wrote:
[Tjhe powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite. . . . The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.
Eugene L. Shapiro, State Constitutional Doctrine and the Criminal Process, 16 SETON HALL L.
REV. 630, 644-46 (1986) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 290 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed.,
1900)); see also COOLEY, supra, at 87, 173-77 (explaining that state governments possess "all the
general powers of legislation"); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes. 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 169, 178-79 (1983) [hereinafter Williams, Processes] (contrasting state consti-
tutions, as documents of limitation, with the federal Constitution as a grant of specific power).
23. This is necessary because state judges (and subsequent legislatures) are inclined to follow a
strict construction of most provisions limiting the operation of state government. ELMER E.
CORNWELL, JR., ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION
PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES 8 (1974) [hereinafter CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION]. Con-
sequently, "There has been far less interpretative constitutional development at the state than at
the national level. [Judicial] interpretation has been less important [in facilitating government on
the state level] than the more formal processes of amendment and revision." Id. But see Michael
Kammen, Introduction to THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY xx (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) ("Perhaps [this] only tells us that achieving a national
consensus for [constitutional] change in a large and diverse society is much more difficult than
achieving a statewide consensus for change.").
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constitution that contains numerous restrictions, manifestations of
long forgotten political compromises,24 excessively detailed treat-
ment of local matters, and hortatory statements of principle.15 State
constitutions tend to accumulate so many experimental proposals,
obsolescent concerns, and superfluous restrictions on official action
that frequent changes are necessary to adjust to new conditions.2 6
24. See, e.g., Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 19-21 (commenting on the nature
of the political compromises that have resulted in lengthy and detailed Midwestern state
constitutions).
25. See generally Fellman, supra note 15, at 144-50 (discussing in detail the causes of prolixity
and the dangers of obsolescent or archaic language). After surveying the New York Constitution
in 1958 for purposes of simplification, a committee of legal scholars reported that they were "liter-
ally amazed by the extent to which [it] contain[ed] hollow phrases, defective provisions, and
creaking antiquated policies." INTER-LAW SCHOOL COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF
SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE NEW YORK SPECIAL LEGISLATURE 330 (1958);
see also Kimbrough Owen, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana, 8 LA. L. REV. 1, 2
(1947) ("The document will trip, entangle, infuriate and then exhaust [a lay student]."). Exces-
sive constitutional detail leads to ineffectiveness in government. Fellman, supra note 15, at 145
(citing Application of Central Airlines, 185 P.2d 919 (Olka. 1947)). In Central Airlines, the
Oklahoma Constitution gave the state Corporation Commission jurisdiction to regulate "all trans-
portation and transmission companies." The provision defined those terms as railroads, steamship
lines, express companies, and the like. But air transport did not exist when the enumeration in the
statute was written, so the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Commission had no jurisdic-
tion over air transport. Central Airlines, 185 P.2d at 924. "From a strictly legalistic point of view,
the holding that an enumeration excludes all things not in the list was not a bad decision, but
from a policy point of view it makes no sense at all." Fellman, supra note 15, at 145.
The detailed language of most state constitutions leaves far less room for change, thus interpre-
tation becomes secondary to the more formal processes of revision. Ernest R. Bartley, Methods of
Constitutional Change, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 23 (W. Brooke
Graves ed., 1960). Still, there is much potential for constitutional growth through interpretation,
even if not with regard to individual rights. An example is state financial borrowing which is
clearly and closely restricted in most state constitutions - even though legislatures, with the
concurrence of the executive and the courts, seem to be able to find through subterfuge all sorts of
ways of "borrowing" anyway. Id. at 23. Illinois has followed this same pattern in areas such as
taxation. When the property tax was found to be inadequate in terms of financing state and local
government during the Depression, the Illinois legislature tried a graduated income tax. In Bach-
rach v. Nelson, 182 N.E. 909 (1932), however, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the tax
because income was property and subject to uniformity provisions in the constitution. Moreover,
the court said that the constitution did not permit other kinds of taxes; the legislature could only
add to the list of occupations, franchises, and privileges designated as taxable. This resulted, ulti-
mately, in a retailers occupation tax, which was really a legal fiction. In fact, it was a sales tax on
buyers or on transactions, rather than a tax on retailers. This fiction was approved, more or less,
by the state supreme court. See Winter v. Barrett, 186 N.E. 113 (1933). Other public officials
raised no objection. "Adlai Stevenson believed that the difficulty of amending the Illinois constitu-
tion before 1950 made evasion of the law a practical necessity in order to avoid 'anachronisms' of
the Illinois constitution." SUBER, supra note 9, at 17 (citing Robert L. Farwell, Gateway to
What?, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 274, 278 (1961)). Thus it seems that Illinois courts feel justified in
supporting attempts by the other branches to govern "creatively."
26. The United States Constitution is also afflicted with language expressing obsolescent con-
cerns. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I (containing provisions regarding letters of marque
and reprisal).
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Second, while many legislatively initiated amendments might
have been necessary to reverse the deleterious effects of earlier judi-
cial opinions interpreting constitutional or statutory provisions2 -
or to respond to the need for fundamental structural change to pro-
mote effective government - most constitutional measures could,
and arguably should, have been enacted as "ordinary" legislation.
These measures do not become ordinary law because legislators be-
come overly cautious or "defensive" as a result of the numerous con-
stitutional restrictions on their power. They become convinced that
they need somehow to create greater permanence for their work."8
They seek, in other words, to use "constitutional legislation ' 2 9 to
prevent either the state high court or future political majorities from
meddling with whatever policies, principles, or programs the present
27. Many provisions in modern state constitutions were adopted to overcome earlier judicial
interpretations prohibiting the exercise of power. These provisions, which are essentially grants of
power, may also be used to remove constitutional ambiguity or to ratify and protect pre-existing
practices. Williams, Processes, supra note 22, at 178-79, 195-96; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 108 (1973) (elaborating on the states' use of constitutional
provisions to reach legislative goals through anti-legislation); Note, Developments, supra note 4,
at 1355-56 (discussing the state courts' role in interpreting state constitutions as often open-ended
and controversial). See generally W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, Constitutional Change in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 168-74 (1979) (explaining the process of
constitutional change in state governments).
28. Whereas Congress often turns potential constitutional amendments into statutes (for exam-
ple, the Sherman Antitrust Act arid the Civil Rights Act of 1964), state legislatures frequently
constitutionalize legislative policy. May, supra note II, at 167 (citing Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., The
American Constitutional Tradition: Its Impact and Development, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION AS AN AMENDING DEVICE 57 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter Cornwell,
Constitutional Tradition]). The constitutional amendment process is thought to offer both the
public and the legislature opportunities for various kinds and magnitudes of changes in social
policy not possible through other channels. Williams, Processes, supra note 22, at 175 (inquiring
whether state constitutions are "instruments of law making through which interest groups . . .
seek the grand prize of law making, striving to achieve constitutional status for the policies they
advocate"). This "legislation" in constitutional form is thought to be largely insulated by the
greater burden presented by the constitutional amendment process; any amendatory procedure
would seem more involved and difficult than obtaining a legislative majority to pass an act of
repeal. Yet the texts of most state constitutions are much more volatile - certainly more so than
their federal counterpart - because they are extraordinarily subject to change from a number of
different sources. These sources include legislative proposals, referenda, initiative amendments,
and the relatively numerous proposals submitted to state voters by frequent constitutional conven-
tions. Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1353-54. Consequently, amendment of most state
constitutions can be initiated easily and consummated by simple majority vote in a referendum,
and state constitutions are "amended [if not quite as often as statutory provisions, than at least] at
a furious rate." Williams, Processes. supra note 22, at 176.
29. Amendments proposed as instruments through which interest groups or discrete segments of
society seek constitutional stature for the policies they advocate when ordinary legislation would
otherwise be adequate. Williams, Processes, supra note 22, at 196.
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majority finds "inspired," 30 regardless of whether political opposi-
tion or constitutional challenges would ever materialize were these
measures instead promulgated through ordinary legislation. They
also proceed despite the fundamental harm the resulting constitu-
tional prolixity might cause.3 In this fashion, each succeeding gen-
eration of powerful factions attempts to preserve for posterity its
views and policies."2 Thus legislators, perhaps even more than draft-
30. For some reason, members of constitutional conventions, like legislators, occasionally as-
sume they are wiser and more righteous than members of future conventions or legislatures. Thus,
a member of the 1870 Illinois convention declared:
It is assumed that when we depart from this hall all the virtue and all the wisdom of
the state will have departed with us. We have assumed that we alone are honest and
wise enough to determine for the people the ordinary, and in many instances even the
most trivial, questions affecting the public welfare; as if the mass of people of the
state of Illinois were not as competent hereafter to select others that are honest and
capable as they were to select us.
Fellman, supra note 15, at 144 (quoting WALTER F. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT 96 (2d ed. 1928)
[hereinafter DODD. STATE GOVERNMENT]).
31. Excessive constitutional "legislating" undermines the notion of a "higher" law and judicial
review itself. Even as early as the 1760s and 1770s, colonial leaders argued that:
[V]arious parliamentary enactments were void because they violated higher principles
of the British Constitution reflected in revered texts like Magna Charta, and in funda-
mental unwritten and common law traditions. These colonists came to define the Brit-
ish Constitution not merely as the structure and arrangement for governmental insti-
tutions, but also as a set of substantive legal principles limiting the legitimate exercise
of government power.
Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432 (1987) (citing BER-
NARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-98 (1967);
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978)). Thus:
Our whole political system rests on the distinction between constitutional and other
laws. The former are the solemn principles laid down by the people in its ultimate
sovereignty; the latter are regulations made by its representatives within the limits of
their authority, and the courts can hold unauthorized and void any act which exceeds
those limits. The courts can do this because they are maintaining against the legisla-
ture the fundamental principles which the people themselves have determined to sup-
port, and they can do it only so long as the people feel that the constitution is some-
thing more sacred and enduring than ordinary laws, something that derives its force
from a higher authority.
DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 253.
32. "Policy issue" amendments, which could be dealt with by ordinary legislation - or, for
that matter, by statewide non-binding referenda (see, e.g., 10 ICLS §§ 5/28-9 to -13 (1993) -
"are almost equal to, and may even outnumber, amendments concerned with subject matter usu-
ally associated with constitutions - structures, powers, processes, and bills of rights." May, supra
note 11, at 165 (citing Cornwell, Constitutional Tradition, supra note 28, at 26-28). Of course,
constitutional legislation is often enacted for sound reasons as well. Some provisions advanced by
legislators simply record (rather than avoid or redirect) change in social policy thought significant
enough to be treated as permanent. Also, merely proposing amendments sometimes provides a
forum for the popular resolution of major local social conflicts; for example, income taxation,
school busing, environmental protection, and official corruption. However, by the same token, ac-
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ers and revisers of state constitutions, are responsible for the enor-
mous growth in the substance of state charters.
The commonness of constitutional legislation has had an impor-
tant impact on judicial interpretation of state constitutions. For ex-
ample, much of this amending - whether through legislative ac-
tion, conventions, or revision committees - produces innovative,
state-specific provisions.33 These provisions are an invitation to state
judges to engage in independent, expansive interpretation in order to
promote and assist local governmental experimentation. a4 Also, by
ceptance of this practice of regularly submitting amendatory constitutional measures allows legis-
lators to occasionally act irresponsibly: to relegate policy-making to the people directly, taking no
personal responsibility for the bills they draft:
(After all, in] proposing amendments legislatures do not have upon them the responsi-
bility for final action, and if a proposed amendment is adopted and works badly the
blame can easily be shifted to the people who approved it by their votes. Then, too,
ordinary legislation is subject to the check of executive disapproval, which does not
apply to the proposal of amendments.
DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 273-74; see also May, supra note 11, at 165
(discussing the legislative character of state constitutional politics). The most recent example in
Illinois was the measure on the November, 1992 ballot to amend the Illinois education article in
an effort to reform public school financing. Rather than holding hearings to determine and enact
the appropriate broad scheme of state revenue production that school financing reform required, a
proposed constitutional amendment to, inter alia, require greater state financing (as opposed to
continuing oppressive local property tax support) was placed on the ballot. This was done without
any prior legislative effort to resolve the very real problem that increased income tax might exceed
any possible reductions in local property tax. If the amendment had succeeded, the legislature
could have blamed the resulting higher taxes on the voters; since the measure failed, the legisla-
ture can still blame the inequitably financed schools on the voters. By proposing a constitutional
amendment, legislators avoid the politically risky exposure flowing from hearings and debates on
the issues. See R. Bruce Dodd, Tragic Flaws Mar the School-aid Amendment, CHI. ENTERPRISE,
September 1992, at 7; Michael D. Klamens, To Fund or Not to Fund Schools, ILLINOIS ISSUES,
June 1992, at 8-9; James D. Nowlan, Why School Amendment Shouldn't Be Approved, CRAIN'S
CHI. Bus., Sept. 7, 1992, at 13.
33. See Walter F. Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 635, 637 (1920) [hereinafter Dodd, Constitutional Construction]; Frank E. Horack Jr., Co-
operative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 382, 384 (1950); Note,
State Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. REV. 996, 998-1000
(1968) [hereinafter, Note, Constitutional Change]. But see CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVI-
SION. supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the state amendment process).
34. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of state consti-
tutions). This may also be the case with regard to the interpretation of innovative individual rights
provisions. Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1348-51. The unique role and responsibilities of
federal constitutional law compel "a circumspect and conservative approach to federal constitu-
tional issues. Federal jurisprudence presses toward a reliance on bright lines." Id. As one scholar
has stated:
Federal courts are apt to be selective in the targets they pick, and restrained in the
constitutional limits they prescribe, because they strive to preserve their credibility for
the defense of the most important guarantees and principles. . . . State courts are
largely free of these restraints and hence can approach state constitutional interpreta-
tion more innovatively, even experimentally. Because they are concerned with smaller,
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covering a broader range of concerns with what is often a code-like
comprehensiveness and specificity, state constitutions confuse the
sense of distinction generally clear in the federal courts between
"straight-forward" statutory construction and "open-ended" consti-
tutional interpretation.3 5 (In fact, unlike interpretation at the fed-
eral level, state constitutional interpretation actually may be tanta-
mount to statutory construction.)36 Independent and expansive
interpretation at the state level therefore seems more appropriate
and defensible: it is less controversial and less often criticized as
being "open-ended" than at the federal level. Thus, the practice of
enacting constitutional legislation would seem to arguably create a
receptive legal environment for judicial activism.
Of course, state courts are ordinarily reluctant to imply limita-
occasionally more homogeneous jurisdictions, state courts can develop principles more
closely attuned to local circumstances. . . . [Sitate courts can more comfortably risk
taking stands that may be perceived to be more political or intrusive on majority rule.
Id.
35. Id. at 1355. See, e.g., May, supra note 11, at 166. May states:
[S]tate constitutions in several key respects resemble statutory law more than ...
[the] aloof, unchanging federal Constitution. Both their susceptibility to revision in
response to popular opinion and the wealth of content they encompass encourage a
view of state constitutions as integral parts of the democratic state governmental
processes, not as external restraints placed on them.
Id. (citation omitted); see also infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the tension be-
tween notions of statutory construction and constitutional interpretation and how this tension re-
lates to state constitutional provisions).
36. Judicial interpretation of state constitutional provisions has become somewhat more confus-
ing and complex because of continuing uncertainty about the relationship between statutory con-
struction and constitutional interpretation. For example, as a result of the doctrine of "negative
implication," many grants of authority to state legislatures become limitations on legislative power
through judicial interpretation. Williams, Processes, supra note 22, at 201-02. Also, because of
the increasing use of the constitution as an alternate vehicle for law-making, there is occasionally
an unjustified but almost de facto presumption that constitutional provisions are self-executing,
when enforcement of such provisions could (and, it often turns out, should) have been relegated to
statutory law. Id. at 175, 177, 199. Professor Gardner writes:
Perhaps state constitutional provisions might be viewed, like statutes, as outcomes of
frankly pluralistic power struggles, but concerning subjects that the polity wants for
some reason to remove from the political agenda for some period of time. Indeed, this
seems to be the direction in which state supreme courts have moved; they are gener-
ally unwilling to invoke the grandest interpretive strategies of constitutionalism, but
are nevertheless forced to treat constitutional positive law as somehow different from
ordinary statutory law.
Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 833. State judges may be intuitively correct.
"[T]here may turn out to be only differences of degree rather then of kind between maxims of
statutory construction and rules of [state] constitutional interpretation." Note, Developments,
supra note 4, at 1355; see also May, supra note 11, at 166 (contrasting the state constitutions
with the federal Constitution); Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1353 (noting that state con-
stitutions resemble statutory law more than the federal Constitution).
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tions on otherwise plenary-powered state governments. 7 This may
work against expansive judicial construction of state constitutions -
including state bills of rights provisions. 8 Nevertheless, a number of
factors relating to the process by which state constitutions are
amended, and to federalism generally, encourage activism in state
high courts. The process of state constitutional amendment, for ex-
ample, includes: (1) the near universal requirement that measures to
revise or amend a constitution be subjected to popular ratification;
and (2) frequent amendments, which guarantee the availability of
relatively recent, complete, and accessible legislative histories re-
garding most state revision or amendment efforts.
The right of informed popular consent to constitutional change is
certainly one of the important residual bases of "popular sover-
eignty"; this near universal requirement among the states supports
the legitimacy of state judicial activism and thus encourages it in
several ways. First, popular ratification makes it far more difficult
than it would be in the federal courts (where the Constitution was
not brought into effect by popular referendum) to justify judicial
interpretation based on post hoc conclusions about the "intent" of
the framers. Instead:
[T]he "common and ordinary meaning" in which the constitution's words
37. This is because when legislation is challenged as unconstitutional, the issue is not whether
the measure is authorized by the state constitution (as is the case with federal legislation), but
whether it is prohibited by the language of that document. In other words, an important product
of federal constitutional interpretation has been the notion of implied power; but implied limita-
tions are the important judicial determinations regarding state constitutions. See, e.g., Williams,
Processes, supra note 22, at 178 (noting that state constitutions are documents of limitation
whereas the federal Constitution provides grants of specific power) (citing W. F. Dodd, Implied
Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137, 160 (1919) [hereinaf-
ter Dodd, Implied Powers]). This distinction has advantages for state citizens. For example, in the
absence of explicit limiting language, state courts would presumably be empowered to hear cases,
not limited by self-imposed rules of justiciability as are federal courts. Gardner, Failed Discourse,
supra note 14, at 809. Thus, many state courts have more relaxed rules of standing. Id. (citing
Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1269,
1298-1303 (1985)); NettickSimmons, supra note 19, at 285. In any event, in the absence of clear
constitutional language speaking to a challenged exercise of state power, state courts are reluctant
to imply limitations which would impede the presumptively rational conduct of a state government
with plenary power. Courts are obviously far more willing to restrain the federal government
which is specifically limited to certain enumerated powers. Williams, Processes, supra note 22, at
201-02.
38. Because of Judge Cooley's view that state constitutions are limitations on plenary legisla-
tive power, "a state court's interpretation of its bill of rights does not represent a substantial
departure from its normal constitutional function." Shapiro, supra note 22, at 646. State judiciar-
ies generally construe the documents so strictly that "change and growth by interpretation" is
difficult and rare. Bartley, supra note 25, at 23.
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must be construed is the meaning they would have had to the vast majority
of ordinary voters [who ratified the provision] rather than to a group of
highly educated lawyers and legislators, as may sometimes be considered
when construing statutes. 89
Further, because it is fully informed consent - in the sense that the
voters will tend to be familiar with contemporary public debate on
preconvention problems and have access to voter pamphlets and
news reports of convention debates - state judges are better able to
discern the voters' intent when ambiguous situations call for the use
of extrinsic interpretative materials.40 Finally, state constitutions
tend to reflect current, and thus better understood, social mores and
values because they are revised, amended, and ratified relatively fre-
quently. That is, the "normative values expressed [in state constitu-
tional provisions] have undergone continuing review by both the
people and their elected representatives" and are framed in terms
that possess a particular meaning for the modern intellect. 41 Conse-
39. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Consti-
tutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491, 510 (1984)
[hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity] (emphasis added); see also Charles R. Adrian, Trends
in State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 311 (1968) (noting the influence of the populace on
state constitutional provisions); Shapiro, supra note 22, at 652-53 (explaining methods for ascer-
taining the intention of the voters). Scholars have noted that:
[T]o shed light on ambiguous constitutional language, [a state court must] look to the
original intent and understanding underlying the constitutional provision. Because a
state constitution is the expression of the people's will, a state court must be con-
cerned primarily with the intent of those who ratified the document. Evidence of the
drafters' intent becomes important because, in many cases, it is the only evidence we
have of the people's understanding . . . [of the] social and political setting in which
the provision originated or when the change took place.
Utter & Pitler, supra note 8, at 657.
40. Utter & Pitler, supra note 8, at 657 (citing Linde, E. Plubius, supra note 20, at 183). In
addition to what the framers would have thought a desirable result as reflected in the convention
debates or reports, there are other important factors to be considered, including: (1) the language
of the provision; (2) the provision's place in the structure of the document; (3) the common law
codified in or rejected by an amendment; (4) relevant case law contemporaneous to the enactment;
and (5) the unique traditions, history, character, and other surrounding circumstances "that can
be discerned through the exercise of ordinary common sense." Titone, supra note 19, at 463 (cita-
tions omitted). These resources, primarily "[m]inutes of the convention's proceedings, contempo-
raneous news accounts, summaries included on the ballots, and the antecedent circumstances giv-
ing rise to a constitutional change[, are] all . . . examined in ascertaining the intention of the
voters." Shapiro, supra note 22, at 652-53 (citing L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Consti-
tutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1978)); see also Utter, Freedom
& Diversity, supra note 39, at 511-13, 516-18 (discussing the importance of ascertaining the
intent of the people involved in adopting specific provisions); Williams, Processes, supra note 22,
at 197-98 (noting the difficulties present in attempts to ascertain the intent of the people).
41. Titone, supra note 19, at 462 (citing Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow.
Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353, 387
(1987) [hereinafter Williams, Supreme Court's Shadow]).
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quently, the "non-interpretavist" argument which predominates at
the federal level - that provisions must be construed in terms of
the "spirit" of the text rather than the "divined" intent of the Fram-
ers because the Framers' true intent cannot reliably be discerned -
loses much of its force when applied to more modern state docu-
ments.42 Even conservative state justices are encouraged toward ex-
pansive interpretation by this fact.
There is a second way in which popular ratification supports inde-
pendent judicial interpretation. The frequency of amendment means
that:
[Sitate citizens have a greater opportunity to . . . articulate new shared
ideals or individual rights [which] might justify greater use of broadly for-
mulated state provisions and of the discretion of state judiciaries in review-
ing the acts of government [because a] judicial construction of a broad con-
stitutional provision that was simply out of touch with the current ideals of
the state could be vetoed through the democratic process of constitutional
amendment.4 s
In fact, as Professor Eugene Rostow initially pointed out many
years ago, the very legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic
society rests in large part upon the continuing power of the electo-
rate to amend a constitution in order to revise judicial decisions in-
volving constitutional adjudications." This power vested in the peo-
42. Id. State courts should construe state constitutions by means of "interpretivism." See gener-
ally Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985) (argu-
ing that the current governmental structure hinders noninterpretive state court review); see also
Utter, Freedom & Diversity, supra note 39, at 524-25 (noting that judges should consider current
values and conditions when interpreting state constitutions). "Interpretivists argue that constitu-
tional decision-making must be based upon the original intent of the [framers] to ensure that the
will of the [people, as] reflected in the normative values expressed within the four corners of the
[document,] is implemented." Titone, supra note 19, at 432.
43. NettikSimmons, supra note 19, at 278-79. "[T]he art and technology of winning elections
are harnessed to changing state constitutions on a direct and regular basis. There is literally no
federal parallel to this kind of politics." May, supra note II, at 165; James M. Fischer, Ballot
Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 44-45 (1983). Since amendment votes usually focus on single issues, when
these issues are politically sensitive (e.g., capital punishment, school busing, or abortion) political
conflict and confrontation tend to become exacerbated in the state, contributing to a focused elec-
toral politics unknown at the federal level. May, supra note 11, at 166.
44. Fischer, supra note 43, at 88-89 n.225; May, supra note 11, at 170; Eugene V. Rostow,
The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 197-98 (1952); Robert F.
Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountabil-
ity: Is there a Crocodile in the Bathtub?. 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 34 (1989) [hereinafter Utter,
State Constitutional Law]; see also Grover Rees III, Constitutional Conventions and Constitu-
tional Arguments: Some Thoughts About Limits, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79, 82 (1982)
(stating that "[t]he amending process is a link, however tenuous, to the idea of government by
consent"). This relationship between judicial review and textual flexibility is more pronounced in
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pie has been "the most important electoral check on state court
interpretation."45 Thus, the requirement in almost every state con-
stitution for popular participation in the amendment or revision pro-
cess gives greater political legitimacy to judicial "activism" at the
state level because the constitutional text (and the state judiciary
itself) is subject to more direct democratic control than at the fed-
eral level.
Our system of federalism also encourages independent interpreta-
tion. Much "of the case for state courts' playing an active role in
developing an independent body of state constitutional law turns on
constitutional theory - the place of state constitutions and state
courts in the federal system."4 State court justices have different
the case of state constitutions. Although judicial review was not explicitly embodied in early state
constitutions, it attained formal recognition in several state cases between 1778 and 1787, many
years before its quiet introduction at the federal level. Albert L. Sturm, The Development of
American State Cdnstitutions, 12 PUBLIuS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1982, at 57, 62 [hereinafter
Sturm, American State Constitutions]. To illustrate this point, compare Holmes v. 'Walton (N.J.)
(1780); Trevett v. Weeden (R.I.) (1784) and Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787) with
U.S. v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52-53 (1851) (citing U.S. v. Yale Todd (Feb. 17, 1794));
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 409
(1792). This may well be attributable to the fact that the early state constitutions were "more
communitarian in orientation than the federal Constitution . . . [and placed] more emphasis on
direct, continuing consent of popular majorities." Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at
12 (citing Donald S. Lutz, The Theory of Consent in the Early State Constitutions, 9 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM, Spring 1979, at 11 [hereinafter Lutz, Theory of Consent]).
45. May, supra note 11, at 170-71, 177 (citing, for example, the recognition of this fact in
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Mass. 1975), where the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court essentially suggested that their instant death penalty decision should be overturned
by the voters if it was inconsistent with public opinion); Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra
note 44, at 35 (citing Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things First: Amendomania and State Bills of
Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223, 233 (1984)); see also Dorothy T. Beesley, The Georgia Bill of Rights:
Dead or Alive?, 34 EMORY L.J. 380 (1985). For additional discussion of specific examples of
ratification of independent state decision-making through concrete attempts at state constitutional
amendment, see Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 36-39.
46. Howard, Introduction, supra note 14, at xx. The federal and state court systems perform
different functions and have different roles and duties. Thus, for a number of reasons, the Su-
preme Court of the United States limits itself to providing only a minimum level of federal consti-
tutional rights. Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1348-49, 1358; Timothy R. Lohraff, Note,
United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitu-
tional Law, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 350-51 (1987). The Court does this because, first, as a
matter of federalism, the Court must consider the impact of its decisions (and those of the lower
federal courts) on state courts or legislatures which are entitled to freedom of action in developing
state law. Id. at 350-51 (citing William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, Individual Rights];
Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1025, 1042-43 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, State Court Comment]).
Second, the Supreme Court is restrained in its constitutional interpretation because it is re-
quired to fairly formulate "uniform national standards of conduct." Lohraff, supra, at 350-51
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authority, exercise that authority under different circumstances,4
and often bring more relevant personal backgrounds to the process
than do federal judges. 8 States, through their legislatures and
courts,4 9 serve as protective counterweights to federal power 50 by
(citing Utter, State Court Comment, supra, at 1043; Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1348-
49); Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577, 612 (1989).
Thus it tends to underenforce constitutional norms. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms. 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226-27 (1978) [herein-
after Sager, Fair Measure].
Third, Supreme Court jurisdiction is limited not only by the Constitution itself, but by federal
statutes and a constraining, self-imposed federal law of justiciability. Lohraff, supra, at 350-51
(citing Utter, State Court Comment, supra, at 1044; Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1348-
49). "State courts which reject Supreme Court decisions and developing state law do not threaten
the uniformity of interpretation of federal law because state courts relying on federal cases do not
create federal law." Lohraff, supra, at 351.
47. See Howard, Introduction, supra note 14, at 934-40 (describing the state judge's role in
making independent use of state constitutional law); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in
Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 403 (1987) [hereinafter Kaye, Dual Constitu-
tionalism] (noting that each state by its own constitution may limit its powers as wisdom sug-
gests); Linde, E. Pluribus, supra note 20, at 173, 181-83 (illustrating the difference between fed-
eral and state constitutional jurisprudence); Burt Neuborne, Forward: State Constitutions and the
Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893-901 (1989) [hereinafter Neuborne, Posi-
tive Rights] (noting that some of these different circumstances include the text of the state consti-
tution, other local circumstances, and the ease of the amendment process); Lawrence G. Sager,
Forward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 973-76 (1985) [hereinafter Sager, State Courts] (noting the diversity
among the states and the full exposure of state justices to local circumstances); Utter, Freedom &
Diversity, supra note 39, at 494-96 (discussing the difference between state and federal constitu-
tions); Williams, Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 41, at 355, 397-402 (noting: (1) the differ-
ent relative positions of the state and federal judiciaries in their respective systems; (2) the
stronger position of the state courts vis-A-vis the state legislature and executive branches; and (3)
the fact that state courts are closer to state affairs).
48. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century
of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REv. 39, 56 (1988) [hereinafter Kaye, State Constitutional
Law] ("State courts are generally closer to the public, to the legal institutions and environments
within the state, and to the public policy process. This both shapes their strategic judgments and
renders any erroneous assessments they may make more readily redressable by the People.").
49. The Supreme Court, on a number of occasions, has explicitly encouraged initiative and
experimentation under state constitutions. E.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1031 (1983); Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030, 1032 (1983); South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 567 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J.
dissenting); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489
(1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S.
551, 557 (1940).
50. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46 (James Madison). Of course, the balance historically
sometimes seems to favor the exercise of federal power, but that in no way diminishes the impor-
tance or influence of developing state constitutional law. Once our early, agrarian society became
a "national, high technology, industrialized society" after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment - and even more so after the "selective incorporation" of the federal Bill of Rights
into the due process clause, and the revolutionary use of the Equal Protection Clause in the 1950s
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acting as laboratories for experimentation. 5 While uniformity be-
tween federal and state criminal procedures may be desirable as a
matter of practical law enforcement, "[w]hen weighed against the
[state court's duty and] ability to protect fundamental constitutional
rights, the practical need for uniformity can seldom be a decisive
factor"52 in state constitutional interpretation. As a result, state
courts have a duty to develop their own higher constitutional stan-
dards to protect their citizens,53 regardless of whether state-specific
factors would support such divergence.5 Indeed, they are justified in
and 1960s - "power naturally shifted from the states to the federal government," including a
presumed superior power to enforce civil liberties. Utter, Freedom & Diversity, supra note 39, at
641-42 (citing John M. Wisdom, Forward: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063, 1078 (1984)); see also Phillip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court,
1963 Term - Forward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145-62 (1964) (noting that the Warren
Court worked an "egalitarian revolution"); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal
and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1985) [hereinafter Mosk, Liberal and Conserva-
tive] (detailing the rise in federal supremacy over state prerogatives). Given the increasing en-
forcement of the federal guarantees against state authority, state courts gave less and less serious
consideration to state constitutional protection of civil liberties despite their traditional role as the
primary protectors of individual rights. Utter, Freedom & Diversity, supra note 39, at 641-42
(citing Stanley Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY 212, 216 (B.
Schwartz ed., 1976) [hereinafter Mosk, State Courts]; Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inade-
quate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 KAN. L. REV. 305
(1985)). Even as early as 1910, the eminent scholar Walter F. Dodd had pronounced that:
[W]ith reference to the general guaranties of life, liberty and property, similar provi-
sions will usually be found in both the state and federal constitutions. These state
guaranties have, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, become mere sur-
plusage, except in so far as they retard uniform judicial action by being interpreted
more strictly by the state courts than similar federal provisions are interpreted by the
federal courts. The need of state power to declare laws invalid on state constitutional
grounds, as depriving of life, liberty, or property, or as depriving individuals of the
equal protection of the laws, has entirely disappeared.
DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 244-45 n.223.
51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the idea of states as laboratories for
experimentation).
52. Lohraff, supra note 46, at 350-51 (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561
(1986)).
53. State courts are within their "rights" in construing their state constitutions more broadly
than the federal Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Paul
G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and Purpose, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLI-
NOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3 (1970) [hereinafter Kauper, Nature and Purpose]; Sager,
State Courts, supra note 47, at 959; William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th Cen-
tury, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577, 593-96 (1971). But see Wilkes, supra note 45, at 232-35 (noting that
the modern role for state bills of rights seems to be reducing rather than expanding such rights).
54. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856-57 (N.J. 1987) (construing the state
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to preclude recognition of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon); State v. Hunt,
450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring) (noting that state courts should con-
strue their state constitutions as they deem appropriate, taking into account numerous factors
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engaging in independent interpretation55 even where the relevant
state constitutional wording is similar to the federal Constitution. 6
After all, independent interpretation of state documents serves no
less a traditional function than educating the United States Su-
preme Court on the acceptability' and practicality of expanding indi-
vidual rights."
including United States Supreme Court decisions); People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 558
(N.Y. 1986) (noting that the New York constitution imposes a more exacting standard than does
the federal Constitution for the issuance of search warrants authorizing seizure of allegedly ob-
scene material); see also Lohraff, supra note 46, at 351-52 (noting that state courts do not need to
explain divergences from federal law).
55. But see Tarr & Porter, Introduction, supra note 21, at 9. They write:
[The] more intensive [recent] scrutiny of state rulings [under the post Long analysis
of adequate and independent state grounds doctrine] raises serious questions about
whether state courts can develop constitutional principles without reliance on Wash-
ington and about what it means to interpret independently a state constitution in a
federal system in which federal and state courts constantly influence each other.
Id.
56. See, e.g., Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among the State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 732, 764-93 (1982); Sager, State Courts, supra note
47, at 975-76; Williams, Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 41; Note, Developments, supra
note 4, at 1356-57.
57. Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 45-46 (citing Project Report: Toward
An Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 290 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Project Report]). State courts have often been at the forefront in developing constitutional
analysis in a variety of areas affecting individual rights, analysis which was later adopted by the
Supreme Court. Through independent interpretation, state courts offer their insights on the devel-
opment of federal constitutional law both before and after the Supreme Court decides an issue,
and thus they aid in the development of that law. Id.; Utter, State Court Comment, supra note
46, at 1031-41. As Chief Justice Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals commented:
Development of federal law through experimentation within the states has a long tra-
dition. . . . The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this process [in] giving the ex-
clusionary rule national [application. Subsequently,] the Supreme Court reversed its
prior ruling on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges [after state judicial
experimentation. Three] Justices explicitly made known their interest in the issue, but
said they preferred to allow it to percolate further in the state laboratories, to gener-
ate solutions upon which the Supreme Court might rely.
Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism, supra note 47, at 425-26 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S.
961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., concurring)). As Professor Elazar writes:
[E]ven where it has appeared to act radically, in many of the cases involving the
apparent limitation of the states' powers [through the use of the Civil War Amend-
ments during the past thirty years], the Court's decisions have come only after three-
fifths of the states had individually adopted the same positions (at least in theory) on
their own initiative. Until recently at least, in no important cases except [perhaps]
those involving reapportionment have fewer than half the states been on the same side
as the Court. This unstated (and perhaps unperceived) "three-fifths rule" can be seen
as operative in the whole range of desegregation cases, in the Court's decision to disal-
low the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts, in the . . . requirement that
counsel be provided in all criminal cases, and in the prohibition of mandatory prayers
and Bible-reading in the schools, to name only a few of the "landmark" cases of [the
past 30 years]. It is possible to view these efforts to create more uniform standards as
292
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State courts are able to engage in experimental interpretation be-
cause the constraints on state judges are quite different from those
imposed on federal judges. The federal courts, guided by the Su-
preme Court, must consider - in addition to numerous other self-
imposed institutional and justiciability restraints - what impact
their decisions will have on federalism; 58 it would be illogical, how-
ever, for a state court to feel restrained by Supreme Court decisions
resting on concerns over the preservation of the federal system. 59
In addition, under state constitutions, most states' judges are ei-
ther elected to the bench or subject to retention elections.6" This
violations of the spirit of federalism that seeks to allow diversity to flourish within the
nation, but it is also possible to argue that this unstated three-fifths rule serves to
provide an opportunity for adjusting American legal ideas to changes induced by the
continuing frontier in a manner consonant with the perpetuation of a dual legal
system.
ELAZAR. AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 173-74; see also Fischer, supra note 43, at 88
(discussing the use of "ballot propositions" to give the state judiciary feedback on its decisions);
Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 47-48.
58. See NettikSimmons, supra note 19, at 280-81. He writes:
One feature of this concern of federalism is a mistrust about the degree of power...
the United States Supreme Court [should] have over the lives of hundreds of millions
of persons living in diverse geographical and cultural environments. Such responsibil-
ity requires that the Supreme Court proceed very cautiously in reviewing the acts of
state governments before imposing a narrow rule upon the legislatures and agencies of
fifty states. . . . [Tihe diversity of the fifty states cautions against excessive federal
judicial activism. [Individual] states, on the other hand, are significantly more homo-
geneous and state courts are responsible for far fewer persons, agencies, and inferior
courts. Likewise, most states have requirements that state judges have practiced in
the state before they can be appointed or elected to the bench. Further, in states...
where there are regions - for example, urban and rural areas - with different politi-
cal, cultural, and legal perspectives, there often is significant representation of those
diverse areas on the appellate courts. Thus, it is possible for state judges to have more
insight into the fiscal, administrative, political and cultural character of state govern-
ment and to use this insight in responsive judicial review.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. Howard, Burger Court, supra note 19, at 941. Professor Howard provides an odd example
of this: a state court, refusing to intervene in a student hair-length case, cited a United States
Supreme Court opinion by Justice Hugo Black for the notion that the case raised a question "best
left to the states." Id. (citing Dunkerson v. Russell, 502 S.W. 64, 65 (Ky. 1973)).
60. Most state court judges are elected or appointed for fixed terms. Braveman, supra note 46,
at 609 (citing MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY - SELECTION, COM-
PENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 9 (1987)). Furthermore, in the majority of states, high court
justices are either elected initially or citizens vote periodically on the retention of appointed jus-
tices. Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 34 (citing Erick B. Low, State of the
Judiciary, in 27 BOOK OF THE STATES 146, 157-73 (Council of State Governments ed., 1988-89)).
"Most states adopted popular election of the judiciary in the mid- to late-nineteenth century,
seeing it as a means to reinforce the credibility of judicial decision-making." Id. (citing Kermit L.
Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of
State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 346-47 [hereinafter
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characteristic of state judiciaries avoids much of the antidemocratic
nature of federal judicial review. 6' Indeed, because state citizens
elect judges knowing that they will occasionally enjoin the actions of
other elected officials, it has been argued that state judicial elections
represent an attempt by state voters:
[T]o select persons of principle who in the heat of controversy will persuade
the public to abide by the constitutional principles they have adopted for
themselves. Thus, the election of judges, like the adoption of constitutional
rights for individuals, expresses an affirmation of judicial review."
Furthermore, state judges are part of a common law tradition in
which state judiciaries actually "make" law in many fields.6 This
continuing common law tradition demonstrates not only public ac-
quiescence in judicial law-making, but also that "at least where in-
dividual rights are concerned, state courts have the institutional
ability and legal resources to construe state constitutions more
broadly than the federal Constitution may be construed by federal
courts." '64 Thus, the political benefits that flow from popular amend-
ment of state constitutions, the unique place of state courts in the
federal system, the relatively greater accountability of state judges
and their unique and often superior qualifications to engage in judi-
cial review, and the importance of state judicial review to the devel-
opment of federal constitutional law make it clear that the growth
of independent state constitutional law is both legitimate and
important.
There are, however, two essential requirements for constitutional
growth, either by textual amendment or through judicial review.
First, even though other viable means of amending the inflexible
federal Constitution have evolved - court decisions, for example65
Hall, Popular Election]).
61. NettikSimmons, supra note 19, at 278,80. But see Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot
Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on Judges' Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants' Rights,
7 LAW & INEQUALITY J. 107 (1988) (noting that judicial elections should be eliminated because
they interfere with a judge's fairness and impartiality).
62. NettikSimmons, supra note 19, at 280.
63. Federal judges, on the other hand, "have had solely an interpretive function: they are
charged with interpreting the Constitution, federal statutes, and federal regulations." Id. at 280
(citations omitted).
64. Id. (emphasis added); see also Shapiro, supra note 22, at 652 (noting that judicial review
at the state level "involves a state judiciary in the assessment of matters within its own expertise
[and judgments] ...are far less likely to be criticized as antidemocratic checks upon the people's
elected representatives or as involving policy determinations beyond the scope of judicial
competence").
65. These evolved informal amendatory techniques - which in addition to judicial interpreta-
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- amending articles in state constitutions must ensure a proper bal-
ance between constitutional stability and flexibility. The amendment
and revision process in each state must be stringent enough to pro-
vide for continuity in social norms and political rights, but still flexi-
ble enough to allow government to meet new circumstances or solve
modern problems;66 i.e., legislative problem-solving through struc-
tion include convention and usages, executive acts, amendment through disuse, and amendment by
acquiescence - "testif[y] to the flexibility of this most adaptable instrument which would con-
tinue to be effective, even without its most awesome power, the power given in the amending
article ...." Robert C. Weclew, The Constitution's Amending Article: Illusion or Necessity, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 167, 187 (1968); see also Levinson, supra note I1, at 422 ("Central to under-
standing the American government . . . is recognition, and concomitant assimilation, of the extent
to which the Constitution has indeed been amended, been the subject of political inventiveness, by
means other than the addition of explicit text.") (citations omitted).
Thus, for quite a few years now it has been common to see in legal and political science litera-
ture, without references or attribution, comments such as: "[A] basic difference between the U.S.
Constitution and the state constitutions [is that flederal constitutional law is changed primarily by
acts of interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Congress, and the presidency [, while s]tate
constitutional law is changed primarily by amendment, a procedure that usually involves voter
participation." John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, in STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 13 (John Kincaid ed., 1988). It has been the accepted wisdom for
some time "that judicial amendments are effective and obligatory methods of adaption to chang-
ing circumstances." SUBER. supra note 9, at 199 (citing LESTER B. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 214-15 (1942)). Nevertheless, there has always been an important difference
between "interpretation" and "amendment":
[The difference] is akin to that between organic development and the invention of
entirely new solutions to old problems. From this perspective "interpretations" are
linked in specifiable ways to analyses of the text or at least to the body of materials
conventionally regarded as within the ambit of the committed constitutionalist ...
[On the other hand, plerhaps the simplest way of conceptualizing what we mean by
an amendment is to describe it as a legal invention not derivable from the existing
body of accepted legal materials.
Levinson, supra note 11, at 413-14 (citations omitted). For an excellent discussion of "judicial
amendment" and its practical and theoretical ramifications, see SUBER. supra note 9, at 197-206,
415 n.3 (citing Fredric R. Coudert, Judicial Constitutional Amendment, as Illustrated by the
Devolution of the Institution of the Jury from a Fundamental Right to a Mere Method of Proce-
dure, 13 YALE L.J. 331, 364-65 (1904) (noting that if the amending clause becomes too difficult of
a procedure, judicial amendment will become more prominent; but if judicial amendment becomes
too prominent or easy, the foundation of our government - respect for the Constitution - will be
sapped)). Professor Suber's book is "a fairly complete compendium of the constitutional law relat-
ing to constitutional amendment . I..." Id. at xix.
66. It has been argued that "procedurally arduous means of achieving constitutional change are
preferable not only because they represent an accepted norm," but for other reasons as well.
Colantuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1475 (emphasis added). A relatively inflexible constitu-
tion insures that "revisions reflect broadly shared concerns rather than the self-interest of the
authors." Id. at 1507. Also, inflexibility: (I) avoids the unintended consequences of haste by pro-
moting deliberation; (2) promotes a stable state constitutional law and thus maintains a social
consensus on values; and (3) makes "the adoption of provisions hostile to minority interests less
likely by giv[ing] minority interests the opportunity to combat fear and prejudice with information
and education." Id. at 1509-11. The somewhat more neutral view is that:
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the na-
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tural and fundamental reform must be encouraged. To this end, ju-
ture of safety-valves - they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar
function with too great facility, . nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it
with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode
the machine.
JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS. supra note 14, at 549; see also DEALEY, supra note 15,
at 139 (noting that the ease of the amending process requires a balance between being flexible and
unalterable); John Dickinson, The Constitution and Progress, 181 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 11, 12 (1935) ("The function of a written constitution is to provide ... a principle and
framework of order within which change can proceed without endangering stability."); Fellman,
supra note 15, at 154-55 (concluding that the amending process should be more difficult than the
ordinary legislative process, but not impossibly difficult, and that the central problem is finding a
proper balance between stability and change) (citation omitted). As one scholar has noted:
[A] constitutional road to the decision of the people, ought to be marked out, and
kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. . . . [However,] frequent
appeals would in great measure deprive the government of that veneration, which
time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest govern-
ments would not possess the requisite stabilty.
FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 199 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) [hereinafter AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION]. E.g., Grad, Function and Form, supra note 15, at 972; Douglas Linder, What in the
Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 719-33 (1981). A number of the Foun-
ders and many of their contemporaries shared this view, believing that an article in the United
States Constitution providing for amendments was desirable for two reasons. First, they had no
illusion that the constitutional scheme was perfect for present circumstances, let alone for the
needs of future generations. As George Washington wrote to his nephew, Bushrod Washington,
who later served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1798 to 1829:
The warmest friends and the best supporters the Constitution has, do not contend that
it is free from imperfections; but they found them unavoidable and are sensible if evil
is likely to arise there from, the remedy must come hereafter . . . and, as there is a
Constitutional door open for it, I think the People (for it is with them to Judge) can
as they will have the advantage of experience on their Side, decide with as much
propriety on the alterations and amendments which are necessary [as] ourselves. I do
not think we are more inspired, have more wisdom, or possess more virtue, than those
who will come after us.
Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 17, 1787), reprinted in AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 83.
Of course, the most eloquent expression of this view probably belongs to Thomas Jefferson:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the
arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. . . . But I know also, that laws and
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institu-
tions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain
ever under the regimen of their barbarious ancestors.
10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42-43 (Paul L. Ford ed.) (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons
1899) [hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS]; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787. at 202-03 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (quoting the comments of
George Mason); Linder, supra, at 719 (noting that delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia believed that an article providing for Constitutional amendments was desirable).
Secondly, the Framers believed that a flexible constitution would provide the protection against
revolutionary upheavals needed by a young and somewhat fragile government. See, e.g., RECORDS,
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dicial independence in expansive interpretation must also be en-
couraged. But what encourages independent constitutional analysis
and expansive interpretation? It seems clear that state court judges
are justified in doing so on occasion and that by doing so they serve
an important function. But why does any particular state court con-
strue a state constitutional provision independently and more expan-
sively than similar provisions in the federal Constitution?67 If it is
easier politically to simply rely on federal nomenclature and stan-
dards even though all state courts have the authority to engage in
expansive interpretation of their own provisions, then what accounts
for the significant advance of the new federalism in some but not
other jurisdictions?68
supra, at 202-03 (noting the comments of George Mason); Linder, supra, at 719. Thus, Article V
is itself so necessary that it should not be amended to create any new limitations on the amending
power. It would not be in the interest of democracy to allow one generation to prevent succeeding
generations from making fundamental political and moral choices. See Linder, supra, at 732; see
also CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY, 145-46 (4th ed.
1968) (discussing "the political effect of depriving the amending power of some part of what is its
essential function"); SUBER, supra note 9, at xiv (arguing that the law cannot tolerate a state's
attempt at enacting laws that effectively provide that "this rule may not be changed"); CHARLES
WARREN. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 673 (1937) (noting the necessity of the amending
process).
The amending clauses of most state constitutions, however, have themselves been amended nu-
merous times. SUBER. supra note 9, at 20. "[S]elf-amendment [, that is, use of amending clauses
to amend amending clauses,] may well be a strict self-contradiction, but the evidence of legal
history suffices to show its lawfulness even in the face of logical doctrine. . . . [The] only alegal
source of legal authority is social practice, not normative principles from morality or logic." Id. at
Xii.
67. See, e.g., Lohraff, supra note 46, at 347 ("All state courts are faced with the dilemma [of]
. . . whether to diverge solely because of dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court case curtailing
criminal procedure rights or to accede to the Supreme Court's view if no state-specific or interpre-
tive evidence supports a decision to diverge.").
68. Utter & Pitler, supra note 38, at 638 ("[T]he majority of states have a low level of state
constitutional rights litigation."). As of 1982, there were only fourteen states having a moderate or
better reputation for protecting civil liberties under their state constitutions. G. Alan Tarr &
Mary Cornelia Porter, Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate
Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919, 953-54 (1982) [hereinafter Tarr & Porter, Gender Equal-
ity] (noting that these states were Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin). By 1985, Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court would suggest adding
four more states, for a total of eighteen. Abrahamson, Criminal Law, supra note 19, at 1181
(suggesting the addition of Arizona, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Vermont). Some states,
however, "have virtually no record of reliance on their state constitutions so that large sections of
the country, including the Midwest, remain largely unaffected by the growing trend toward devel-
opment of independent state constitutional jurisprudence." Utter & Pitler, supra note 8, at 638
(noting that of 311 actual cases decided since 1950 on independent state constitutional grounds,
the Midwest accounted for only 6.8 percent) (citation omitted). As Professors Tarr & Porter have
observed: "Whether the new judicial federalism represents a short-term response by some courts
to a particular set of historical circumstances or a major long-term shift in the locus of responsi-
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There are some answers to these questions. Intuitively, one might
assume that most state courts feel that the minimal criminal proce-
dural rights articulated by the federal courts are deemed more than
sufficieni by the state citizens in most states and therefore judges in
those states are simply responding to popular opinion. However, in
the last twenty to thirty years, no doubt catalyzed by the conserva-
tive trend on the United States Supreme Court on the subject of
criminal procedure,69 there has been growing interest in many state
courts concerning the use of state constitutions not only as indepen-
dent sources for individual rights, but as sources for greater individ-
ual rights than those presently protected by the federal Constitu-
tion."' For some reason, these state courts are not only sensitive to
their legitimate anti-majoritarian function, but feel free to take the
political risks that flow from developing an independent state indi-
vidual rights jurisprudence.
Some scholars argue that it is not appropriate for state courts to
engage in expansive interpretation; that such activism is reactionary,
bility for the protection of civil liberties remains to be seen." Tarr & Porter, Introduction, supra
note 21, at 7.
69. The interest in the possibility of expanding state constitutional protection was primarily a
response to Burger Court conservatism. See, e.g., Brennan, Individual Rights, supra note 46, at
489; Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-Federal
Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273, 284-85 (1973); Howard, Introduction, supra note 14, at 873; Pro-
ject Report, supra note 57, at 271. But it was also a response to those who have criticized state
courts for ignoring state constitutions as a source of constitutional law independent of federal
court developments. See, e.g., Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground. 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Hans A. Linde, Without Due Process: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon,
49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970) [hereinafter Linde, Without Due Process]; Swindler, supra note 53;
see also Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 812-14 (arguing that state constitutions
provide states with powers separate and distinct from the federal Constitution).
70. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317-35 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) [hereinafter Abraham-
son, Homegrown Justice] (bibliography); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Guardians of Individual Rights]; Brennan, Individual Rights,
supra note 46, at 489; Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judi-
cial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV.
317, 317-18 (1986); Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Indi-
vidual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 599
[hereinafter Collins et al., State High Courts]; Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?,
45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the
Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV.
11 (1988); Sager, State Courts, supra note 47, at 959; Note, Developments, supra note 4, at
1324; Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking to the States, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-2 [hereinafter
Collins, Looking to the States].
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result-oriented, pragmatic, and unprincipled."' Most scholars, how-
ever, appear convinced of the legitimacy and importance of indepen-
dent analysis. They point to several reasons why levels of protection
for individual rights under state law ought to differ from the prop-
erly circumspect federal view of least intrusive uniform national
standards.7 2 But if they are correct, why has expansive interpreta-
71. E.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 963 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring); George
Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under the
California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 975, 994-95 (1977); Maltz, supra note 42, at
995; Teachout, supra note 70, at 34; Steven J. Twist & Len L. Munsil, The Double Threat of
Judicial Activism: Inventing New "Rights" in State Constitutions, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1005 (1988).
But see Ronald K.L. Collins, Forward: The Once "New Judicial Federalism" and Its Critics, 64
WASH. L. REV. 5, 5-18 (1989) [hereinafter Collins, New Judicial Federalism] (summarizing sev-
eral reasons why critics of expansive state court interpretation provide analytically deficient argu-
ments). Such activism seems reactionary, it has been suggested, because the expansive decisions
rarely seem adequately justified. This, according to some, is because of the failure of the funda-
mental premise of state constitutionalism "that a state constitution ... reflects the [presumably
unique] fundamental values, and . . . character" of the people of the state - a premise said to be
no longer in accord with reality. Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 813-18. This argu-
ment is not fully convincing, however, because state constitutionalism may not really reflect the
premise Gardner suggests it does, namely that "values" will differ significantly from state to state.
The better view of why there is independent and expansive decision-making is that, under appro-
priate circumstances, similar values will have relatively different importance to the citizens of
some states. When these values - manifested in part through unique state histories, traditions,
demographics, political cultures, and other local conditions - are then balanced against state
interests which are more or less compelling in different states, local differences will produce differ-
ent results.
History captures not only the events within a state, but their impact on the spirit of the people
responding to those events. For an analysis of the use of history in United States Supreme Court
opinions, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 190-91
(1969). Independent interpretations of state constitutions may properly rely on the unique tradi-
tions that shaped local values, even if those local values are similar to values held nationally.
Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, I EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. LAW 17, 23 (1988) [hereinafter Kaye, Midpoint Perspective] (stating "[w]here
the state's history indicates some special concern, clearly there might well be a different result" in
the balancing); see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (1982) (finding expanded
protection for poor women seeking medically necessary abortions by relying on the long-standing
New Jersey tradition of according high priority to the preservation of health); ELAZAR, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 10-21 (discussing the different ways states respond to the needs of
society); Bartley, supra note 25, at 23-24 (noting that state constitutional change occurs to a great
extent through interpretation and informal state processes); Bravemen, supra note 46, at 606 (dis-
cussing the state courts' use of tradition to justify a departure from the federal approach); Note,
Constitutional Change, supra note 33, at 999-1000 (discussing several factors which interact to
determine whether judicial interpretation in a state will be static or will manifest constitutional
change).
72. See, e.g., Kaye, Midpoint Perspectives, supra note 71, at 17; Linde, Without Due Process,
supra note 69, at 125, 133-35; Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 39, at 239. But see
Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 818 ("[T]he notion of significant local variations in
character and identity is just too implausible to take seriously as the basis for a distinct [state]
constitutional discourse."); Maltz, supra note 42, at 1022 (noting that state legislatures already
tend to enact laws which are consistent with the fundamental values of state citizens).
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tion of state constitutions been common in no more than eighteen
states? 73 Three factors are commonly advanced as influencing inde-
pendent and expansive judicial interpretation of state constitutions:
(1) the mode of judicial selection, (2) the relative ease of amending
a state's constitution, and (3) the existence of a "political culture"
in the state sympathetic to such interpretation. 74 These variables are
not of equal import and the nature of their impact is not fully
understood.
For example, there has long been a debate over whether "popular
elections" rather than "appointment" of state judges will more ef-
fectively tend to encourage expansive interpretation. But the fact
that state judges are subjected to popular election and are thus more
accountable than judges at the federal level is "a dubious ground on
which to argue for greater state court activism."75 Indeed, judges
are rarely held accountable at the ballot box for engaging or failing
to engage in "independent interpretation." 6 The impact of occa-
sional elections on a state judge's inclination toward state constitu-
tionalism would seem negligible one way or the other, at least in
73. "[T]he relation between the nature of state constitutionalism and approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation remains a crucial issue in state constitutional law." Tarr & Porter, Introduc-
tion, supra note 21, at 6; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing the states that
have used their state constitutions to expand individual rights).
74. Otherwise, where there is a consensus on a high court as to "goals, tasks and methods," and
a general belief that the role of the state court is to serve as an "inferior tribunal" to the U.S.
Supreme Court, high courts will only rarely invoke adequate and independent state grounds. Su-
SAN P. FINO. THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 19-20
(1987) (citing Edward N. Beiser, The Rhode Island Supreme Court: A Well-Integrated Political
System, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV. 167 (1974); Neil T. Romans, Of State Supreme Courts in Judicial
Policy-Making: Escobedo, Miranda, and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 WEST. POL. Q.
38 (1974)).
75. Howard, Introduction, supra note 14, at 939-40 n.348. Many commentators have argued
that, precisely because of a lack of political isolation, state judges are less likely to strive for
greater protection for the individual rights of the politically powerless. E.g., Report of the ABA
Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986) ("[J]udges are far less likely to...
take ...tough action if they must run for reelection or retention every few years."); Brennan,
Guardians of Individual Rights, supra note 70, at 551 ("[S]tate court judges are often more
immediately 'subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts, and are correspondingly less
independent than their federal counterparts.' "); Paul Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Re-
ply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1359-60 (1970); Howard, Burger Court, supra note 19, at 941 n.354;
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 41-44 (discussing electoral
challenges to judges engaged in independent interpretation and concluding that the "infrequent
rejection" of these judges "may fairly be considered a ratification of the independent decisions").
The reaction of the electorate to activist judges more often than not reflects public sentiment
about crime and capital punishment, rather the than ratification of independent high court deci-
sion-making. Collins et al., State High Courts, supra note 70, at 622-23.
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states where judges are not insulated from the political process. 77
Professor Kenneth Karst has pointed out that it makes no difference
whether judges are elected or appointed; it is their "independence"
that matters:
The reason for the consistent noninterventionist record of Virginia's
judges [in interpreting the state constitution] is not hard to find. Judges in
Virginia are appointed and reappointed by a majority vote of each house of
the legislature. It is the regular pattern for the members of each house to
hold party caucuses on questions of judicial appointments. Such a system
does not encourage doctrinal trailblazing among judges, who must be
acutely aware of their personal accountability for new concepts or novel in-
terpretations ...
In contrast, it is no accident that the justices of the California Supreme
Court, who have been so receptive to the development of state constitutional
guarantees, are selected under the Missouri Plan. Judicial independence -
certainly the kind of independence needed if a state court is to give life to its
state constitution . . . is rooted in sand when the legislature can decide in
its discretion whether to reappoint a judge who has voted to limit its
power."s
Scholars have also raised the question of "whether the ease of
amending the state constitution affects the manner of interpreting
the state constitution. 17 9 The possibility that the political process in
a state can be easily marshalled to change constitutional text di-
rectly would seem quite relevant to any judicial inclination to de-
velop independent and expansive state constitutional law.80 State
amendment procedures which can facilitate popular reaction to judi-
cial decisions might offer something of a challenge to judicial inde-
pendence." Yet such procedures clearly provide a much better op-
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting reasons for expansive judicial
interpretation).
78. Kenneth L. Karst, Book Review, A New State Constitution: Of Independent State Grounds
and Independent State Judges, 28 STAN. L. REV. 829, 834-35 (1976); see also FINO, supra note
74, at 13 (noting that the higher the degree of judicial independence from the political branches,
the greater the degree of judicial activism) (citing JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUS-
TICES: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY (1979)); Collins et al., State High Courts, supra note
70, at 612 (noting that judicial independence may account for the fact that, "contrary to expecta-
tions, justices in western moralistic states who are linked to voters either by direct election or
retention elections [nevertheless] have been among the leaders in developing state constitutional
rights law"). But see FINO, supra note 74, at 20-21 (positing that an appointive system holds more
promise for qualified judges more likely to develop an independent body of state law than an
elective system, given the minimal amount of information the average voter possesses about the
candidates).
79. E.g., Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice, supra note 70, at 308.
80. Note, Constitutional Change, supra note 33, at 999-1000.
81. May, supra note 11, at 170 ("Characterized by mechanisms that invite popular and politi-
cal influence and frequent change, state [amendment] procedures pose a challenge to the indepen-
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 43:269
portunity than that presented at the federal level for garnering
direct popular support for newly articulated rights and liberties
while reinforcing the notion of judicial accountability. 2 Professors
Tarr and Porter have observed that it is not clear which way this
cuts in practice:
[S]hould the relative ease of constitutional amendment mean that state
judges should feel free to pursue an activist course, recognizing that the
people can readily respond to judicial initiatives through amendments? Or,
does the ease of amendment suggest that constitutional provisions should be
interpreted narrowly, since the people of the state remain free to grant new
powers or award new rights whenever they deem it desirable?"8
dence of the judiciary in the development" of individual rights under a state constitution); see also
Howard, Burger Court, supra note 19, at xx-xxi (noting that in states which have the initiative,
ease of revision seems to threaten experimental interpretation of their bills of rights).
82. May, supra note 11, at 170. To some extent, the state amendment process seems to have
limited individual rights. Id. at 171. There has nevertheless also been much "buttress[ing] of the
individual rights edifice." Id. (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, Forward: Reliance on State Constitu-
tions - Beyond the New Federalism, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. xii (1984) (hereinafter Collins,
Forward]). The new judicial federalism "has also brought with it a social consciousness that rec-
ognizes the importance of measures that reinforce rights." Id. Actually, "except for criminal jus-
tice and certain racial questions, the voters either support )r leave other civil rights alone." Id.
(citing Fischer, supra note 43, at 69-70). Professor Shapiro believes that:
It is a mistake to assume that these mechanisms for maintaining the responsiveness
of state constitutional law will manifest themselves in an automatic popular reaction
against the expansion of individual rights. With regard to the criminal process, the
most significant popular repudiations of constitutional policy have been amendments
focusing upon the restoration of capital punishment and the scope of the exclusionary
rule. [citations omitted]. In light of the wide range of judicial developments in this
area, such efforts have been relatively infrequent. Few issues excite a polarization of
opinion as do these, and electorates are capable of differentiating between the merits
of a particular policy and a generalized animus against acknowledging the rights of
the accused. [citations omitted]. It would be presumptuous indeed to suppose that a
state court's approach to problems like [reinforcing a suspect's right to refuse to con-
sent to a search] or its independent view of prosecutorial abuse in the courtroom
would be greeted by popular indignation.
To the contrary, there is every indication that the prizing of self-government and
the appreciation of diversity that underly our state constitutional provisions are widely
shared, and the notion of local sovereignty over significant aspects of our individual
freedoms remains a source of pride and promise.
Shapiro, supra note 22, at 654-55.
83. Tarr & Porter, Introduction, supra note 21, at 6. Some commentators feel judicial activism
is fostered by the knowledge that the public can "correct" inappropriate decisions. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (Mass. 1975) (Hennessey, J., concurring); Robert D.
Brussack, Note, Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights,
10 GA. L. REV. 533, 562 (1976); Galie, supra note 56, at 791-92; Howard, Burger Court, supra
note 19, at 939-40; Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309,
330 (1963) [hereinafter Note, Counterrevolution]. But see Collins, Forward, supra note 82, at 17
n.62 (noting one judge's hesitancy to rely on a state constitution for fear of being overruled by
constitutional amendment); Mary Cornelia Porter, State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the
Warren Court: Some Old Inquiries for a New Situation, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICY-
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
What is fairly clear is that neither ease of amendment nor judi-
cial elections - not even both of them occurring in the same state84
- comes close to fully explaining the recent national experience
with independent and expansive state constitutional interpretation.
Then why does the possibility of desirable and easy "democratic in-
put" 85 into the judicial decision-making process (such as voting for
judges or for amendments reversing their decisions) seem to coin-
cide with activist inclinations in only some state courts? 86 It may be
because something more than the reassurance of their own ultimate
accountability or the potential for popular approval through amend-
ment is required to motivate potentially "active" jurists. What
seems to be needed is a strong judicial perception that any demo-
cratic input genuinely reflects the popular will rather than mere par-
tisan politics. This will be the case only if there is a sufficient mea-
sure of independence from the political branches and fair,
reasonable, and regular opportunity for popular participation in con-
stitutional amendment or revision. This state of affairs would most
likely create a climate conducive to independent judicial interpreta-
tion. But what factors encourage or discourage expansive interpreta-
tions of individual rights provisions?
The final variable having an influence on state constitutionalism
has the advantage of not only suggesting what may encourage inde-
pendent interpretation, but accounting for expansive interpretation
as well: the arguably unique "political culture" of each state.87 In
MAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3, 10 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982) (ex-
pressing fear of institutional damage to the judiciary through the politicization of its decision-
making). It is also important to note that there may be a great deal of difference in a given state
between the permissible level of activism in criminal procedural rights as compared to educational
funding, environmental policy, or privacy rights for the "non-criminal" population.
84. See, e.g., Utter, State Constitutional Law, supra note 44, at 44-45. Justice Utter writes:
At one extreme is California, with its amendment initiatives and willingness to re-
move unpopular justices, creating a possible "chill" on judicial independence. New
Hampshire, at the other end, appoints each justice for a term that ends on his or her
70th birthday and requires a super-majority legislative and popular vote to amend the
constitution. Along this continuum lies an ideal balance of democracy and
independence.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing the states that have used their state
constitutions to expand individual rights).
87. State constitutional development and interpretation are affected by the political culture of
each state. Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 17 (citing Samuel C. Patterson, The
Political Cultures of the American States, in PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY 275-92 (Nor-
man R. Luttbeg ed., 1968)). To a large extent, the various states share a common political cul-
ture. However, "there would appear to be three major political sub-cultures in the country -
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1966, Professor Daniel J. Elazar suggested that:
[A] state's social and economic diversity will affect the degree of internal
unity of the state and the general relationship between the state and the
federal government: the greater the degree of internal unity, the greater the
state's ability to resist "outside encroachment" from the federal government.
State internal unity is a function of the degree of intrastate sharing of pat-
terns, norms and policy interests considered in relationship to the degree of
state deviation from national patterns, norms and policy interests. [Thus,]
socioeconomic diversity within a state will have an adverse effect on internal
unity and, consequently, make the state less equipped to fend off "federal
encroachment." ... [It is possible, however,] that a state with high internal
unity can successfully avoid the impact of decisions of the federal Court "if
they can bring courts, prosecutors, police, and the bar together at the state
level and in the state's communities in common agreement as to how the
individual's basic rights are to be protected under the state's scheme." In
sum, socioeconomic diversity is related to the degree of state internal unity,
and state internal unity, in turn, affects the general relationship between the
state and the federal government."
At present, there is only limited support for Elazar's hypothesis.89
Nebraska and Arizona, for example, are highly "unified" states, but
their courts rarely invoke the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds to preserve state constitutional rulings against "fed-
eral encroachment." 90 On the other hand, "diversified states, such as
Michigan and New Jersey, more frequently [rely] exclusively upon
individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic - rooted in the particular constellation of ethnic
and religious groups and socioeconomic conditions which make up each state." Id.
88. FINO. supra note 74, at 6-8 (citing ELAZAR. AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 13);
see also Collins et al., State High Courts, supra note 70, at 607-10 (suggesting that "variations in
state constitutional litigation in individual rights cases may . . . be associated with political cul-
ture") (citing Gregory Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Su-
preme Courts, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 178, 187-88 (Mar. 1985)). Professor Elazar writes:
[T]here exists a wide range of issues in which the dominant interests in any state can
act as if they had statewide consensus behind them . . . [and] ...a wide variety of
ways in which each state . . . can capitalize on its potential for internal unity in the
face of outside pressure. . . .While the extent to which a state possesses internal
unity of purpose varies from issue to issue, there are some guidelines by which to
assess the probable degree of internal unity. These include:
A. The degree of overall state deviation from national patterns and norms.
B. The degree of intrastate sharing of common patterns and norms.
C. The degree of overall state deviation from national policies and interests.
D. The degree of intrastate sharing of common policies and interests. ...
The more all four factors are intensified . the greater the likelihood of intra-
state unity vis-A-vis the outside world ....
ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 10-13.
89. FINO. supra note 74, at I11.
90. Id.
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state law.""' If there is any correlation between "internal unity"
and independent state constitutional interpretation, it may be in
states with "distinctly judicial sources" of internal unity of pur-
pose9 2 and "moralistic" political cultures rather than "individualis-
tic" or "traditionalist" cultures.93
Consequently, if the courts of a given state exhibit a high degree
of independence in state constitutional interpretation and frequently
invoke the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds to
91. Id.
92. Among, say, all those engaged in law enforcement and the protection of individual rights.
93. FINO. supra note 74, at 9-11; Collins et al., State High Courts, supra note 70, at 607-10.
According to Elazar, three forms of political culture are important to federal-state political
relationships:
(1) [T]he set of perceptions of what politics is and what can be expected from govern-
ment held by both the general public and the politicians; (2) the kinds of people who
become active in government and politics, as holders of elective offices, members of
the bureaucracy and active political workers; and (3) the active way in which the art
of government is practiced by citizens, politicians and public officials in light of their
perceptions ...
The political culture of a particular state embodies both elements of American po-
litical culture - the concept of the marketplace, the idea of bargaining and rational
self-interest; and the concept of commonwealth, the ideal of community interest in the
best government to implement shared moral principles - to varying degrees. In the
individualistic . . . culture, the emphasis is on marketplace values, the triumph of
private concerns over community interests. . . . Politics is perceived as another form
of professional business activity . . . . [In Individualistic] cultures [one] would expect
to find career judges who are well salaried, . . . [complicated with] judicial selection
via partisan election . . . a highly bureaucratized state court system . . . [and] gov-
ernment . . . [serving] as referee among many competing individual interests, not
. . . implement[ing] any broad policy of the public good. . . . [L]itigation rates in
[Individualistic] cultures will be relatively high, ... [with] challenges to economic
regulation ....
Unlike the Individualistic . . . culture, the Moralistic . . . culture emphasizes the
commonwealth - the ideal of a common good and a public interest. . . . Govern-
ment is not left to the professional politician; instead it is the duty of every citizen.
[One might expect] fewer career judges . . . and lower . . . salaries. There is little
tolerance of corruption . . . and political party regularity is not important. [There
would likely be] merit . . . or nonpartisan [judicial] election[s] . . . . Government
intervention is expected for the sake of the public good . . . . Therefore, [one] would
not expect challenges to the scope of government regulation in the courts. Instead,
there will be challenges to the nature of regulation because the conception of. . . the
public good [changes] from era to era. ...
[T]he Traditionalistic [Political Culture] features "ambivalent attitudes toward the
marketplace combined with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the common-
wealth[;]" . . . [a] hierarchical [society where] maintenance of [the] hierarchy [is
the role of government, not] imposition of equality. It "confine[s] real political power
to a relatively small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite."
[It] is "instinctively anti-bureaucratic" because... "bureaucracy interferes with the
fine web of informal personal relationships that lie at the root of the political system."
FINo. supra note 74, at 9-11 (emphasis added) (citations to Elazar's work omitted).
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evade federal judicial review, that state will tend to have some pre-
dictable political characteristics. There will be a relatively indepen-
dent judiciary; one less directly responsible to the political branches
for their nomination yet more accountable to the voters themselves
for their election to the bench (or, under the "Missouri Plan," reten-
tion). 94 This allows for the election 'of intellectually dominant jus-
tices who can lead the court toward independent analysis. There will
also be flexible, open, and regular opportunities for popular partici-
pation in state constitutional amendment; this would be welcomed
by such justices. An environment in which popular consent to (or
distaste for) court decisions about the relative importance of individ-
ual rights may genuinely find expression encourages independent ex-
pansive constitutional interpretation. It does so because this environ-
ment makes it clear to state courts that there is local consensus
about the independent political role -of courts. In those cases where
amendments are not initiated to reverse philosophical sea-changes
and justices are then reelected, such retention represents a tacit ap-
proval of judicial exercise of that independent role, especially re-
garding questions peculiarly amenable to judicial leadership.
In contrast, where a state court has little if any record of engag-
ing in independent interpretation, one might also expect to find a
number of specific conditions in that state, including: (1) a judiciary
closely dependant on the partisans of the political branches for their
positions and judicial resources; (2) rigid, difficult, and limited op-
portunities for popular participation in constitutional amendment;
and (3) a highly factious citizenry which possesses a popular fear
and mistrust of "majority rule" or "direct democracy" as a basis for
fundamental constitutional change. This antipathy toward facile
change - especially through textual amendment but impliedly by
judicial or nonformal amendment as well - would be expected in a
state with an historic tradition of continual intense contention
among widely divergent factions over divisive local issues. Such a
political climate carries with it the constant threat of social turmoil
and economic disruption should the existing constitutional order be
disturbed too readily by some momentarily powerful faction. This
fear is especially strong where the numerous compromises that most
every constitution represents have been arrived at only with great
difficulty, and after a careful but tenuous balancing of interests. In
94. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (describing the three main elements of what is
now commonly called the "Missouri Plan").
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such a state, it would seem prudent for the courts to implement a
philosophy of judicial restraint consistent with the sense of social
stability required by that state's uniquely disunified, individualistic
political culture. Such restraint would be politically defensible as re-
sponsive to the popular will in matters of fundamental change. But
how do state courts gauge the popular attitude with regard to fun-
damental change?
The historic basis for what consensus exists on the subject of con-
stitutional change are most likely to be reflected in the legal history
of state constitutional self-amendment. This is the process through
which the state constitutional amending provisions - and the judi-
cial interpretations of those provisions - amend or revise the
amendment process itself.95 The nature of the political environment
will determine the popular inclination toward change, and this incli-
nation becomes manifest through self-amendment.96 Nonuse of
the mechanisms of legal change, especially the supreme power of constitu-
tional amendment . . . might reveal a certain contentment with the un-
amended constitution ... [and a lack of popular consent to change if] the
procedure is fair .... But to change the fairness and difficulty of the
amending procedure are virtually the only reasons to amend the amendment
clause. Hence, self-amendment will almost always affect our ability to assess
the people's consent to be governed by their constitution and the people's
power to alter legal conditions to meet their consent. 97
The absence of a reasonable and regular opportunity for constitu-
tional amendment is usually apparent to state judges; they tend to
be familiar with the politics, common law, and constitutional history
95. See generally SUBER. supra note 9, at 11-14 (discussing the paradox of a state constitu-
tion's self-amendment process).
96. Professor May notes:
Interest in amendments has often been in arid legality rather than in political reali-
ties. There has been insufficient recognition that controversy over the amendment pro-
cess is a function of something else, a commitment for or against a governmental
policy in social, economic, or political matters. If a given amending procedure is
deemed more or less likely to result in a certain amendment, proposal or ratification,
then the attitudes about process have an anchor in policy preference.
May, supra note 11, at 167 n.59 (quoting CLEMENT E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMEND-
MENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, at 342 (1972)). However, if the
development of ultimate policies is traditionally contentious and difficult, the voters become wary
of change and prefer an element of permanence in their state constitutions. Id. at 168 (citing
Albert L. Sturm & Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1980-81 and
the Past 50 Years, in 24 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 115, 121 (COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
ed., 1982-83)); Cornwell, Constitutional Tradition, supra note 28, at 30. The conservative atti-
tude is even stronger where there is popular satisfaction generally with existing government insti-
tutions. DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 140-41'n.29.
97. SUBER. supra note 9, at xv.
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of their states."' They function within state court systems where,
unlike the federal courts, the judiciary is dependent on and responsi-
ble to the party structure within the political branches for their posi-
tions and resources.9" Therefore, many state judges are naturally re-
luctant to usurp sovereign power or intrude into matters of public
policy by engaging in expansive interpretation. The leadership of the
state political parties will usually wish to decide public policy and
design the political or constitutional compromises in their states for
themselves. The function of judges in states without relatively inde-
pendent judiciaries (states noted for close party control over judicial
nomination and retention), therefore, is essentially to referee private
conflicts rather than to deviate from the political and social status
quo initially established (constitutionally) and maintained by the
party that sponsors a judge in the first place. 100
A difficult process for state constitutional amendment is perhaps
the single most important signal to the judiciary. It directly impedes
constitutional reform which could thereby increase the independence
98. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
99. See generally SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 78 (noting that the higher degree of judicial
independence from the political branches, the greater the degree of judicial activism). There
seems to be no significant difference in activism between those judges who are appointed as com-
pared to those who are elected. Collins et al., State High Courts, supra note 70, at 610-12. Yet
party identification is a very strong factor in voting patterns in judicial elections, even in nonparti-
san elections. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984
Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 361, 369 (1987). Thus it is the relative indepen-
dence from the political branches (not from the voters) that accounts for judicial activism. The
lesser the degree of judicial independence, the lesser the degree of judicial activism in state su-
preme courts. FINO, supra note 74, at 13; see also supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the idea that independent judges tend to be more activist).
100. On the close relationship between party affiliation and judicial policy, see PHILIP L. Du-
BOIS. FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 20-
35, 137-77 (1980). Onslow Peters, a delegate from Peoria to the 1847 Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention who strongly advocated an appointive system of selecting judges, stressed the importance
of an independent judiciary in asking:
[W]ould you trust a man on your bench whose very office, whose salary, whose means
of living, and the very bread for his wife and family, may depend on the decisions he
will make - when he, if he offend that power or that party which put him in office,
knows and feels he will be by them put out again?
ARTHUR C. COLE. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 460 (1919). This sense of depen-
dence might diminish should the public choose to implement the "Missouri Plan," developed in
1913 by Professor Albert Kales of Northwestern University Law School. The three main elements
of the plan in its present incarnation are: (1) the nomination of judicial candidates by a nonparti-
san commission, comprised of both lay persons and lawyers; (2) appointment by the governor from
a nominee list submitted by the commission; and (3) a short probationary period, in many in-
stances no more than one year, followed by a nonpartisan retention election. ANTHONY CHAM-
PAGNE & JUDITH HAYDEL. INTRODUCTION tO JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 7 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
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of the state's judiciary. In most states, reform of judicial selection
methods requires amendment of the state constitution. 101 It is dis-
heartening enough for judges to rest their hopes for reform on politi-
cally-controlled, self-interested legislatures, without the added bur-
den of an inflexible amendment process. Thus, the implicit message
behind a continuing lack of real judicial independence, reinforced as
it is by a local political history of antagonism to constitutional
change, is not lost on state courts. It is likely to cause the judicial
rejection of interpretations of individual rights provisions which
might limit or restrain the local political branches. This is especially
true where a more activist approach has no discernable support
from either the people or the political parties that administer the
executive and legislative branches. 102
Thus, constitutional flexibility, measured by the relative facility of
the state process for amendment, can serve as implicit popular ratifi-
cation of interpretive discretion and independence in the courts, es-
pecially if that very process were to be used to advance state court
independence from the political branches through reforms of state
judicial selection. Rigidity in the amendatory process, on the other
hand, indicates: (1) popular antagonism toward constitutional
change of any kind; (2) the absence of at least one important check
on independent judicial interpretation; and (3) a lack of means by
which to increase judicial independence and thereby encourage inde-
pendent state constitutional jurisprudence.
III.
The majority of states experience little if any state constitutional
individual rights litigation and few report decisions independently
interpreting state bills of rights.'03 Some states, in fact, have
virtually no record of reliance on their state constitutions so that large sec-
tions of the country, including the Midwest, remain largely unaffected by
the growing trend toward development of independent state constitutional
jurisprudence."0 '
101. Merit selection has been established by executive order only in Delaware, Maryland, and
Massachusetts.
102. Criminal procedural rights would be the most obvious example, especially those related to
punishment. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (arguing that there are disadvantages inher-
ent in expansive judicial review without political or party support).
103. Utter & Pitler, supra note 8, at 636 (citation omitted).
104. Id. (citations omitted).
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Illinois is typical of these midwestern states. Throughout most of
the past twenty-five years, the Illinois Supreme Court has largely
refused to independently interpret the individual rights provisions of
the Illinois Constitution, choosing instead in most cases to follow in
lockstep with the United States Supreme Court in matters of indi-
vidual rights. 105 With only some deviation, 106 this continues to be
the case. The general rule is that:
Any variance between the [Supreme Court's construction of a bill of rights
provision] and similar provisions in the Illinois Constitution must be based
on more substantial grounds. We must find in the language of our constitu-
tion, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional con-
105. See Thomas B. McAfee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradi-
tion: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. I, 14 (1987) ("[I]n the face
of repeated pleas to acknowledge the court's freedom and duty to independently examine constitu-
tional issues under the state constitution, the supreme court [in People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147
(111. 1984)] makes clear that the Court views the practice of following the United States Supreme
Court as a governing rule, rather than a discretionary practice of the court."); Denise E. Gale,
State Courts Breaking Their "Lockstep" With Federal Constitutional Decisions, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL.. Jan. 21, 1992, at 5 (criticizing the lockstep doctrine). For cases illustrating the "lockstep"
doctrine, see, e.g., People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410 (I11. 1984); People v. Exline, 456
N.E.2d 112 (111. 983); People v. Jackson, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961); People v. Tillman, 116 N.E.2d
344 (111. 1953); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (I11. 1924). But see People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce,
533 N.E.2d 873 (111. 1988) (ruling that an accused's right to jury trial under the state constitution
exceeded the minimum protection afforded under the federal Constitution because "there is a
difference in the language of [the] State constitution ...and the difference is one of substance
and not merely one of form"); Rolfingsneyer, 461 N.E.2d at 413 (Simon, J., concurring) (noting
that the assumption that the state constitution has the same content as the comparable federal
guarantee unless there is some indication to the contrary is "the reverse of the correct one and
inverts the proper relationship between the state and federal constitutions"); People v. Rosa, 565
N.E.2d 221, 226 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that state constitutional provisions in certain cir-
cumstances may be given broader construction than similar federal provisions). For other opinions
bucking the "lockstep" tendency, see, e.g., People v. Porter, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1167 (II1. 1988)
(Simon, J., concurring); People v. Holland, 520 N.E.2d 270, 285 (III. 1987) (Clark, J., concur-
ring); Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 166 (Clark, J., concurring); Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 166 (Goldenhersh,
J., dissenting); People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 954 (III. 1984) (Simon, J., dissenting);
Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (I11. 984); People v. Van Cleve, 432 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Il1.
1982); People v. Bernasco, 541 N.E.2d 774 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Bryant, 520 N.E.2d
890, 892-93 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
Most recently, in People v. Diguida, 576 N.E.2d 126 (II1. App. Ct. 1991), an Illinois appellate
court held that a defendant's activities in collecting signatures on political nominating petitions,
while on the property of a food store, was protected by the Illinois constitutional free speech
provision. In People v. McCauley, 595 N.E.2d 583 (I11. App. Ct. 1992), a panel from the same
appellate district held that a suspect's protection against self-incrimination was greater under the
Illinois constitution than the federal document. A few days after McCauley, however, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed Diguida, holding that "the State action requirement of the first amend-
ment [sic] is also present in article 1, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution." People v. Diguida,
604 N.E.2d 336, 344 (Ill. 1992).
106. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 873 (granting additional protection because of substantial and ex-
plicit differences in the state provision).
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vention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution
are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the
Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned."' 7
This difference in constitutional language, if any, must be "one of
substance and not merely one of form." 10 8 This is a conservative
view of the appropriate conditions for independent interpretation, 19
but one more or less shared by most states like Illinois, states with
infrequent adjudication under their state bills of rights.1"0 This is so
even though it is never altogether clear why there should be a pre-
sumption against independent construction of the state document"'
or why that presumption does not inappropriately render the state
bill of rights superfluous."'
The Illinois amendment provisions are, interestingly enough,"'
also quite "conservative" in that they have consistently made the
Illinois constitution difficult to amend. Illinois has had an inflexible
constitution at least since voters first had the opportunity to ratify
the constitution of 1848."1 The 1848 Constitution included a judi-
cial article reflecting the Jacksonian concern for creating democratic
accountability through judicial elections."' The Illinois Constitution
107. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
108. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875.
109. Several independent state judiciaries have articulated much broader justifications and con-
ditions for independent and expansive interpretation. E.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J.
1982); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).
110. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
111. See Note, Developments, supra note 4, at 1356-66.
112. See People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 166 (Clark, J., concurring); McAfee, supra note
105, at 29.
113. "Interesting" because the conventional wisdom is that, as in the case of the federal Consti-
tution, many scholars associate a difficult amending process with a heavy reliance on judicial
interpretation to accommodate inevitable change. Yet Illinois does not seem to experience expan-
sive interpretation of its state constitution to any great extent, especially considering the historical
inflexibility of that document. See supra notes 25, 105 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
conservativism in interpreting the Illinois constitution).
114. The 1818 Constitution was not submitted to the people for ratification. JANET CORNELIUS,
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS: 1818-1970, at 10, 18-19 (1972).
115. See infra note 123-26 and accompanying text. The 1848 Constitution established the
Jacksonian system of democratic judicial elections. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 42. Illinois is
only one of eight states that still retains all the remnants of this system of selecting judges. This is
due, in part, to the fact that the 1848 Constitution, which provided for this system, and the Con-
stitutions that followed were relatively inflexible:
On the one hand, the [1847] delegates inserted policy-making legislation into the con-
stitution in the excessively detailed sections dealing with salaries and judicial reor-
ganization. Yet, when faced with the possibility that their work might be amended or
changed, they regarded their document as a broad, unchanging statement of funda-
mental principles, assuming that "wisdom would die with them and that nobody else
19941
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of 1870 simply continued the inflexibility of the 1848 document;"1 6
it was often described as rigid and unworkable. 117 Actually, it was
only one of many post-Civil War state constitutions that were ulti-
mately found to be problematic for these same reasons."18
By 1944, Illinois was in the worst position with regard to constitu-
tional inflexibility of any state in the Union." 9 Although a majority
of the voters frequently had shown that they thought the constitu-
tion was in need of general revision, rigid and restrictive provisions
prevented such revision from occurring. 20 Consequently, the Sixth
should be permitted to disturb their labors, and interfere with what they had done."
Compared to changes in amending procedures in other states during the period, Illi-
nois's 1848 provisions seem especially rigid. . . . [Divisions within the state] in-
creased suspicions on all sides that future tampering with the constitution, if made too
easy, would be harmful. Therefore, the Illinois Constitution submitted to the voters in
1848 was a legislating document, but without the flexibility which might have made
such a document effective.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. By 1910, the constitutions of Delaware, Oregon, California, and Louisiana were described
as flexible; those of Illinois, Tennessee, and Indiana, as well as most of the New England and
other Midwestern states, were characterized as rigid. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra
note 15, at 140-41.
118. "Restrictive provisions" are those in which extensive details which could otherwise have
been left to statute are written into the constitution. These provisions often make sections of the
constitution obsolete as times and conditions change. The problem becomes compounded when
there is limited capacity for revision. See, e.g., Ann Lousin, Illinois Constitutional Law 6 (May,
1979) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Louisiana and California are examples of
states which have an unusual amount of "legislative detail" yet relatively easy amending proce-
dures. Id. at 7. The construction of practically every local dam or road in Louisiana requires a
constitutional amendment. LA. CONST. art. 6, § 32; Lousin, supra, at 7. Furthermore, for a lim-
ited time California gave constitutional status to the Rule Against Perpetuities. CAL. CONST. art.
20, § 9 (repealed Nov. 3, 1970); Lousin, supra, at 7. However, the Louisiana legislature can
easily submit amendments and California has simple requirements for popular initiatives for both
legislation and constitutional amendments. Lousin, supra, at 7. The voters in both states vote on
constitutional proposals almost every year. Id.
119. Charles A. Bane, The Need for Reexamination of the Illinois Constitution - Workable
Amending Clause or Straitjacket?, 50 CHI. BAR. REC. 18 (1968); Kenneth C. Sears & Charles V.
Laughlin, A Study in Constitutional Rigidity 11, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 374, 439 (1944); see also
Melvin Price, Urbanism and a New State Constitution, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 532 (1968) (explain-
ing that reform of the 1870 Illinois Constitution was needed due to urbanization, confusion about
how to provide for growth of local governments, and the new factor of potential federal assistance
to urban areas - none of which were effectively dealt with in the outdated constitution).
120. See Sears & Laughlin, supra note 119, at 439 (discussing the difficulties in revising the
Illinois Constitution). In 1944, Illinois was one of only six states requiring a majority of those
voting in the general election (that is, including those not voting on the amendment itself) to ratify
a constitutional proposition. Id. at 438. In 1919, Illinois was one of fourteen states with this
"super-majority" requirement-Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming
were the others, although Alabama and Tennessee also allowed special elections. Legislative Ref-
erence Bureau, Bulletin No. 3: The Amending Article of the Constitution, in ILLINOIS CONSTITu-
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Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1969-70 sought to make the
process of amending the Illinois Constitution easier in several
ways."' However, it is by no means clear that the work of this Con-
vention has encouraged any constitutional growth. 22
One of the most striking examples of present inflexibility is the
state's perpetual inability to mount a successful reform of judicial
selection methods despite a long-held consensus about the need for
such reform. The common complaint for many years has been the
seeming lack of judicial "independence," most often said to be
caused by the fact that judges are elected like members of the polit-
ical branches. Jacksonian democracy, and its emphasis on popular
election of constitutional and legislative officers, had a significant
influence on the emergence of judicial elections not only in Illinois,
but throughout the country during the mid-nineteenth century. 23
TIONAL CONVENTION BULLETINS 121 (1920) [hereinafter Bulletin No. 3]. Even prior to the Illi-
nois Convention of 1919-22, it was clear that submission of proposed amendments was much more
frequent in some states than in others, such as Illinois, Indiana, and Wyoming. DODD, REVISION
AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 266-68.
121. This was because, as late as 1969, the Illinois Constitution was still thought of as rigid
compared to those of most other states: it was one of only nineteen requiring a two-thirds vote in
each house to propose an amendment; one of only fifteen requiring passage of an amendment
proposal by two successive legislatures; one of only five requiring a majority vote of those who
voted at the general election to ratify an amendment; and one of only four that did not allow
submission of an amendment to the same article for a designated period. Robert W. Bergstrom,
The Amending Process, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
465, 470-71 (Victoria Ranney ed., 1970). The state had made only fourteen changes in the hun-
dred years prior to 1970; New York, on the other hand, had made 168 changes to a document
only seventy-five-years-old by 1970. CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION, supra note 23, at
4. By 1960, fifteen states had amended their constitution over 70 times a piece. Bartley, supra
note 25, at 22 n.L
122. "Innovative" provisions added in 1970 were still relatively conservative in their approach.
There are, for example, only fourteen states at present with the requirement that convention calls
be submitted periodically, ranging from Hawaii at nine years, Alaska, Iowa, Rhode Island, and
New Hampshire at 10 years, Michigan every sixteen years, and Illinois, Connecticut, Montana,
Maryland, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma at 20 years. Also, unlike Illinois, forty
states now require only a majority vote on a constitutional proposition, and most states place no
other restrictions on the election process. May, supra note 11, at 157.
123. COMISKY & PATTERSON. supra note 60, at 4. "The general population was resentful that
property owners controlled the judiciary. There was a common desire to terminate the privileges
of the upper class, making the influence of Jacksonian Democracy, with its notions of popular
sovereignty, pervasive." LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 3 (1981). In other words, the shift to elections "was based on emo-
tion rather than on a deliberate evaluation of experience under the appointive system." HURST.
supra note 21, at 140. It was also a "lawyer's reform" seeking "to ensure that state judges would
command more rather than less power and prestige." Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery
and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861-
1899. in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 29 (Gerad W. Gawalt
ed., 1984) [hereinafter Hall, Judicial Professionalism].
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Understandably, there was substantial debate during the 1847 Illi-
nois Convention on the momentous proposed change from the ap-
pointment system to an election system. Onslow Peters, a delegate
from Peoria, was the strongest advocate for retaining the appointive
system. He stressed the need to maintain an independent judiciary
and he argued that elections put the judiciary in a position where "it
was easily induced to swerve from the path of rectitude, and its pu-
rity endangered by becoming dependent upon [the political parties]
for support.' 12 4 Other delegates believed that elections helped estab-
lish needed judicial independence from the executive and legislative
branches. 2 5 In the end, the argument that tipped the scale in favor
of judicial elections was that the delegates simply did not like the
1818 Constitution's practice of allowing the legislature to appoint
judges for life.'2 6 Judicial elections have survived in Illinois for 146
years.
Since 1848, there have been efforts to both institute more com-
pletely the "Missouri Plan" or return to an appointment system, but
they have failed in Illinois not only due to opposition from political
parties but equally to the gross inflexibility of the 1870 Constitu-
tion. 2 ' At the 1969-70 Convention, the issue was considered so sen-
sitive that, so as not to endanger the entire Constitution, it was de-
cided the electorate should vote on a separate proposition to change
124. COLE, supra note 100, at 458. Peters argued that judicial election was incompatible with
independence because decisions which offended the "power" or "party" which put them in office
could destroy their livelihood. He also believed that the people were not competent to determine
the quality of judicial candidates. Id. at 458-60.
125. Id. at 461. David Davis, future U.S. Senator and U.S. Supreme Court Justice, thought
that any system could be abused. He suggested that he would "rather see judges the weather-
cocks of public sentiment, in preference to seeing them the instruments of power . . . registering
the mandates of the Legislature, and the edicts of the Governor." Id. at 462. William Archer also
believed that election of the judges by the people would not cause judicial reliance on a particular
person or group and would thus promote judicial independence. Id. at 463.
126. Id. at 465. Only about one-fourth of the delegates sided with a system of appointment. Id.
at 484.
127. RUBIN G. COHN, To JUDGE WITH JUSTICE: HISTORY AND POLITICS OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL
REFORM 9-10 (1973). Efforts at creating greater judicial independence were thwarted by the
"super-majority" effectively required to pass a constitutional judicial reform measure under the
1870 amendment provisions. Id. at 10. For about ten years after the 1950 Gateway Amendment,
which eased the amending process, the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations jointly recommended
the reform of judicial selection based on merit known as the Missouri Plan. Adopted in part by
Missouri in 1940, the plan was proposed by Professor Albert Kales of Northwestern University
Law School and was promoted by the American Judicature Society. COMISKEY & PATTERSON,
supra note 60, at 4. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the fundamen-
tals of the plan).
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to an appointive system. 128 Two million votes were cast; the judicial
appointment proposition lost by fewer than 150,000 votes. "Down-
state Illinois, with its consistently conservative tradition of resistance
to any constitutional change, tipped the balance in favor of . . . the
elective process."' 12 9 Since then the "General Assembly has stead-
fastly refused to set up a merit system for filling vacancies or to put
a constitutional amendment on merit selection up for a popular ref-
erendum."'' 3 0 None of this has been lost on the Illinois judiciary,
which continues to function in an environment closely controlled by
the political branches.' 3' In fact, whatever efforts that have been
made to move toward the appointment system or a complete Mis-
souri Plan may actually have detracted from, rather than contrib-
uted to, judicial independence.3 2
128. To explain why conventions occasionally engage in this strategy, the late Professor Swin-
dler suggested that:
Offering to the electorate in a single package an integrated revision of the existing
constitution has substantial logic but an even more substantial political handicap. It
permits disparate groups critical of different and unrelated elements in the draft pro-
posal to unite into an aggregation of minorities which thus becomes an accidental
majority in opposition. It hazards its chances for adoption on the unwarranted as-
sumption that the average elector has the same sophisticated understanding of the
flaws in the existing charter and the rationale of the new remedies which became
apparent to the draftsmen in the course of their work on the revision.
Swindler, supra note 53, at 591.
129. COHN. supra note 127, at 142.
130. Nancy Ford, From Judicial Election to Merit Selection: A Time for Change in Illinois, 8
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 665, 680 (1988).
131. The weight of authority indicates that the election of judges in Illinois has not produced
judicial independence to the same extent as states that have elements of the Missouri Plan in their
judicial selection schemes. Under the Missouri Plan, the person who makes the final selection of
judicial candidates - the Governor - is elected by the people, is accountable to them, and is
seen to wield less political patronage power then political parties themselves because only a short
list of candidates reaches the executive mansion. SPECIAL COMM. ON MERIT SELECTION OF
JUDGES BY APPOINTMENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND
THE ASSEMBLY OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR AsSOCATION 3 (1987). Furthermore, the nonpartisan
retention election after the selected judge has served a relatively short probationary period is said
to give the voters more meaningful input than does an initial election system; voters in the former
system have some judicial record on which to base a more informed decision. COHN, supra note
127, at 17.
132. Several scholars believe that efforts to increase the "professional accountability" of judges
at the expense of their "democratic accountability" have been' unnecessary, counterproductive,
and harmful to judicial independence by undermining the judiciary's "popular credibility." Hall,
Popular Elections, supra note 60, at 369, cited in Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly
Explanations for the Rise of the Elected Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 190, 203 n.101 (1993). These efforts may have resulted from changing assumptions about
the nature of judging:
If the function of appellate judging is considered essentially technical, then popular
elections and limited tenure in office thrust unwanted and undesirable political consid-
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The problem, unfortunately, is that election advocates and ap-
pointment advocates both argue that their method secures judicial
independence. Both suggest that independence is necessary because
the judiciary must be free of interference from or influence by the
citizenry.1 3 Neither group, however, adequately acknowledges the
role of political partisanship in the lack of actual judicial indepen-
dence, especially concerning "constitutional" matters that come
before the judiciary. Even nonpartisan elections are no improve-
ment. Removing party affiliations from the ballot does not guarantee
the reduction of partisan political influence; it only shifts party re-
sponsibility to candidate selection and the supervision of judicial
performance. 3
Alexander Hamilton thought that lifetime appointment during
good behavior - the approach taken by the 1818 Constitution as
well as an accepted political doctrine and an English tradition even-
tually established by statute (1700)'35 - was "the best expedient
which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws.' 3a6 He thought lifetime
appointment would insulate judges from the real problem: potential
influence by the executive or legislative branches, regardless of how
judges were originally chosen. 37 Hamilton may have been right.
There has been little real "judicial independence" in Illinois since
the 1848 Constitution,3 8 and without the guarantee of reasonably
erations into the selection process and, ultimately, into the performance of the judicial
role. On . . .the other hand, if the judicial role is more art than science, and an art
that ought to be sensitive to political necessity as well as formal legal rules, then
popular election offers a legitimate means of ensuring judicial accountability through
the political process.
Hall, Judicial Professionalism. supra note 123, at 34.
133. Robert W. Bergstrom, Non-Political Judiciary is Goal: Merit Proponent, CHIC. DAILY L.
BULL.. June 2, 1988, at 2.
134. COHN. supra note 127, at 16. Thus, judicial dependence continues, given the fact that
judges still cannot accomplish at least "one object of the judiciary [, which is] to protect the
people from the other branches of government ...." COLE, supra note 100, at 466 (comments of
Delegate Archibald Williams) (emphasis added); see also id. at 461-62 (comments of Delegate
David Davis); CHAMPAGNE & HAYDEL. supra note 100, at 11 ("At one level, the controversy over
judicial selection appears to be a conflict between the values of judicial independence and demo-
cratic accountability. However, there is another dimension to the issue. [It] also involves the issue
of whom is in a position to control the recruitment and selection of judges.").
135. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 286 (1987).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
137. Id. at 466-71.
138. Politics and economics have combined to pull judges in one direction and then the other
since the 1840s. "State constitutional revision in the 1840s and 1850s embodied a growing inclina-
tion to hobble the power of the executive, the legislature, [and] the courts ...." Morton Keller,
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lengthy tenure in office and nonpartisan selection of objectively mer-
itorious judicial candidates, there can belittle judicial independence
in any state.
What is important, however, is that in Illinois there is a common
basis for: (1) the inflexibility of the amending provisions; (2) the
resultant tradition of judicial dependence on the political branches;
and (3) the continuing relative reluctance of the Illinois courts to
engage in independent expansive constitutional interpretation.' 39
That is, these conditions all result from the "political culture" of a
given state. Illinois is one of five states in the middle of the country
that are generally ranked low in what has been called "internal co-
hesiveness." Instead, it is a state
united primarily in [its] concern with maintenance of the established politi-
cal patterns that give [it] power against various pressures, usually external.
Since there is little that unites the public in these states, the problems of the
powerholders remain the most significant ones. They include the mainte-
nance of low tax rates against the pressures of rising needs for governmental
The Politics of State Constitutional Revision, 1820-1930, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
AS AN AMENDING DEVICE 67, 72 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1981). The Illinois courts, in particu-
lar, operated under volatile conditions from 1840 to 1854, and there was virtually no judicial
independence or devotion to balanced decision-making in Illinois until at least the 1870s. KEITH R.
SCHLESINGER, THE POWER THAT GOVERNS: THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN A MID-
WESTERN STATE, 1840-1890, at 5 (1990). "[Tlhe law and business tended to gravitate toward one
another before the Civil War. For example, [state] Supreme Court Justice John Dean Caton, who
also served as president of the state's primary telegraph company, became deeply involved in the
compromise which took shape in the telegraph industry." Id. at 6. The Civil War accounted for
the factors which ultimately enhanced the authority of judges and lawyers, while reducing that of
the politicians well into the 1890s. Id. at 6-8.
139. Elazar has said that the "political culture" of the midwest originated when:
Across New York, northern Pennsylvania, and the upper third of Ohio, the Yankee
stream moved into the states of the upper Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley. There
they established a greater New England in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Iowa, and they attempted to do the same in settling northern Illinois ...
Unlike the Puritans who sought communal as well as individualistic goals in their
migrations, the pursuit of private ends predominated among the settlers of the middle
[Atlantic] states. . . . The political culture of [these] middle states reflected this dis-
tinctive emphasis on private pursuits from the first and, by the end of the colonial
period, a whole system of politics designed to accommodate itself to such a culture
had been developed . . . . [This group] moved westward, across Pennsylvania into the
central parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, then on into Missouri. There, reenforced
by immigrants from western Europe and the lower germanic states who shared the
same attitudes, they developed extensions of their pluralistic patterns. Since those
states [including Illinois] were also settled by representatives of [the Yankee Moral-
ists and Southern Traditionalists], giving no single culture clear predominance, plu-
ralism became the only viable alternative. So the individualistic political culture be-
came dominant at the state level in the course of time while the other two retained
pockets of influence in the northern and southern sections of each state.
ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 108-12 (emphasis added).
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services, the maintenance of patronage systems .. and the maintenance of
entrenched political organizations and alignments .... 1 0
The state was settled mostly by Southerners, who produced the
brief 1818-document which reflected the South's approach to consti-
tution-making at that time.141 But by the 1830s, New Englanders
arrived and settled in great numbers, ultimately influencing changes
in the 1848 Constitution to suit their own needs after successful ne-
gotiation and compromise with those from Southern and Middle-
state backgrounds. " 2 The Civil War, however, divided Illinois as se-
140. Id. at 21 (citation omitted). "[Entrenched] organizations and alignments" must be main-
tained because:
[lun most states (Illinois and its relations with Chicago may be one exception) the
cultural question is a mitigating or intensifying factor of some importance. In those
states with major metropolitan centers that have attracted immigrant groups reflect-
ing political cultures different from those dominant among the older population ele-
ments in the state as a whole, the metropolitan-outstate conflict has invariably been
intensified beyond the relatively simple conflict between urban and rural economic
interests. The reason is simple. When men holding power believe that those seeking to
displace them share their basic values, they are less likely to fear political change.
However, when such change also promises to introduce men who will alter the very
basis of the political value system - i.e., change the political consensus at its most
crucial point - the intensity with which men will hold onto their positions is immea-
surably increased.
Id. at 129.
141. Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 20. Illinois, like the six other states admit-
ted into the Union between 1801 to 1830, had a common constitution based on the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which included those features of rights, popular representation, and democ-
racy characteristic of the great middle west of that period. Congress set the rules for admission of
territories as states in the enabling act permitting the calling of a convention and articulating the
conditions to be embodied in the state constitution. These details were set out in an ordinance
which was an "irrevocable compact" between the territory and Congress. This constitution was
not submitted to referendum, as Congress did not require a popular referendum until the enabling
act for Minnesota was presented in 1857. The 1818 Constitution gave legislative veto power to the
Governor and judges of the Supreme Court. Id.
142. Id. The 1848 document was conciliatory in many respects, seeking to heal all nature of
enmity between the different factions in Illinois. That document may even have begun a tradition
of heightened deference for religious freedom in Illinois in the course of integrating a variety of
difficult compromises:
When the 1818 constitution was written, a sect of Covenanters in Randolph County
presented petitions asking that "this convention may declare the scriptures to be the
word of God, and that the constitution is founded upon the same." The petitions were
ignored, and according to Governor Ford, the Covenanters for many years "refused to
work the roads under the laws, serve on juries, hold any office, or do any other act
showing that they recognized the government." Remembering this, Judge Lockwood
of Morgan County created an addition to the [1848] preamble, which stated that
"We, the People of the State of Illinois [are] grateful to Almighty God, for the civil,
political and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and look-
ing to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the same
unimpaired to succeeding generations."
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verely as the nation, straining the compromises of the 1840s. 1,3 To
restore harmony and settle outstanding differences, the state
adopted the 1870 Constitution, which maintained the compromises
of 1848 but "restructured the institutions [of] compromise to allow
for [and protect] minority representation in each part of the
State."144 Between 1870 and 1970:
[N]one of the several attempts to adopt a new constitution succeeded, pre-
cisely because leaders of the state's important interests were afraid to upset
the balance of forces established by the compromise. New interests were
accommodated[, if at all,] by constitutional amendments, initially granting
home rule to Chicago in 1904, and a spate of modernizing amendments in
the late 1950s. The cleavages of the Civil War era[, it was thought], had
sufficiently diminished by the late 1960s to enable a new constitutional con-
vention to shape a document that is considered to be one of the most ad-
vanced in the country. 14 5
But "the cleavages of the Civil War era" may not have completely
diminished. In Illinois, the mostly "individualistic" and "disunified"
political culture has continued to produce significant popular fear of
easy change in the political status quo. The historic cleavages, and
the fear of potentially significant shifts in control of policy-making
authority to different antagonistic political factions in the state, 146
are not only reflected in the continuing conservative approach of the
courts and the legislature toward fundamental constitutional
change,147 but also in the traditionally restrictive and difficult
amendment and revision provisions.
CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 33 (citations omitted).
143. Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 20.
144. Id. For example, the introduction of multi-member legislative districts in the 1870 Consti-
tution was "a means of holding the state together after the cleavages of the Civil War era."
Daniel J. Elazar, State Constitutional Design in the United States and Other Federal Systems, 12
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1982, at 1, 2 (hereinafter Elazar, Constitutional Design].
145. Elazar, State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 20.
146. "The passage of each constitution in Illinois has depended on avoiding the strong hostility
of any major state group." CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 63.
147. Professor David Kenney, the senior author of BASIC ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT: A SYSTEM-
ATIC EXPLANATION (1993), was a member of the Governor's cabinet for eight and one-half years,
and has written a biography of former Governor William G. Stratton as well as an account of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1967-70. Professor Kenney points out that:
[Even] in going over [the list of amendments since 1970], one is struck by the lack of
general significance of the matters which the General Assembly has chosen to propose
to the public as amendments to the constitution. And it certainly is not that the public
lacks serious constitutional concerns. [Yet even] in the face of strong sentiment for
change in the Judicial article [in recent times], no proposed amendment has come out
of the General Assembly. The "old boy network" binding legislators, judges and party
personnel together has been too strong to allow any proposals for changes to occur.
David Kenney, The Need for a Broader Public Initiative In Amending the Illinois Constitution 5-
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IV.
[The] single fact or enterprise which more nearly than any other single
thing embraced the significance of the American Revolution ... [was] the
formation of the Massachusetts [Constitutional] Convention of 1780, ...
[resulting in a] constitution [which] rested upon [a] fully developed conven-
tion, the greatest institution of government which America has produced,
the institution which answered, in itself, the problem of how men could
make government of their own free will.148
The only means of amendment provided for in the Illinois Consti-
tution of 1818 was the constitutional convention. The idea of a con-
stitutional convention was of fundamental importance in the early
history of the United States. This starkly original method of creat-
ing fundamental charters that would last for generations probably
had its beginning on May 10, 1776, when the Continental Congress
passed a resolution which advised the colonies to "form new govern-
ments."' 49 The Continental Congress, however, failed to indicate
how this should be accomplished. Constitutional conventions, with
power derived directly from the people, were not contemplated at
the time of the Articles of Confederation. Legislatures generally de-
vised constitutions in the decades preceding and following the
American Revolution.' 5" Yet by 1784151 - and certainly by 1787
6 (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). According to Professor Kenney, this in-
cludes inaction in the other areas generally deemed to be in need of change, e.g., educational
financing, the definition and audit of "public funds," the implementation of anti-discrimination
provisions, the Compensation Review Board's operations, and the amendatory veto, to say nothing
of the procedures for reapportionment. Id.
148. Howard, Introduction, supra note 14, at xiii (quoting Andrew C. McLaughlin, American
History and American Democracy, 20 AM. HIST. 255 (1915)); see also AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 66, at xi ("The Massachusetts constitution of 1780... was the first to be drafted by a
convention elected just for that purpose ...[and] it was the first American constitution to be
submitted to the electorate" - setting a precedent for the 1787-88 federal convention); DODD,
REVISION AND AMENDMENT. supra note 15, at 23 (noting the constitutional convention was devel-
oped in Massachusetts during the Revolutionary period "for constitutional action, with the sub-
mission of its work to a vote of the people"); HURST, supra note 21, at 205-07 (stating that the
Massachusetts convention was also the first to submit the question of calling a constitutional con-
vention to the voters); Harvey Walker, The Myth and Reality in State Constitutional Develop-
ment, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 15 (1960) ("[T]he constitu-
tional convention is a distinctively American contribution to political theory and -action. . . .[lI]t
is the personification of the sovereign people assembled for the discharge of the solemn duty of
framing their fundamental law.").
149. AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, at 8.
150. W.P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 63-66, 75 (1980); GORDON
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- legislatures were considered incompetent to do so; to suggest in
1787 that a legislature ought to draft a constitution would have
been viewed as dangerous.152 In a matter of a few years, legislating
and the drafting of constitutions quite suddenly came to be consid-
ered two entirely different tasks, each requiring a separate body.""3
There is little doubt, therefore, that during those eleven tumultuous
years from 1776 to 1787, American political thought underwent a
sort of "Kuhnsian" revolution, 15" resulting in a uniquely new aware-
ness of how to create and maintain popular sovereignty. 5 There
S. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1783, at 306 (1969); Howard, Intro-
duction, supra note 14, at xii-xiii.
151. DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 38.
152. WOOD. supra note 150, at 306.
153. See ADAMS, supra note 150, at 63-66, 75.
154. Sometimes in the history of science, the general view held within a particular discipline of
how the relevant world operates radically changes as a result of some sudden, new intellectual
insight. This new realization creates a paradigm which explains (or allows for) phenomena that
could not be understood (or foreseen) within the terms of the previous "world view" or paradigm.
Thus, a "scientific revolution" destroys a paradigm and replaces it with a radically more useful
one. For a discussion of this notion, see generally THOMAS KUHN. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). It would be fair to say that the major advance in political science
represented by the development of "popular sovereignty" as a practical possibility arose because of
a sudden new insight into what constitutions could be and how they might be organized and
maintained indefinitely by the people as the ultimate sovereign power.
155. In 1776, the conventional wisdom was that most any political system that could be devised
would inevitably degenerate because "governments had never been able to adjust continually to
the operations of human nature." WOOD, supra note 150, at 613-15. But the American states
possessed:
[A] "healing principle" built into their constitutions, which contained within the
means of [their] own improvement. The idea of incorporating, in the constitution it-
self, a plan of reformation, enabling the people periodically and peacefully to return
to first principles, as Machiavelli had urged, the Americans realized, was a totally
new contribution to politics. In one thing [the early state constitutions] were perfect.
They left the people in the power of altering and amending them whenever they
pleased. Americans had, in fact, institutionalized and legitimized revolution.
Id; see also ADAMS, supra note 150, at 139-44.
British constitutionalism (which included the use of colonial charters) and its understanding
that a constitution was a permanent code to which those in power were subject and which they
had no authority to alter, was quite important to the development of early constitutions. Id. at 18-
22. But in the New World, "constitution" no longer referred to the actual organization of power
developed through custom, prescription, and precedent. AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 66,
at ix-x. Instead, it had come to mean a written document setting fixed limits on power. This view
was closely related to the rejection of the old concept that authority descended from the Crown in
favor of the new view that authority was derived from the consent of the governed. The latter view
held that written constitutions were instruments by which people delegated and entrusted power to
their agents. Id. (quoting OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY 55
(1961)). "[The] analogy between corporate charters and political constitutions had profound im-
plications" for the Federalists. The analogy suggested that government power could be bounded
by its "charter, [and] the fence could be maintained by judges following an emerging body of
agency law." Amar, supra note 31, at 1434-37. Professor Amar asks:
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was a new understanding that "permanent" constitutions might be
accomplished not by legislatures, as in the past, but by separate
bodies popularly called "conventions," with delegates elected for
that purpose, whose efforts would then be ratified by the people.
One important scholar of the early Republic, commenting on the
significance of the growth of political sophistication between 1776
and 1787, stated:
[The] idea of a convention of the people existing outside of the legislature
was far more important than the concept of a higher law in indicating the
direction American political thought was taking in the years after indepen-
dence, [but] the two ideas were inextricably linked, and developed in tan-
dem; for if the constitution were to be made truly immune from legislative
alteration, it soon became obvious that it would have to be created by a
power superior to that of the ordinary legislature. [citations omitted] [But
most] Americans in 1776 had as yet no real modern appreciation of the
permanent and unalterable nature of the constitution, or if they did, they
possessed little knowledge of the means by which it was to be made perma-
nent and fundamental.
1
5
6
[How] could the power of colonial governments be legally limited if the sovereign was
by definition above the law? The ultimate American answer, in part, lay in a radical
redefinition of governmental "sovereignty." [G]overnments could be delegated limited
powers to govern .... [But who], then, was the ultimate unlimited sovereign . . . ?
The American answer was at once traditional and arresting: True sovereignty resided
in the People themselves. . . . By thus relocating true sovereignty in the People them-
selves Americans domesticated government power and decisively repudiated British
notions of "sovereign" governmental omnipotence ...
This change in thinking did not occur overnight. Considerable noise, literally and
figuratively, punctuated the great constitutional debates between 1763 and 1789. Old
words took on new meanings, as patriots struggled to build an intellectual framework
that would order their thinking, affirm their deepest values, and make sense of the
ideological spinning . . . around them.
Amar, supra note 31, at 1434-37; see also James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections:
Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockian Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189,
200-13 (1990) [hereinafter Gardner, Popular Sovereignty] (discussing the doctrine of popular
sovereignty); Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 14, at 813 (noting that the American ap-
proach also solved the problem of how there could be federal and state "dual sovereigns"); Colan-
tuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1495 (noting that these new constitutions additionally limited
the power of popular majorities).
156. WOOD, supra note 150, at 306-07; Colantuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1495. The
town meeting of Concord, Massachusetts is often credited with "inventing" the constitutional con-
vention on October 21, 1776. It was the first to propose this method in response to the dilemma
posed by the fact that the body that creates a constitution would have the power to change it, and
thus a constitution drafted by the legislature would offer the people no protection against the
legislature itself. ADAMS, supra note 150, at 88-89; Resolutions of the Town Meeting of Concord,
Massachusetts, October 21, 1776, reproduced in AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, at 8-9.
However, Concord may not be entitled to this distinction. The New York Mechanics Guild had
publicly called for the popular ratification of constitutions - at about the same time and with the
same reasoning as that of the Town Meeting of Pittsfield, Massachusetts - soon after the Conti-
nental Congress's original resolution in May, 1776. The objection of both these latter groups was
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Conventions have been widely used for amending state constitu-
tions since the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780.'1 7 Clearly, such use will continue in the future.1 58 The popu-
larity of conventions is due to several distinct advantages which they
possess, such as: the high quality of delegates; the relatively large
degree of freedom they enjoy in making proposals for change - in
fact, delegates are expected to focus on the question of the need for
change; and they are less vulnerable to political pressures than the
legislature. 59 Conventions also tend to stimulate public interest be-
to the authority of the legislature to draft, enact, and modify a constitution. ADAMS, supra note
150, at 85, 88. Consequently, the draft constitution prepared by the Massachusetts legislature in
1778 was soundly defeated. The principal objection was that the document was not drafted by a
special convention (other objections were the lack of a declaration of rights and certain problems
with apportionment). JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 14, at 251; Shapiro,
supra note 22, at 642. A convention was finally elected in 1779, for the express purpose of draft-
ing a constitution with the product to be submitted to the people for ratification. AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION, supra note 66, at 8. Although 30 delegates were to compose the initial draft, the work
was done almost entirely by John Adams. The finished document was finally approved in 1780,
and "popular sovereignty" came into being.
157. ALBERT L. STURM, MODERNIZING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1966-1972, at 8 (1973) [herein-
after STURM, MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS] (stating that "224 such bodies were convened in the
States through 1972"); May, supra note 11, at 164 (noting that there were more than 230 such
bodies by 1986); see generally Samuel W. Witwer, The Shape of the Illinois Constitution, 17
DEPAUL L. REV. 467, 468 (1968) ("Constitutional conventions have been the principal means
utilized in writing new constitutions and revising old ones .... ").
158. STURM, MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 8. Sturm writes:
In American states, the traditional method for extensive revision of an old constitution
or writing a new one is the constitutional convention . . . Although employed pri-
marily for major overhaul and to draft new basic charters, in recent decades conven-
tions have been used increasingly to propose more limited alterations in the form of
one or more amendments when other methods were unauthorized or inexpedient.
Thirty-nine state constitutions . . . expressly authorize the use of constitutional con-
ventions, but they have been sanctioned extraconstitutionally by judicial interpretation
and practice in the remaining States.
Id.
159. According to Professor Janice C. May:
[An "idealized" approach to changing a state constitution is fairly common among
convention delegates, who view their role as something different from engaging in
"normal" politics. Also, the movement for a new constitution is commonly led by
reformers who prefer a nonpartisan or a bipartisan approach.
May, supra note 11, at 169. In fact:
[To the extent that conventions appear political and operate like normal legislatures
(which rarely have favorable public images), they will fall far short of the ideal they
are expected to approximate. [Consequently, the delegates should be] chosen in such
a way as to guarantee a modicum of disinterestedness and stature as well as broad
representations.
CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION, supra note 23, at 15-18. But see Walker, supra note
148, at 15 (stating that "experience has shown that the convention rarely rises above the legisla-
ture in the quality and experience of its membership and that pressure groups and political parties
have significant influence upon its deliberations").
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cause they are the most familiar method of constitutional revi-
sion. 160 On the other hand, there are some disadvantages. These in-
clude: rigid procedural requirements in some states; the inevitable
opposition of vested interests; legislative hostility; the high cost of
holding a convention; 6' the substantial time required to authorize
and assemble a convention; general public inertia; and the fear of
radicalism - which is particularly high in Illinois.' 62
Illinois has had six constitutional conventions. Of the six, four
produced constitutions which were adopted, but only three were rat-
ified directly by the voters. 6 Congress, acting under the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, passed an enabling bill for Illinois's first consti-
tutional convention, and President James Monroe signed that bill
into law on April 18, 1818.164 Thirty-three delegates were elected in
July of that year and they convened in August. 65 Their constitution
was approved by both Congress and President Monroe and went
160. STURM, MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 32.
161. Id. The initial appropriation for the 1969 Illinois Convention was $2,880,000.00, including
the appropriation for the Constitution Study Commission. Id. at 39. However, $13,924,063.00 was
ultimately spent for the 1969-70 Convention, and estimates for a new convention in 1990 (ad-
justed for increases in inflation) were as high as $31,000,000.00. ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE,
VOTERS' PAMPHLET ON THE PROPOSED CALL FOR A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 11
(1988).
162. The fear of radicalism at constitutional conventions is particularly persistent and intense
in Illinois. The popular and legislative disaffection for efforts at constitutional revision is long-
standing. There are good reasons for this. For instance, whenever state constitutional conventions
are to be held pursuant to a successful referendum, it is generally the responsibility of the legisla-
ture to enact enabling legislation (finances, rules, etc.). See supra notes 260-64, 267 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the obligation of the Illinois General Assembly to enact enabling legisla-
tion). Just after the turn of the century, however, out of the more than 200 called state
conventions, there were only six occasions when, notwithstanding popular approval of unlimited
conventions, state legislatures nevertheless felt compelled to attempt to control or restrict that
convention in the enabling legislation. Three of these six attempts were in Illinois (the conventions
of 1848, 1862 and 1869); the other instances were in Pennsylvania (1873), Alabama (1901), and
Virginia (1902). DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 91 n.33. Thus, from a
historical point of view, legislative apprehension at the prospect of an "open" convention in Illinois
was understandable, especially given the unusual activities in the Illinois Conventions of 1847 and
1862. See infra notes 174-76, 183-94, and accompanying text.
163. See generally CORNELIUS, supra note 114 (highlighting the history of constitution-making
in Illinois). Cornelius writes:
Although some states were submitting their proposed constitutions to a popular vote,
including Mississippi in 1817 and Connecticut in 1818, no suggestion of such a proce-
dure seems to have been made in Illinois [in 1818. The 1818] Illinois Constitution did
require approval by Congress and the President of the United States, however.
Id. at 18-19. Illinois's constitution went into effect on December 3, 1818, when President James
Monroe signed the joint congressional resolution admitting Illinois into the Union. Id. at 20. The
constitutions of 1848, 1870, and 1970 were ratified by the voters. Id. at 44, 81, 160.
164. Id. at 3-20.
165. Id. at 6.
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into effect on December 3, 1818.166 Constitutional revision could
only be effectuated by convention under this constitution. 167 The ar-
ticle on the amending process, copied from the Ohio Constitution,
required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to place before
the voters the question of whether "to vote for or against a conven-
tion.' ' 8 It required that once the question to call a convention was
on the ballot, it took the affirmative vote of a "majority of all citi-
zens of the state, . . . voting for representatives" to convene such a
convention.'" 9 The provision ultimately proved unduly restrictive, al-
beit inadvertently, when radical changes in ballots transformed this
innocuous language into a "super-majority" requirement needed for
authorizing a convention. The number of delegates would equal the
number of members of the General Assembly. There was no re-
quirement that the efforts of the convention be approved by voter
referendum.170
The 1818 Convention had before it another potential model for an
amending article - the more radical Indiana Constitution of 1816,
which provided for an automatic vote on whether to call a conven-
tion every 12 years. In Indiana, the election on a convention call
question did not always have to be initiated by the legislature.' 7 1
Yet while the Illinois delegates borrowed extensively from the Indi-
ana Constitution, they chose not to include the automatic periodic
convention call provision.' 72 Thus one finds relative caution over
constitutional change even from the moment of Illinois's inception.
After a lack of success in 1824'17 and 1842, a convention call was
166. Id. at 20.
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id.; ALAN S. GRATCH & VIRGINIA H. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE: NEW SUFFRAGE AND
AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 12-13 (1973).
169. Id. at 16. It would eventually become a "super-majority" requirement because not every-
one would vote on the amendment itself. The effect of an abstention is therefore a "no" vote. For
example, suppose 100 people vote in the election for representatives. Suppose also that there is a
constitutional amendment being voted upon at the same election, and that 45 people vote "yes" on
the amendment while 25 people vote "no" (this means 30 people did not vote on the amendment).
Even though the amendment had more "yes" votes than "no" votes, it would still fail because a
majority of the 100 total people voting (that is, 51) did not vote in favor of the amendment.
170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. This practice was modeled after the Constitutions of Massachusetts (1780) and New
Hampshire (1792). CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 16 (citing 2 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FED-
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1057-59 (1909)).
172. Id.
173. Id. The very first convention call submitted to the people after 1818, the call question of
1824, was part of a hotly-contested effort to use a convention for purposes of amending the 1818
Constitution in order to permit slavery in Illinois. Id. at 20-23. The convention call question was
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finally carried in 1846, and the convention convened in 1847. This
convention resulted in an intensification of the tension among the
factions in the state. The practice of submitting state constitutions
for popular approval was followed without exception by state con-
ventions held between 1840 and 1860. Yet the 1847 Illinois conven-
tion was one of the rare few conventions during this period which
actually declared an article of the proposed constitution in force
without submitting it to the people. 174 Only three other conventions
among those not held during the Revolutionary or post-Civil War
period asserted similar power. 175 With the exception of that one ar-
ticle, the resulting constitution was submitted to and ratified by the
voters on March 6, 1848.176
The most significant improvement in the 1848 document's amend-
ing provisions was the new alternative method of revision (common
almost everywhere else by that time) - legislative amendment. 177
Under this method, either house could propose amendments.
17 8 If
two-thirds of the elected members approved the amendment in a
given legislative session then there would be a second vote on the
amendment after an intervening general election.' 79 If a two-thirds
majority of those subsequently elected to each house then approved
the proposal and if it was published in full at least three months
before the next election of members of the General Assembly, it
would be submitted to the electorate. 180 The only other restriction
on the 1848 process was that amendments could not be proposed to
more than one article of the constitution at any general election.' 81
ultimately defeated, with voting patterns reflecting southern (pro) and northern (anti) lines. Id. at
23. The northern counties, with recent settlers from Ohio and the Northeast, turned the tide
against the proposed convention. Id. at 23-24.
174. See infra note 313.
175. In one of those instances, "After submitting their work to the people, [the Kentucky con-
vention of 1891] made material amendments to that constitution as ratified by the people" by
adding an entirely new section which went into effect without popular approval. See Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 44 S.E. 754 (Va. 1903); Miller v. Johnson, 18 S.W. 522, 526 (Ky. 1892) (both
declining to hold invalid a constitution framed contrary to statutory restrictions because the gov-
ernment and public had acted as if the constitution were valid); see also Bartley, supra note 25, at
35 (discussing the South Carolina convention of 1895, which acted on its own initiative).
176. GRATCH & UBIK. supra note 168, at 12-13. Jameson's treatise erroneously reports the
date as March 5, 1848. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 651.
177. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 12.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 12-13.
180. Id. at 13. The amendment would have to have been approved by two successive legisla-
tures. By 1960, only about twelve states had such provisions. Bartley, supra note 25, at 24.
181. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 13.
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If approved by a majority of the voters, the proposal would become
law.18
2
The next Illinois convention was convened in 1862, but its consti-
tution was not approved, no doubt due to the internecine fighting
during that convention over Civil War issues.' 8 Actually, the Illi-
nois Convention of 1862 was one of the most radical conventions in
American political history. Declaring itself "sovereign," it sought to
exercise wide powers of governance. 84 Most noteworthy, perhaps,
was its initiative in the area of slavery. As a compromise attempt to
prevent the outbreak of war, the United States Congress, by a joint
resolution on March 2, 1861, proposed the Corwin amendment
which would have prohibited any further amendment to the United
States Constitution authorizing Congress "to abolish or interfere
within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service under the laws thereof.' 1 85
The method of ratification was to be by action of "the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states. 86
The Illinois legislature failed to ratify the proposed amendment in
'a vote taken in 1861.187 The convention of 1862, notwithstanding
the fact that they discussed and probably understood the illegality
of their efforts, sought to remedy this legislative "oversight" by vot-
ing decisively, on February 8, 1862, for a resolution ratifying the
Corwin amendment."' 8 The vote was based on a completely merit-
less construction of Article V which says that amendments are valid
only "when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states,
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress."'819 Not to be
outdone, the next Illinois legislature ratified the Corwin amendment,
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 47-50 (discussing the extraordinary actions of the
1862 convention)..
185. Id; JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 450.
186. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 450.
187. Id. The next legislature, however, did ratify this amendment as prescribed by Congress.
Id. Illinois, Ohio, and Maryland were the only states to approve this amendment. CORNELIUS,
supra note 114, at 49 n. 11.
188. CORNELIUS, supra note 114 at 49 n.1 1. There was much controversy during the convention
over how to respond to newspaper reports that many of the delegates were in "complicity" with a
disloyal society, known as the "Knights of the Golden Circle, whose aim was to revolutionize the
state." JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 468-69.
189. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
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as did the legislatures in Ohio and Maryland. 190
The 1862 convention also took another "legislative" initiative re-
garding extraneous matters; "with the cooperation of that part of
the people to be affected by it, [it attempted] to repeal an Act of the
legislature, local in its scope and operation."'191 This action was held
invalid, however.' 92 There were even discussions about whether the
convention could remove from office persons presently holding pub-
lic office by election or appointment, but the power was never exer-
cised. 193 Regardless, it is easy to see why Illinois legislatures histori-
cally have been less than receptive toward the convention process. 94
The fourth Illinois convention was convened in 1869 and its con-
stitution was adopted on July 2, 1870.195 Most of the deliberation at
the 1869 Convention on the subject of constitutional amending sur-
rounded controversies that arose at that convention. The delegates
sought to avoid future conflict over these same matters; e.g., the
number and replacement of delegates 96 and the oath to be taken by
delegates.' 97 Yet even though one of the declared aims of the 1869
190. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 49 n. 11.
191. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 431-32 (noting that the act
dealt with local police elections) (citation omitted).
192. Id. (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 320-21. Of course, a convention could abolish existing offices and thus indirectly
effect the removal of those who filled them. Id.
194. "[AII of the members of the [1969-70 Convention were aware] of the historic antagonism
of the legislature toward the convention process." GRATCH & UaIK, supra note 168, at 22. The
question of calling a convention was submitted to referendum by the legislature only six times in
Illinois's first 50 years (1824, 1842, 1846, 1856, 1860, 1868), and only three times between 1870
and the present (1918, 1934, 1968). Id. n.13. See generally CORNELIUS, supra note 114 (discuss-
ing the history of Illinois constitution-making).
195. The vote in favor of adoption was 154,227 to 35,443. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTIONS, supra note 14, at 651.
196. No guidelines existed from 1848 as to replacements for delegates, and when four died and
one resigned during the 1869 Convention, the members decided they had the power to order spe-
cial elections for substitute members, holding three such elections during the 1869 Convention.
CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 79 (citation omitted). They ultimately decided that, in the future,
vacancies would be filled in the same manner as in the General Assembly. Id.
197. The oath was an unusual problem, causing days of debate. Convention enabling legis.lation
containing an oath or other requirements was enacted in Georgia (1833), North Carolina (1835,
1875), and Illinois (1862, 1869). JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at
366-67. Before 1887, about 50 percent of the state conventions had administered oaths to dele-
gates before they entered upon their duties. These generally resembled the oath at the 1847 Illi-
nois Convention: "You do solemnly swear, that you will support the Constitution of the United
States, and that you will faithfully discharge your duty as delegates to this Convention, for the
purpose of revising and amending the Constitution of the State of Illinois." Id. at 281. Oath-
taking has been controversial. Many conventions, including a few Illinois conventions, fought over
whether the oath should contain an additional clause to support the existing constitution of the
state as well. Id. at 282-86. The question had been uniformly decided in the negative before 1869
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Convention was to make alteration of the Illinois Constitution eas-
ier,"aB the delegates ended up increasing the difficulty of the process.
The 1870 document retained the convention and legislative amend-
ment methods as they had been since 1848, but added another re-
striction: now, not only could you not propose an amendment to
more than one article in each legislative session, but amendments to
the same article could not be proposed more than once in four
years.1"'
The fifth convention, which adjourned in 1922, resulted in a docu-
in Louisiana (1844), Ohio (1850), Iowa (1857), and Illinois (1862), even though an oath to this
effect was contained in the Illinois enabling legislation. Id. The 1862 Illinois delegates - having
decided that they could not take the prescribed oath swearing allegiance to the Illinois Constitu-
tion - "[a]roused some apprehension, especially among Republican newspapers such as the Chi-
cago Tribune, which expressed the opinion that the convention itself was not legal because the
members had refused to take the prescribed oath." OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE ILLINOIS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1862, at 10-11 (1905).
In 1869 as well, after election of a temporary chairman, three and one-half days were taken up
deciding whether or not delegates chosen to "revise, alter, or amend" the Illinois Constitution
could properly be required to take an oath to support that constitution. CORNELIUS, supra note
114, at 63, 79; 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 391 (1870) [hereinafter DEBATES]. The debate was serious, often bitter, and
raised and discussed several pertinent questions about the function of conventions and constitu-
tions. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 558. The same fundamental
argument was raised as in 1862: one could not in good faith swear to support a constitution that
one was there to change. Ultimately, the delegates decided there would be no real inconsistency
between swearing to uphold the Illinois Constitution and functioning as a member of the conven-
tion. Delegates would not be swearing to uphold the written instrument - this was just the evi-
dence of organic growth up to the last convention - but the organic growth itself (the actual
"constitution"). I DEBATES, supra, at 391; JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note
14, at 285. The delegates job is to conform the old constitution to the present constitution and
interpretation. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 285. Still, others
feared the excesses possible (as in 1862) if delegates did not first declare allegiance to certain
principles or controls. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 63-64. A convention is "an elementary body,
deriving its authority from no source; that absolute sovereignty and paramount authority were the
attributes of such a body; . . . [it] was, as it were, the people en masse." I DEBATES. supra, at 10-
1 I (comments of Delegate William Archer). After a final stormy session, the delegates agreed to
make the oath voluntary. CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 63-64. To avoid this problem in the
future, the 1870 delegates provided explicitly for an oath which included a commitment to the
Illinois Constitution. The issue did not arise during the 1920 or 1970 Conventions. Id. at 79, 102.
198. Cornelius, supra note 114, at 79.
199. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2 (amended 1970). Delegate John Dement, arguing in
favor of allowing at least two articles to be amended at one session, accused other members of
distrusting future voters. Cornelius, supra note 114, at 80. The majority of the delegates, however,
actually distrusted the legislature. They agreed with one delegate who feared that they "would
have the Legislature, half of its time, perhaps, engaged in framing proposed amendments." Id. at
80. Delegate George Wait said that "the Legislature, in a very short time, could entirely demolish
our constitution, build up a new one on its ruins, and thus make our organic law as unstable as the
desert sands." Id. at 80-81.
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ment that was ultimately defeated at the polls. °00 One of the major
reasons for the failure of the 1922 Convention was the many frus-
trating recesses in the convention's work caused by conflict over the
popular initiative; officially in session for two years and nine months,
the delegates spent only 140 days in actual convention work.2"' The
proposed 1922 Constitution failed overwhelmingly at the polls in
large measure due to the failure of the delegates to include a popu-
lar initiative provision.20 2 In fact, there "is no record in the history
of American politics that equals this for an uprising of the people at
the ballot box on a local issue."20 a
The amending article was eventually revised through the 1950
Gateway Amendment, 04 which eased the revision process. The
Gateway Amendment provided an alternative to the 1870 constitu-
tional requirement of voter ratification of an amendment by a "ma-
jority voting in the election." Now, approval by two-thirds of those
voting on the measure would also suffice, regardless of whether a
majority of those voting for members of the General Assembly
could be obtained.20 5 Further, the Gateway Amendment allowed the
General Assembly to propose amendments to three articles at the
same session and required that all amendments proposed be printed
on a separate blue ballot. 06
Popular approval of the Gateway Amendment generated wide-
spread hope that revision by amendment would once again become a
feasible method for initiating constitutional change. Gateway was
the first amendment adopted since 1908207 and was a partial success
200. The document was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 921,398 to 185,298. GRATCH &
UBIK. supra note 168, at 16.
201. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 103-05.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 115.
204. See id. at 121-46. The Gateway Amendment was a republican alternative to a strong
effort by Governor Adlai Stevenson in 1949 to place a convention call on the ballot. He lost by
two votes in the House and ultimately accepted the compromise of an amendment which at least
made it easier for future amendments to be passed (hence the name "Gateway"). Id. at 122-24.
Governor Stevenson announced his support and said:
I doubt the sincerity of the "Gateway proposal".. It looks like an effort to dodge
responsibility for blocking much-needed changes. . . .But in spite of my misgivings,
I feel it is better to have something than nothing. . . .I will urge the Democratic
party in an all-out nonpartisan effort to secure ratification of the Gateway Amend-
ment by the votes in 1950.
Id. at 124.
205. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 13.
206. Id.
207. CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 125.
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during the first legislative session after its passage. 20 8 At the next
session, the legislature attempted to resolve the difficult question of
reapportionment, and a reapportionment amendment backed
strongly by then-Governor William Stratton passed through the
General Assembly. 0 9 The voters approved the proposal in Novem-
ber of 1954. It provided that if the legislature did not redistrict,
then the task would go to a commission, and if that did not produce
redistricting, then all members of the intransigent chamber would
have to be elected at-large in the state. Of course, that is exactly
what happened in 1964 when all 177 representatives were forced to
run at-large. It was just such a relatively independent cohort - a
class of legislators not beholden to district partisans or constituen-
cies - that might finally be convinced to seriously consider propos-
ing a constitutional convention. In fact, but for this and other fortui-
tous circumstances, 1 0 the coming 1970 Constitutional Convention
might not have been proposed, and the resulting document might
never have been adopted.21'
208. The first two proposals after the Gateway Amendment were defeated, but the second two
passed under the new Gateway requirement. Id. at 126.
209. Id. at 127.
210. Fortunately, one of those elected to the House in the 1964 election was Ms. Marjorie
Pebworth, former president of the League of Women Voters. "She recommended the formation of
the Constitution Study Commission to the General Assembly and in 1965 became its first chair-
man. (T]he commission recommended that the General Assembly place the question of calling a
constitutional convention on the ballot in the November 1968 general election." Id. No other
amendment would be placed on the ballot. "The success of the convention call in the General
Assembly rested primarily on two factors. One was the desire of the members to honor the mem-
ory of Mrs. Pebworth, who died suddenly during her second term in the House of Representatives.
Her dedicated and energetic efforts on behalf of the convention call were widely recognized, and
passage of the convention resolution was in large part a tribute to her efforts. Secondly, many
members were apparently willing to vote for the measure because they felt its chances for popular
approval were slim." Id. at 140.
211. The vote in favor of the proposal was 1,222,425 to 838,168. SAMUEL K. GOVE & THOMAS
R. KITSOS, REVISION SUCCESS: THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 134 (1974).
Not all products of state constitutional conventions have been as readily accepted by their elector-
ates. See STURM, MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 12 (providing examples of
revisions proposed by state constitutional conventions that were not accepted by voters); Adrian,
supra note 39, at 312 (providing a table of state constitutional amendments that have been
presented for a vote); Lewis B. Kaden, The People: No! Some Observations on the 1967 New
York Constitutional Convention, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343 (1968) (discussing the failure of the
New York Charter proposed by the state's ninth constitutional convention).
There were specific reasons for Illinois's success in 1970. Although most conventions write new
constitutions which must be presented to the voters for approval, if the new constitution is pro-
posed as a whole; passage has proven less likely if there are controversial new sections. STURM.
MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS. supra note 157, at 10. One of the reasons that the 1970 Illinois
Constitution was approved by the voters was 'that four controversial changes simply were not in-
cluded in the proposed constitution: (1) the issue of cumulative voting versus single-member dis-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:269
Article 14, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 sets out
the present procedures for calling a constitutional convention. 12 The
tricts; (2) the so-called "merit" appointment of judges; (3) the abolition of the death penalty; and
(4) the lowering of the voting age to eighteen. These matters were voted upon as separate pro-
posed amendments; all four provisions were rejected by the voters. GOVE & KITSOS, supra, at 218.
The 1870 Constitution was also submitted with eight separate propositions, and all eight were
adopted with the constitution by substantial majorities - but the party circle ballot, in use at that
time, made non-voting virtually impossible. See CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 83. There were
several obvious advantages to submitting the 1970 Constitution to a vote without the four contro-
versial provisions: (1) it prevented the convention from breaking up over highly emotional issues;
and (2) it significantly increased the chances of the constitution being accepted by the voters. Id.
at 154; see also Levine, supra note 14, at 387 n.4 (quoting Samuel W. Witwer, president of the
1970 Constitutional Convention: "We tried to write the best constitution which could be
adopted."). Also of vital importance was the fact that the 1870 Constitution gave future conven-
tions the authority to designate the kind of election at which proposals would be submitted to the
voters. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 1 (amended 1970) ("[Proposals s]hall be submitted to
electors ...at an election appointed by the Convention for that purpose. ... ). By calling a
special election for the sole purpose of voting on the 1970 Convention's proposals, all voters were
able to cast ballots, overcoming what had previously been the difficult task of gaining the votes for
necessary approval of the amendments under the 1870 Constitution. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note
168, at 26-27. The 1870 Constitution was also adopted at a special election on July 2, 1870.
CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 83. It would therefore seem that the structural "intent" of the
1870 document was to make it easier to revise the entire constitution, or portions thereof, by
convention rather than by legislative initiative. No such choice in the timing of an election is
available to a General Assembly proposing an amendment. See ILL CONST. of 1970, art. XIV,
§ 2(a) (mandating that the legislature submit amendments to voters at the next general election
at least six months after legislative approval).
212. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1. This article provides:
(a) Whenever three-fifths of the members elected to each house of the General
Assembly so direct, the question of whether a Constitutional Convention should be
called shall be submitted to the electors at the general election next occurring at least
six months after such legislative direction.
(b) If the question of whether a Convention should be called is not submitted dur-
ing any twenty-year period, the Secretary of State shall submit such question at the
general election in the twentieth year following the last submission.
(c) The vote on whether to call a Convention shall be on a separate ballot. A Con-
vention shall be called if approved by three-fifths of those voting on the question or a
majority of those voting in the election.
(d) The General Assembly, at the session following approval by the electors, by law
shall provide for the Convention and for the election of two delegates from each Leg-
islative District; designate the time and place of the Convention's first meeting which
shall be within three months after the election of delegates; fix and provide for the
pay of delegates and officers; and provide for expenses necessarily incurred by the
Convention.
(e) To be eligible to be a delegate a person must meet the same eligibility require-
ments as a member of the General Assembly. Vacancies shall be filled as provided by
law.
(f) The Convention shall prepare such revision of or amendments to the Constitu-
tion as it deems necessary. Any proposed revision or amendments approved by a ma-
jority of the delegates elected shall be submitted to the electors in such manner as the
Convention determines, at an election designated or called by the Convention occur-
ring not less than two nor more than six months after the Convention's adjournment.
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most important provision is subsection (a), which provides that
"[w]henever three-fifths of the members elected to each house of
the General Assembly so direct, the question of whether a constitu-
tional convention should be called shall be submitted to the voters at
the next occurring" general election, provided that the election is
"at least six months after [the] legislative direction."21 3 The re-
quired legislative majority for a convention call was reduced in 1970
from two-thirds to three-fifths. Now a call is approved when "three-
fifths of those voting on the question, or a majority of those voting in
the election, vote for the proposal."214 This was considered a signifi-
cant step toward greater constitutional flexibility, 15 but it was
largely symbolic.
There was little historical evidence to support the view that such a
change would make it easier to obtain voter approval of convention
calls. Regardless of how well organized the campaigns are for or
against a certain constitutional reform, voter approval is still diffi-
cult because:
[Convention politics] almost invariably revolve around the issue of the main-
tenance of the status quo versus change. . . . [T]he least recognized aspect
in the whole area of constitutional revision is that there are people and
Any revision or amendments proposed by the Convention shall be published with ex-
planations, as the Convention provides, at least one month preceding the election.
(g) The vote on the proposed revision or amendments shall be on a separate ballot.
Any proposed revision or amendments shall become effective, as the Convention pro-
vides, if approved by a majority of those voting on the question.
Id.
The parallel article of the federal Constitution, Article V, reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Consti-
tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses of the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
213. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1(a).
214. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § l(c).
215. The three-fifths requirement seemed to be a reasonable effort toward flexibility because
Illinois's population in 1970 was divided almost equally into three discrete geographic and political
groups - each with interests and goals in common: (1) Chicago; (2) the suburbs of Chicago
(suburban Cook and the five "collar" counties); and (3) "downstate" (the ninety-six other coun-
ties). The old two-thirds requirement allowed just one of these segments of the state's population
to "frustrate the will of the other two." E.g., Lousin, supra note 118, at 8.
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groups who do not want change. . .. [Ilt is really change versus non-
change that divides most conventions." 16
When the question of calling a convention was before the Illinois
voters in 1856,217 a majority of those voting on the question voted
for it, but they still represented less than a third of the state-wide
number who voted for Governor.218 The call was defeated decisively
under the restrictive two-thirds majority required under the 1848
(and 1870) Constitution, 1 9 and would have been defeated under the
present 1970 requirements as well. Similarly, when a convention call
was placed on the ballot in 1934, it also failed, primarily because
newspapers campaigned actively against the call.22 0 Once again,
though the call received a majority of the votes of those voting on
the question, 561/2 percent of the voters in the general election sim-
ply failed to vote on the call.221
Only the election of 1824 differs from the three other unsuccess-
ful proposals for calling Illinois constitutional conventions (1842,
1856, 1934) in that a majority of voters on the question in 1824
actually voted against the call. The 1824 call was defeated over a
specific issue, slavery,222 while the other calls were defeated by voter
apathy. Even with the help of strong gubernatorial and legislative
backing, as well as active newspaper support, the 1868 call (result-
ing in the 1869-1870 Constitutional Convention) was approved by
only a bare majority of 726 votes.22 3
Fortunately, due in large part to the 1964 "at-large legislative elec-
tions,224 there was a sufficient legislative majority to enact the 1968
convention call; and in response to a unique and extremely well or-
ganized campaign, the 1968 call prevailed by a count of 2,979,977
votes to 1,135,440 votes.225 Such emphatic support was quite un-
216. CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION, supra note 23, at 19-20.
217. CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 45.
218. Id. at 45-46.
219. Id. at 46.
220. The Chicago Tribune was the most vocal in its opposition, claiming that "[t]he Conven-
tion would provide just such troubled waters as Communists and Fascists most desire. They could
ask no better opportunity to destroy free government." Id. at 119. Thus, public apathy and igno-
rance, "perhaps aided by the fear of radicalism and the dislike of spending money for a conven-
tion, were the apparent causes for its defeat." Id. (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 118-19.
222. Id. at 23.
223. Id. at 58-59.
224. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
225. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at xi.
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usual. Compared to other political issues, constitutional reform gen-
erally escapes voter interest. It is boring and the issues are usually
abstract, complex, and affect the voter only indirectly.22 As one
writer has noted:
[Constitutional rieform tends to come and be accepted most readily when it
is dictated by severe need. . . . If those concerned with revision can piggy-
back their efforts to win approval of a convention on some rather obvious
and pressing need, they obtain a powerful assist. [On] the other hand,...
[it] is difficult in the extreme to persuade an electorate [that a] reformed
court system . . . is really worth getting excited about.22
Moreover, voters, indoctrinated throughout their lives with the im-
portance of constitutions as fundamental charters, are understanda-
bly reluctant to engage in wholesale change:
Negative majorities, insofar as we understand their composition and motiva-
tion, are made up of those who fear change in some generalized way, or
have been persuaded that one specific provision, marginal to the grand
scheme, like excision of a lottery ban . . . justifies rejection. . . . [There] is
a presumption against change in the voter's mind.228
When one adds to this "presumption" the requirement that a major-
ity of all those voting at the election must vote for a convention, a
"negative minority" is easily garnered to stop revision or amend-
ment by convention. Consequently, although it is somewhat hyper-
bolic to say so, it is largely true that a state with a "super-majority"
requirement on the call question "might as well give up all thought
of ever holding a convention. 229
"Majority voting at the election" requirements for convention
questions such as that in the Illinois Constitution have not always
raised real problems. When the original super-majority requirement
was placed in that document, voting among the few frontiersman
who arrived at the polling places throughout the state was viva voce,
and every voter voted on all referenda. 230 However, "since the adop-
tion of the printed and secret ballot [and] lists of registered voters,
only those really interested in referenda vote on them, and many,
being ignorant or uninterested, ignore them."2 It has become sim-
226. Id. at x.
227. CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION, supra note 23, at 7.
228. Id. at xi (emphasis added).
229. DEALY. supra note 15, at 144. This observation was made in reference to Illinois, in par-
ticular, as well as a few other similarly-situated states. Id.
230. Id. n.1.
231. Id.
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ply impossible, therefore, to get a total vote on a referendum much
larger than about one-half to two-thirds of the number of people
who vote at the general election. 2  Of course there are a variety of
reasons why it is important to avoid having too small a majority of
the general public authorize what might be hasty, excessive, or par-
tisan-driven large-scale change.2 33 Nevertheless, only requiring a
simple majority on the question of the call would still legitimize that
call, authorizing a convention at the hands of at least one-sixth to
one-third of the voters. This is certainly a large and reliable enough
sample of public opinion. 4 Moreover, there would already be suffi-
cient protection against hasty or ill-considered action, since a legis-
lative "super-majority" would still be required to put the convention
question before the voters in the first place.
There were other significant gestures toward reform evident in the
1970 document. Subsection (1)(c) of Article XIV reinforced the his-
torically significant requirement that the question of calling a con-
vention be placed on a separate ballot.2 5 Subsection (1)(b), how-
ever, added the new requirement that, if not otherwise submitted by
the General Assembly, the question of whether a convention should
be called must be submitted to the electorate every twentieth
year.2 6 This was an important innovation in Illinois.2 7 Actually,
232. See DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 52-54 (claiming that the diffi-
culty in obtaining sufficient votes for the required majority of those voting at a general election is
due to the lack of interest in the matter proposed).
233. See, e.g., JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 552-53 (noting that
if the required majority is too small, proposed amendments could assume a partisan character,
giving the voters free rein to change "organic laws" and thereby jeopardizing their stability).
234. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 53-54. Another alternative might be
a measure similar to the 1891 Kentucky provision: a call passes if the votes equal at least one-
quarter of the qualified voters. This lodges power in those representing a significant enough sam-
ple to reasonably "represent the intelligent public opinion of the community." Id.
235. See Rita M. Kopp, The Illinois Constitution: An Orientation, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 480,
487 (1968) (noting that the "separate ballot" provision was a part of the important Gateway
Amendment finally passed in 1950). For further discussion, see notes 408-14 and accompanying
text (discussing the Gateway Amendment's separate ballot requirement).
236. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § (l)(b). It is generally believed that legislative enactment
of a convention call referendum in Illinois would not require gubernatorial approval. DODD, REVI-
SION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 56-57 n.55. Yet in Nebraska, where this also was as-
sumed to be true, a joint resolution of 1903 to this effect was vetoed by the Governor after ad-
journment of the legislature. No further action was taken. Id.
237. The first provisions for submitting a convention call to the general public were found in
the constitutions of Delaware (1792), Tennessee (1796), Kentucky (1799), and Ohio (1802).
DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT. supra note 15, at 48. Submitting convention questions to the
public was the practice in twenty-six states (including Illinois) by 1910. Sixteen of those states
(including Illinois) required a two-thirds legislative majority for submission, while the others re-
quired a three-fifths vote (Nebraska) or a simple majority. Id. at 48-49. These submissions were
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the notion that it is important for the people to periodically review
their constitutions came to the United States from John Locke via
George Mason;23 8 the idea that this periodic review ought to be
mandatory really should be attributed to Machiavelli via the radical
republicans of the early Republic.2"' Nevertheless, it is Thomas Jef-
ferson who usually gets the credit. He wrote:
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and
constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; be-
cause, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find prac-
tical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the
change in circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with
the times. . . . [Each generation has] a right to choose for itself the form of
government it believes most promotive of its happiness . . . [A] solemn op-
portunity for doing this every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided
by the constitution; .... 240
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1792 was the first constitu-
tion to require the submission of the convention call question to the
people at regular intervals - every seven years.241 Indiana followed
in 1816, requiring a submission every twelve years. 24 2 It is surprising
that a provision similar to Indiana's was not added to the 1848 Illi-
not mandatory, but were to be made at the discretion of the legislature.
238. George Mason expressed John Locke's notion of a right to revolution in the Virginia Bill
of Rights (1776): "[W]hen any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these pur-
poses, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable and indefeasible right to
reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal."
VA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1776).
239. See Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, Letter IV (Philadelphia, 1776), reprinted in
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, at 8 ("[tlhe Anonymous author of this [widely pub-
lished] treatise had considerable knowledge of the law and must have been a radical republican").
It states:
"I wish," says Lord Camden, "that the maxim of Machiaveli was followed, that of
examining a Constitution, at certain periods, according to its first principles; this
would correct abuses, and supply defects .. " [S]ome article in the Constitution
may provide, that at the expiration of every seven or any other number of years a
Provincial Jury shall be elected, to enquire if any inroads have been made in the
Constitution, and to have power to remove them; but not make alterations, unless a
clear majority of all the inhabitants shall so direct.
Id.
240. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in 10 JEF-
FERSON WRITINGS. supra note 66, at 42-43 These thoughts are commonly referred to as the "do-
mestication" of a right to revolution.
241. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 50.
242. Id.
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nois Constitution." 3 New York's constitution of 1846, by compari-
son, followed the lead of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Indi-
ana in requiring submission of the question at regular intervals - in
New York's case, every twenty years.2"4 In the 1850s, Illinois's
neighboring states of Michigan, Ohio, and Iowa, in addition to Ma-
ryland, also adopted this kind of provision. 4 Moreover:
Periodic[, automatic] submission to the people of the convention question
would appear to be consistent with the principle of increased popular partic-
ipation in government embodied in the greater elective power established in
the 1848 [Illinois] constitution; however, there is no evidence that it was
seriously considered by Illinois constitution makers.2 4
This fact might tend to reinforce the assumption that the Illinois
convention intended a more inflexible document than those upon
which it was modeled or those desired by delegates in neighboring
Midwestern states. Still, only six states required periodic submission
by 1910,247 and even by 1960 only eleven states required submission
of convention call questions (usually by the legislature) at regular
intervals. 48 Thus, the lack of a mandatory periodic convention call
referendum provision before 1970 placed Illinois outside the historic
mainstream regionally, but not nationally. There were also problems
with these provisions. Requirements for mandatory referenda were
ignored by the legislatures in a number of cases over the years, and
there was no legal recourse.249 This caused many who drafted con-
stitutions after 1960 to make periodic submission of the call ques-
tion an administrative rather than a legislative responsibility.
Among the states that took this course of action were Alaska, which
243. It was not adopted by the 1818 Illinois Constitutional Convention even though that con-
vention had the Indiana amending provision before it. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying
text (discussing the relationship between the Illinois and Indiana constitutions at this time).
244. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 51.
245. Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State Constitutional
Convention: Enforcing the People's Right to Reform their Government, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 421, 424
n.18 (1970). See generally THORPE, supra note 171 (vols. 1-7) (outlining federal and state
constitutions).
246. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 41.
247. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 51. By 1910, states with automatic
submission of convention call questions included Iowa (10 years); Michigan (16 years); and Mary-
land, New York, and Ohio (20 years). Id. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was the first to
provide, in 1975, for submission of the convention call question to the people. Id. at 43. The New
Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided that a convention would be called in seven years if a
popular vote at that time favored such action. However, periodic submission was not thereafter
required in that state. Id. at 50.
248. Bartley, supra note 25, at 25.
249. Id. at 35.
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made the Secretary of State responsible for initiating a call, and
Hawaii, which made the Lieutenant Governor responsible for initi-
ating a call. 5
The 1970 convention in Illinois also decided not to give the Gen-
eral Assembly the exclusive right to initiate a convention call.25 1
This resulted from a mistrust of the legislature and a general aware-
ness of the "historic antagonism of the legislature toward the con-
vention process.''252 After much discussion, the Committee on
Amending and Suffrage decided to place the convention call ques-
tion before the electorate automatically at regular intervals 253 of
twenty years 25" as an alternative to legislative action. Fourteen
states now require periodic submission; eight of them, including Illi-
nois, have provisions calling for twenty-year intervals. 55
This is yet another reform that may mean little in terms of in-
creased constitutional flexibility. While it was thought that a
mandatory convention call would bypass the legislature at the initial
stage of the process 258 and thereby increase the frequency and ease
with which the Illinois constitution could be amended,257 this has
not proven to be true. The first automatic twenty-year convention
call, on November 8, 1988, failed overwhelmingly at the polls by a
margin of almost three to one. 58
The 1970 Constitution provides that should the voters approve the
convention call question,259 the General Assembly has the responsi-
250. Id. at 33.
251. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 22.
252. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing the relative infrequency of legisla-
tively-proposed convention call elections).
253. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 22.
254. Id. One of the forty-one Suffrage and Constitutional Amendment Committee witnesses at
the 1970 Convention, Professor Stanley Erikson, specifically suggested an automatic call every 15
or 20 years. Id. at 17.
255. STURM & MAY. supra note 96, at 138. The fourteen states and their automatic submission
periods are: Hawaii (9 years); Alaska, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island (10 years);
Michigan (16 years); and Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio,
and Oklahoma (20 years). Id.
256. Constitutional provisions which require that the question of calling a convention be sub-
mitted periodically to the electorate obviously bypass the legislature at the initial stage of the
procedure - the stage at which the legislature has the power to vote to place the call on the
ballot. Henry D. Levine, Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the
State Experience, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 127, 131 (1973).
257. May, supra note 11, at 156 ("Overall, most convention calls are approved, but the auto-
matic calls are frequently rejected.").
258. Tuesday's Ledger of Winners, Losers, CI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1988, §1, at 26.
259. The Georgia Constitution of 1777 was the first to require action by the people for the
calling of a convention. It was also the first to allow popular initiative to this end, but the provision
1994]
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bility for enacting enabling legislation for the convention.2 60 The
legislative authority, however, does not include the power to limit
the scope of subjects to be discussed at the convention unless the
electorate first votes for such limitations.2 61 Enabling legislation may
cover the financing of the convention; the manner of electing dele-
gates,262 including their qualifications;263 and the basis of represen-
was never implemented, probably because it was too cumbersome. DODD, REVISION AND AMEND-
MENT. supra note 15, at 42, 48. By 1910, the practice of obtaining popular approval for the calling
of a convention was virtually a settled rule: thirty-two states required such approval and, even
where it was not required, a popular vote was taken on most calls. Id. at 51.
260. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1(d). However, the obligation of the General Assembly
to enact the required enabling legislation may be unenforceable because it is unlikely that manda-
mus would be issued against the legislature. Dale A. Kimball, Note, The Constitutional Conven-
tion, It's Nature and Powers - And the Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 390, 397;
Note, Constitutional Change, supra note 33, at 1008; see also Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 50-51
(1874) (noting that enabling legislation was "not in itself a call" for a convention, but that the
legislature "might call" a convention). The legislature refused to pass a bill to convene a conven-
tion in Maryland after voters approved a convention call in 1950. In 1886, the "popular vote"
taken in New York (under the 1846 Constitution, which required a vote on a call every twenty
years) overwhelmingly favored calling a constitutional convention. Yet a disagreement between
the legislature And the Governor, each with different party affiliations, made it impossible to ob-
tain passage of a law authorizing the convention until 1894. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT,
supra note 15, at 55. A similar situation occurred in New Hampshire in 1860 and 1864. Id. n.53
(citing JAMES F. COLBY, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 218
(1902)). Even if enabling legislation is enacted, the governor may still veto that law. Legislation
providing for a convention call probably would not require gubernatorial approval; but the ena-
bling legislation for the convention probably would require such approval. Id. at 56-57 n.55.
261. Congress is given similar responsibility for providing enabling legislation for a federal con-
stitutional convention. In the recent past, similar questions have arisen as to whether this responsi-
bility also gives Congress the power to limit the scope of a convention. It has been suggested that
since the Article V convention method was designed as an alternative amending process for use by
the states in the event that Congress became oppressive, Congress itself must not have the power
to limit the scope of the convention's deliberations and actions. Instead, such scholars argue that
Congress only has the power to legislate over housekeeping matters. Douglas G. Voegler, Amend-
ing the Constitution by the Article V Convention Method, 55 N.D. L. REV. 355, 395 (1979); see
also infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text (discussing the question of whether Congress
could limit a convention even if the thirty-four state applications were all confined to a single topic
or issue).
262. This is an important opportunity for the legislature to influence the outcome of the con-
vention. For example, election of delegates for the 1970 Illinois Convention was largely nonparti-
san. 1969 Ill. Laws 76-40. Historically, nonpartisan delegate elections have contributed toward the
success of constitutional conventions in Illinois. Partisan conventions, however, have been a bad
idea on the whole. See CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 97-99 (claiming that "[plartisanship had
been a major cause for the defeat of the 1862 constitution"); Id. at 145-47 (suggesting that "[tihe
non-partisan [sic] method . . . contributed greatly to the individuality and diversity of the conven-
tion delegation"); CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION, supra note 23, at 15 ("To the extent
that conventions appear political and operate like normal legislatures (which rarely have favorable
public images), they will fall far short of the ideal they are expected to approximate and undercut
their claim on public support or approval."). See generally Note, Constitutional Change, supra
note 33, at 1016-22 (discussing a partisan versus nonpartisan basis for elections and supporting
the use of nonpartisan elections). Consequently, nonpartisan elections are the most common
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tation.2 " Experience has shown, however, that it is safer to specify
in the constitution the basis of representation in the convention: It
method for selecting delegates to modern conventions. May, supra note 11, at 157; see also Liv-
ingston v. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138, 145 (I11. 1969) (upholding nonpartisan elections).
Illinois legislatures have generally taken the high road in conforming to national norms in this
area. The problem at the time of the 1920 convention was that, due largely to an Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion (which has never been found), it was thought that delegates could not be elected on
a nonpartisan basis. GEORGE E. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN
ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 559 (1969). By 1970, however, the convention's Com-
mittee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amendment was fully prepared to require - at least in the
original § 1(d) in the 1970 Constitution - that delegates be elected on a nonpartisan ballot. This
was dropped on second reading because the delegates felt that including such a provision directly
in the constitution was too restrictive and that such details should be left to enabling or imple-
menting legislation. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 52.
263. In order to become a delegate in Illinois, a person "must meet the same eligibility require-
ments as a member of the General Assembly." ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1(e). See gener-
ally Note, State Constitutional Conventions: Limitation on Their Powers, 55 IowA L. REV. 244,
254-58 (1969) (discussing the subject of delegate qualifications and selection). The 1870 Illinois
Constitution required delegates to satisfy the same requirements as members of the Illinois Sen-
ate. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § I (amended 1970). Article IV, § 3 of that constitution
prohibited persons who held "any lucrative" state or federal offices from taking seats in the Illinois
Senate. Id. art. IV, § 3. The enabling act for the 1970 Convention provided that legislators and
other public officials who were otherwise qualified could serve, but they would receive no salary
from the convention - and thus would not become "lucrative" office holders. 1969 II1. Laws 76-
40. In Livingston v. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138 (II1. 1969), opponents of dual office-holding argued
that because of article IV, § 3, a person holding another "state or federal office" could not run for
or be seated as a convention delegate. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d at 141. The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the legislative enabling acts as written on the ground that a convention delegate was not a
lucrative state "officer." Id. at 143. But see Forty-Second Legislative Assembly v. Lennon, 481
P.2d 330, 334 (Mont. 1971) (upholding the exclusion of certain public officials as delegates by
determining that the "public position of delegate" is that of a "public office"); see also BRADEN &
COHN. supra note 262, at 560-61 (suggesting that the court's conclusion was clear enough in
Livingston, but "by a route most confusing"). This compromise represented by Public Act 76-40
eventually worked its way into the present constitution, even though the 1970 Committee on Suf-
frage and Constitutional Amendment largely believed that delegates should not hold other offices.
GRATCH & UBIK. supra note 168, at 24-25. It became clear that even if delegates had other part-
time official jobs, they were often valuable to the convention and should be kept. Id.
A related controversy arose in the Illinois Convention of 1862. Delegate O'Melveny had been a
judge within one year prior to having been elected a convention delegate. Id. The earlier constitu-
tion had provided that judges should not be eligible "to hold any other office, for public trust or
profit" in the state during the term of office and for one year thereafter. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art.
V, § 10 (amended 1970). O'Melveny's credentials as delegate were challenged on that basis. At
first, the convention voted to allow him to retain his seat. On a motion to reconsider, those for his
retention argued that a convention delegate was not an "office or public trust" inasmuch as they
were not controlled by the constitution and were not part of any of the three branches of govern-
ment. Those against him argued that, at the very least, a delegate was occupying a "public trust"
as public officials are not mentioned in the constitution. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS, supra note 14, at 317-19. In discussing this event at the 1862 Convention, Judge Jameson
concluded that delegates are officers of the state because they are "part of the apparatus by which
a sovereign society does its work as a political organism." Id. at 319.
264. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing how the 1869 Convention sought to
end conflict over the number and. replacement of delegates).
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should never be the same as the legislature itself.2 5 By 1915, seven-
teen state constitutions used the state house of representatives as a
basis for representation at their conventions. Illinois was one of only
three states requiring that it be twice the number in the state sen-
ate, while two other states required different multiples of the size of
the senate. 66 The 1970 Illinois Constitution requires the General
Assembly to provide in the enabling legislation for the election of
two delegates from each legislative district. 67 To the extent that the
Illinois Senate comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution, so would the next constitutional convention.2 68
Once the convention has been called and the delegates selected,
the convention is charged with preparing "such revision of or
amendments to the Constitution as it deems necessary.' 2 6 9 The
question, though, is whether the convention can be instructed in ad-
vance, by the enabling legislature or the citizens voting for the con-
vention call, on what is "necessary?" In other words, can a conven-
265. ROGER S. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS, AND LIMITA-
TIONS 79-88 (1917).
266. Id.
267. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § l(d). In essence, this provision results in a convention
composed of 118 delegates, or twice the number of state senators.
268. Of course, the question might not arise, since a constitutional convention may not need to
conform to the "one-man, one-vote" rule:
If a convention could proclaim a revised constitution, there would be little doubt that
it would be held to be subject to the one-man, one-vote rule. But where . . . no propo-
sal of a convention can take effect until approved by the people in referendum, the
matter is not so clear.
2 A. E. "DICK" HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1184 (1974)
[hereinafter HOWARD, COMMENTARIES]. In Illinois, it has been held that the "one-man, one-vote"
principle is not relevant to constitutional conventions because conventions do no more than present
proposals to the voters. Livingston v. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138, 146 (II1. 1969); accord Bates v.
Edwards, 294 So. 2d 532, 534 (La. 1974) (sustaining convention call for the Louisiana Conven-
tion of 1973-74, notwithstanding a lack of a popular call and a mixture of elected and appointed
delegates), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 811 (1974). The "one-man, one-vote" principle may apply
to convention delegate elections only if the state constitutional law permits constitutions drafted
by conventions to take effect without popular ratification. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S.
50, 59 (1970); Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 626 (1965). In the absence of a constitutional
provision specifically entitling state citizens to equal apportionment, state courts disagree. E.g., W.
VA. CONST. art. II, § 4; West Virginia ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 794 (W. Va. 1965)
(holding unconstitutional the practice of allocating delegates to a convention by legislative act
without providing for equality of representation). Compare Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 724
(N.J. 1964) (invalidating a legislative article dealing with the apportionment of members of the
legislature) with West v. Carr, 370 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tenn. 1963) (upholding a provision permit-
ting legislative apportionment of convention delegates, since the controlling element is not the
legislative act but the approval and ratification of the Act by the people, especially where there is
no claim of malapportionment of vote).
269. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § l(f) (emphasis added).
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tion be directed or otherwise limited in the scope of its efforts?
These are important questions for Illinois. Should they be resolved
affirmatively, it might increase the possibility of constitutional
change by allowing for more frequent conventions directed at spe-
cific, long-standing controversies. If directed at specific controver-
sies, such as how Illinois judges are to be chosen or how public edu-
cation should be funded, the fear of potentially unleashing
disruption of the political order in a wide-open convention would be
eliminated.
Even if the Illinois legislature was not sufficiently unified to draft
and propose a new judicial or education article, it could at least
submit to the voters the question of whether to call a convention for
the purpose of changing the judicial or education articles. The Gen-
eral Assembly would naturally want to be convinced that there was
significant public support for considering such reform before author-
izing the necessary expenditures. But they would be aided in this by
public hearings and other expressions of public opinion. The legisla-
tors would be accorded electoral support for having initiated impor-
tant public debate, as well as for having facilitated any important
reforms ultimately approved by the voters; yet without suffering the
political consequences of supporting a controversial constitutional
measure that may alienate a substantial number of voters.
The state constitution itself places no limitations on the scope of
conventions in Illinois. Most conventions, of course, have been used
for major revisions;2 70 Illinois's six conventions have all proposed en-
tirely revised constitutions to the electorate.2 71 Nevertheless, an Illi-
nois convention is free to revise the constitution completely or to
only propose amendments to certain portions of the document.272
While there is still some question as to whether a federal constitu-
tional convention could be so limited, 73 a substantial number of all
state constitutional conventions have been successfully limited in
scope through voter approval of limitations. 74 Moreover, referenda
on limited convention calls will tend to achieve greater public atten-
tion and will result in "higher percentages of approval" than those
270. See, e.g., Adrian, supra note 39, at 322 (noting that when given the option, most state
constitutional conventions prefer to write new constitutions).
271. See generally CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 169.
272. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, §1.
273. See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text.
274. Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: The State Precedents, 3 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 563 (1982).
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calling for unlimited bodies.2 7 Thus, assuming a clearly limited pur-
pose in the wording of the convention call ballot and in the voter
information and publicity, the Illinois General Assembly theoreti-
cally could submit a call for a limited, brief, and inexpensive con-
vention to respond to narrow but pressing problems or to consider
revising only specific articles.
The question of whether a federal constitutional convention could
be limited has been discussed often in recent years, as state requests
for a convention on various subjects have approached the thirty-four
votes necessary to "require" Congress to call a convention . 76 The
applications have asked for specific amendments on such issues as
legislative reapportionment, 2 "7 balanced budget requirements, 27 8 and
limits on federal income tax increases.2 79 Before 1893, the states al-
most always submitted applications to Congress for general agenda
conventions.28  However, for some reason, the practice has almost
totally changed, and since 1929, only one state has applied for a
general agenda convention. 8
275. ALBERT L. STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938-1968, at 67
(1970) [hereinafter STURM, THIRTY YEARS].
276. Bills have been proposed in Congress setting out procedures that Congress must follow
when calling and conducting a convention upon general application of the states. See, for example,
S. 817, introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch, and S. 600, introduced by Senator Jesse Helms in
1981. A similar bill was proposed by Senator Sam Ervin in 1967. It passed the Senate in 1971,
but died in the House Judiciary Committee. Most commentators believe such a law would be
helpful in resolving conflicts in advance. See Article V and the Proposed Federal Constitutional
Convention Procedures Bill. Report and Recommendation to the New York State Bar Associa-
tion by the Committee on Federal Constitution, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 529 (1982) [hereinafter N.Y.
Bar Report]; Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United
States Constitution, 85 HARV. L REV. 1612, 1615-29 (1972). Such "[I]egislation would ... help
avoid the chaos and substantial delay which might result if Congress had to make, on an ad hoc
basis following receipt of thirty-four applications, all decisions concerning the sufficiency of appli-
cations, the convening of the convention, and the procedures to be followed by it." Id. at 1617. As
Senator Sam Ervin said in support of his bill: "The Constitution made the amendment process
difficult, and properly so. It certainly was not the intention of the original Convention to make it
impossible . . . . My bill seeks to preserve the symmetry of article V by implementing the conven-
tion alternative so as to make it a practicable but not easy method of constitutional amendment."
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the
Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 895 (1968). But cf Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the
Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 193 (1972) (stating that the Ervin
bill is unconstitutional, unwise, and could not bind Congress in the future).
277. To overturn the "one-man, one-vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
278. See Doyle W. Buckwalter, Constitutional Conventions and State Legislators, 48 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 20, 25 (1971) (noting that Indiana petitioned for a convention on this subject in
1957 and that Wyoming did the same in 1961).
279. Id.
280. N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 276, at 536.
281. Id. at 24 (noting that the states had petitioned for a convention on this matter 31 times
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Could Congress constitutionally limit a convention to any particu-
lar issue submitted by the states? Several scholars support this no-
tion. They view a limited national convention as a sensible and via-
ble means of amending the Constitution. They reason that if only
general conventions were permitted under Article V, the convention
method for merely amending the Constitution would be reduced to
an unworkable absurdity;282 the magnitude of the required operation
and its ultimate effect on our government would make it a very un-
desirable option. Moreover, the states would have no realistic voice
in the convention process unless limited conventions could be
held.2 3 Of course, there are dangers inherent in any method of
amending the United States Constitution. "Thirty-four states repre-
senting 30% of the population could call the convention, twenty-six
states representing one-sixth of the population could propose new
amendments, and thirty-eight states representing less than 40% of
the population could ratify them."2 " Nevertheless, compared to the
power of the Supreme Court to use the Constitution to make what it
considers to be desirable changes in the political and social order,B 5
"The power reserved to the people to express their will and judg-
ment by means of the carefully limited amendment process, whether
initiated by the representatives in Congress or in the state legisla-
tures, seems modest enough. 28 6
There are, however, a number of other scholars who oppose the
before 1971).
282. See, e.g., William W. Van Alsytne, The Limited Constitutional Convention - The Re-
curring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985, 994 n.24 (1979) (citation omitted); see also Arthur E.
Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949,
998 (1968) (concluding that "an article V convention may be limited to the same general subject
matter as that contained in the state applications" and that a "runaway convention is no real
danger since the power of the states and Congress [to limit the scope of the convention] . . . is
based on a sound legal and practical basis"); Buckwalter, supra note 278 (discussing state legisla-
tive attitudes toward the calling of constitutional conventions, including a table of state applica-
tions to Congress which lists thirty-four different subjects).
283. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment - Its
Meaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641, 642-44 (1979) (suggesting that states would
be "helpless to mandate action by Congress on specific grievances" if they were only allowed to
call general conventions); Robert M. Rhodes, A Limited Federal Constitutional Convention, 26
U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1973) (explaining that state legislatures may petition Congress to con-
vene a convention, but Congress may "define and restrict" it through the convention call since
Congress is obliged to "limit the scope" to the matter of the state's application).
284. Paul G. Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MIcH.
L.REv. 903, 914 (1968) [hereinafter Kauper, Amendment Process] (quoting Theodore Sorenson,
The Quiet Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. REV., July 15, 1967, at 17, 19).
285. Id. at 917-18.
286. Id. at 919.
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idea of a limited, or for that matter, any federal constitutional con-
vention. A few believe that although the states have been able to
limit state conventions, those were limitations ratified through a
popular vote. This precedent may not apply to a federal constitu-
tional convention because there is no federal analogue to popular
ratification by state citizens.2"" It has also been suggested that state
applications setting out the exact text of an amendment as the sole
purpose of a convention are really not applications for a "Conven-
tion for proposing Amendments" as described in article V and are
therefore invalid.288 At least one commentator has concluded that
the "course of steady constitutional evolution [through individual
amendments separately weighed and considered as codified solutions
to separate problems] is the only one practicable for a society of the
size and complexity of the United States."2 9 Others are convinced
that judicial review is our real system for developmental constitu-
tionalism.2 90 In particular, many feel that the periodically recurring
applications for a convention for the limited purpose of writing a
balanced budget amendment are unwise. Professor Laurence Tribe
argues that: (1) the Constitution embodies fundamental law and
should not be made the instrument of specific social or economic
policies; (2) it would be a mistake to take the uncharted course of
an Article V Convention while the well-traveled route of amend-
ment by congressional initiative remains open; and (3) an "Article
V Convention,. . . would today provoke controversy and debate un-
paralleled in recent constitutional history."2 91 These fears may be
287. Heller, supra note 274, at 577. But see N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 276, at 537 n.36
(arguing that the "popular vote" may not be a meaningful distinction); see also Levine, supra
note 256, at 142-50 (suggesting that the state experience does illuminate the question of limiting
federal constitutional conventions).
288. See ORFIELD, supra note 65, at 45 (noting that the role of state "legislatures is confined to
applying for a convention, and any statement of purposes in their petitions would be irrelevant as
to the scope of powers of the convention"); Walter E. Dellinger, Who Controls a Constitutional
Convention? - A Response, 1979 DUKE L.J. 999 (1979) (arguing that a convention, not a state
legislature, is authorized under Article V to "define the issues" and to "determine the nature and
text of any amendments"); N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 276, at 538 (noting that the point of
recent scholarship in opposition to Congress's limitation powers is that amendments to the federal
Constitution ought to originate only from a "fully deliberative body of national scope").
289. Ralph M. Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66 MIcH.
L.REv. 921, 930 (1968).
290. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitu-
tion?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931, 947 (1968) (arguing that judicial review is a "traditional and valued
process" and a "major form of American policy-making"); see also supra note 65 and accompa-
nying text.
291. Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Con-
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unjustified, however, because most state applications for a conven-
tion to propose a balanced budget amendment contain "delimiting
provisions," evidence that the states themselves are suspicious of a
runaway convention." 2
The early scholars of state constitutional amendment and revision
did not fully agree as to whether state conventions could be so lim-
ited. 93 Judge John Jameson, at least in the 1867 version of his fa-
mous treatise, was biased by his revulsion over the wild assertions of
sovereignty in the Illinois conventions of 1847 and 1862.294 Thus, he
argued at least implicitly that legislative limits on conventions were
legitimate because the legislature represents the sovereign people. 295
By 1910, however, Professor Walter Dodd had rejected Jameson's
position. He argued that constitutional conventions were indepen-
dent bodies which could not be subordinated to legislatures.296 Pro-
fessor Roger Hoar weighed in by 1917, concluding that while purely
legislative limitations might be invalid, limitations ratified at a pop-
ular referendum on a legislative measure calling the convention
were entirely valid. 97 This last position has gained nearly universal
vention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 633 (1979) [hereinafter
Tribe, Balanced Budget].
292. Maryanne R. Rackoff, Comment, The Monster Approaching the Capitol: The Effort to
Write Economic Policy into the United States Constitution, 15 AKRON L. REV. 733, 734 (1982);
see also Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution,
14 GA. L. REV. 1 (1979) (noting the hazards due to unanswered and unanswerable questions
regarding constitutional conventions); Robert J. Steamer, The Quest for Perfection: Amending the
Constitution, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 29-31 (Feb. 1983) (discussing the need to limit constitutional
amendments to fundamental law).
293. Heller, supra note 274, at 565-66.
294. N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 276, at 537; see JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS,
supra note 14, at 656-59 (responding to Professor Van Hoist's criticisms of the first edition's
thesis of legislative sovereignty as "what the German's call tendenz scholarship" (written to sup-
port a preconceived thesis).
295. JOHN A. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: ITS HISTORY, POWERS, AND
MODES OF PROCEEDING 352, 378-531 (New York, Charles Scribner 1867). But see JAMESON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 342-43 (noting that should the entire electo-
rate, as representatives of the sovereign, "publish instructions to a Convention in reference to the
measures it should consider or report, . . . the consequent duty of obedience on the part of the
delegates could [not] well be denied"); Id. at 354-55, 365 (concluding that whether, under any
and what circumstances, the legislature may dictate what the convention shall do is a question of
some difficulty).
296. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 73-80, 92; see also Franz v. Autry,
91 P. 193, 202-07 (Okla. 1907) (holding that conventions are vested with powers and duties de-
rived from the people, not the legislature, and thus can have no superior but the people
themselves).
297. HOAR, supra note 265, at 91, 108, 121-23; Bartley, supra note 25, at 33-35; Heller, supra
note 274, at 565-66; see, e.g., Pryor v. Lowe, 523 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Ark. 1975) (holding that a
state constitutional convention composed entirely of appointed members, convened without popu-
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acceptance in state courts and legislatures.298 In several instances,
conventions have been compelled to consider some matters but left
free to deal with others as they wished.299 Some conventions, on the
other hand, have been successfully prohibited from amending one or
more portions of the state constitution but otherwise left free to re-
vise the remainder as they saw fit. 300 The most common and suc-
cessful conventions have specified that only a certain mandate or
certain subjects should be considered.301
Nevertheless, several state legislatures, including Illinois's, have
been reluctant to call limited conventions for fear that a convention
would exceed any limitations in the call and destroy existing politi-
cal relationships. 302 In Illinois, the fear that a constitutional conven-
lar approval and limited in subjects it could consider, deprived the people of their inherent politi-
cal power).
298. E.g., Gaines v. O'Connell, 204 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947) (holding limitations
on a convention binding since the Kentucky Constitution contained "no inhibition or restriction
upon the General Assembly" in the matter); Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55, 63 (Tenn.
1975) (holding that the effect of adding the phrase "within the limitation of the call" to the 1870
Constitution was to legalize the "political entity known as a limited constitutional convention");
Cummings v. Beeler, 223 S.W.2d 913, 921-22 (Tenn. 1949) (holding that submitting the question
of calling a convention to a popular vote is valid); see also Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 49, 53-54
(Va. 1945) ("The constitutional convention is an agency of the people to formulate or amend and
revise a Constitution. [It] does not possess all of the powers of the people but it can exercise only
such powers as may be conferred upon it by the people. The people may confer upon it limited
powers.").
299. See, for example, Alabama's Convention of 1875, which was only required to provide for a
public school system. Connecticut's court-ordered Convention of 1965 was only required to con-
sider legislative apportionment (Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D. Conn.
1965)), but being without any other restrictions, ultimately rewrote the entire state constitution.
Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the State Experience, II
HARV. J. LEGIS. 127, 134 n.40 (1973).
300. Some example are: Alabama's Convention of 1875; North Carolina's Conventions of 1835
and 1875; Louisiana's Convention of 1898; Maryland's Convention of 1850; and New Jersey's
Convention of 1947 (which was permitted to make changes in any area except the apportionment
of the state legislature). Id.
301. Some of these successful conventions were California's Convention of 1878; Georgia's
Convention of 1833; New Jersey's Convention of 1966 (prohibited from considering any issue
except legislative apportionment); New York's Conventions of 1801 and 1867; Pennsylvania's
Convention of 1967-68; Rhode Island's 1944, 1951, 1955, and 1958 conventions; Tennessee's
1952, 1960, and 1971 conventions; and Virginia's 1945 and 1956 conventions. STURM, MODERNIZ-
ING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 8. For a discussion of how state court challenges to such
limitations have failed, see Foley v. Democratic Parish Comm., 70 So. 104, 105 (La. 1915) (hold-
ing that prohibiting a convention from changing an "existing law touching a public board and
touching elections . . . was operative and binding"). See also Louisiana v. American Sugar Ref.
Co., 68 So. 742, 744 (La. 1914) ("[The] power of [the] Legislature to submit proposals to the
people for the holding of a convention was not subject to the restrictions applicable to constitu-
tional amendments.").
302. Bartley, supra note 25, at 33.
1994] STATE CONSTITUTIONS
tion might act as a sovereign entity - that is, act as if it were
immune from legislatively proscribed and voter ratified limitations
- derives from Illinois's unique experience with these bodies. At
the 1847 Illinois Convention, for example, a delegate proclaimed:
We are ...the sovereignty of the State. We are what the people of the
State would be, if they were congregated here in one mass meeting. We are
what Louis XIV said he was, "We are the State." [sic] We can trample the
Constitution under our feet as waste paper, and no one can call us to ac-
count save the people.308
And in the Illinois Convention of 1862, a leading delegate stated,
"If the State is sovereign, the Convention is sovereign. If this Con-
vention here does not represent the power of the people, where can
you find its representative? If sovereign power does not reside in this
body there is no such thing as sovereignty. '" 30 Actually, there was
significant support for the view that conventions are sovereign enti-
ties until as late as 1945.05
Of course, as Professor A. E. "Dick" Howard pointed out:
303. 2 HOWARD, COMMENTARIES, supra note 268, at 1182; JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTIONS, supra note 14, at 304; Heller, supra note 274, at 566.
304. Heller, supra note 274, at 566 (citing JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra
note 14, at 304).
305. It was said in the New York Convention of 1821 that "the people are here themselves [by]
their delegates . . .[and n]o restriction limits our proceedings." JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTIONS, supra note 14, at 303; Heller, supra note 274, at 565-66. Just prior to the Pennsylvania
Convention of 1837, Judge George M. Dallas expressed the view that, once assembled, the con-
vention would "possess ... absolute sovereignty ...." JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS, supra note 14, at 303; Heller, supra note 274, at 566; see also Livermore v. Waite, 36 P.
424, 426 (Cal. 1894) (noting that the sovereignty of the people is represented by the constitutional
convention); Koehler & Lange v. Hill, 14 N.W. 738, 744 (Iowa 1883) (dictum) ("The powers of a
Convention are, of course, unlimited."), reh'g overruled sub norm. Koehler v. Hill, 15 N.W. 609
(Iowa 1883); Carton v. Secretary of State, 115 N.W. 429, 430 (Mich. 1908) (holding that delib-
erations past the date set by the legislature did not invalidate a convention's product; the "conven-
tion is an independent and sovereign body"); Sproule v. Fredericks, I I So. 472, 474 (Miss. 1892)
(holding that the constitutional convention "is the highest legislative body known to free men in a
representative government" and "is supreme in its sphere"); Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 49, 53
(1858) (stating that a constitutional convention "is the highest legislative assembly recognized in
law" and that the legislature could not prevent the convention from printing its records); In re
Opinion to the Governor, 178 A. 433, 451 (R.I. 1935) (holding that the General Assembly may
call a constitutional convention because it is elected by the people, and the people are sovereign);
JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 308 (discussing the Kentucky Con-
vention of 1849 and the Massachusetts Convention of 1853); R. K. Gooch, The Recent Limited
Constitutional Convention in Virginia, 31 VA. L. REV. 708, 726 (1945) (discussing the agency
concept in reference to conventions and concluding that "there can be no legal limitation" upon a
constitution-making authority's substantive accomplishment). But see Note, Constitutional
Change, supra note 33, at 1012-13 n.70 (characterizing the view that the convention may itself
possess sovereignty as an extreme approach and a discredited natural law assertion).
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The prevailing view . . . treats a convention as the agent of the people who
have called it. Thus, where the people must vote to approve the calling of a
convention, . . . the people are seen to have given their implicit approval to
limitations on the convention's power contained in the enabling legislation
that put the question of calling a convention to the people.so
6
There is, therefore, far greater support at present for the view that a
convention only serves to advise the people and can be limited with
regard to the advice it is to render by a vote of the people on a
legislative measure proposing a limited convention. 0 7 There is even
precedent for the view that individual electors in one county or leg-
islative district can successfully instruct their delegates on how to
vote on a given issue at the convention.308
306. 2 HOWARD, COMMENTARIES. supra note 268, at 1182-83 ("But are the People, by the
mere act of calling a Convention, obliged to confer upon it all of their powers? Surely not. Upon
what principle, for what reason, or by what analogy, can it be contended that the people cannot
constitute a limited, as well as a general, agency .... ").
307. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 354-55. This view was ex-
pressed best by John Randolph in the Virginia Convention of 1829. Id. at 306; Heller, supra note
274, at 566. See State ex rel. Fortier v. Capdevielle, 29 So. 215, 218 (La. 1901) (discussing an act
that allowed the people to fix the powers of a convention, and also provided for submission of a
convention call question to the people); Opinion of the Justices, 60 Mass. 573, 575 (1833) (stating
that if the people called a convention, the delegates "would derive their whole authority and com-
mission from that vote"); Heller, supra note 274, at 569 n.37 (citing cases in which there was a
constitutional challenge based on the "grounds that the enabling legislation's limits had been
transgressed"); Thomas R. White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 1132, 1140 n.29 (1952) (quoting Judge Black, former U.S. Attorney, who presented the view
that the act of calling the convention limited its power). There is also support for the view that by
approving a constitution in which they will no longer be able to vote on the calling of a convention,
the people still may have delegated to the legislature the power to decide that a convention can be
called for a limited purpose. 2 HOWARD, COMMENTARIES, supra note 268, at 1183; see also Note,
Constitutional Change, supra note 33, at 1014 n.78 (1968) (citing cases supporting the conclusion
that the electorate may delegate to the legislature the power to call limited conventions). Once the
people have ratified a convention's efforts, the question of whether the convention was properly
limited becomes moot. After the fact, the limitation is rationalized as proper because of the popu-
lar vote on the proposed constitution. According to one judge:
The people have the same right to limit the powers of their delegates that they have
to bound the power of their representatives. Each are representatives, but only in a
different sphere. It is simply evasive to affirm that the legislature cannot limit the
right of the people to alter or reform their government. Certainly it cannot. The ques-
tion is not upon the power of the legislature to restrain the people, but upon the right
of the people, by the instrumentality of law, to limit their delegates . . . . When a
people act through a law the act is theirs, and the fact that they used the legislature
as their instrument to confer their powers makes them the superiors and not the
legislature.
Woods's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 71-72 (1874) (Agnew, C.J.) (dictum). See generally Wells v. Bain, 75
Pa. 39, 49 (1874) (suggesting that when the legislature acts to limit a convention, it is effective
because the legislators are representatives of the sovereign people).
308. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 352-55. During the Ohio
Convention of 1850, Butler County passed resolutions instructing their delegates on how to vote
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In any event, an Illinois convention's proposed revisions or amend-
ments must be placed on a separate ballot.309 The changes take ef-
fect upon receiving the affirmative votes of a simple majority of
those voting on the separate revision question. 310 The convention
proposals must be published with explanations at least one month
prior to the election31 so that voters can make an informed deci-
sion.311 Informed popular ratification of state constitutional amend-
on the doctrine of repealability of corporate charters. Id. Vance, one of the candidates for delegate
in that county, publicly stated that he would not follow the resolutions. He was elected, however,
by a wide majority. When the issue arose at the convention, Vance voted contrary to the resolu-
tions. The county electors reiterated their position and asked Vance to resign. Vance resigned
rather than appear disobedient, but according to Judge Jameson he could not have been forced to
resign or conform because it would be like asking advice from a convention after first dictating the
advice. Id. at 353.
309. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1(g). See discussion infra notes 408-14 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Gateway Amendment's separate ballot requirement).
310. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § l(g). This was considered a significant reform toward
easing popular revision. By 1919, Illinois was one of only six states still requiring a "majority of
those voting at [an] election" (a super-majority) to adopt the product of a convention. Bulletin
No. 3, supra note 120, at 191-92. The others were California, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, and
Utah. Id. The 1950 Gateway Amendment in Illinois provided the "two-thirds on the question"
alternative, but this was apparently still too burdensome.
311. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § I(f). The 1870 Constitution did not require prior publi-
cation of convention proposals or explanations of proposals; pre-election publication was only re-
quired for amendments proposed by the General Assembly. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2
(amended 1970). However, there was a general act relating to "any proposition ... other than a
constitutional amendment" which was voluntarily observed in connection with the convention
questions submitted in 1918 and 1934. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 7 /2, para. 9ff (1965). For the current
version of this statute, see 10 ILCS § 30/1 (1992).
312. These published explanations are important. Voters have an implied right to accurate in-
formation about the purpose and function of provisions being proposed by the convention. See
Kahalikai v. Doi, 590 P.2d 543, 552-53 (Haw. 1979) (discussing misinformation in voter informa-
tion pamphlets as an infringement of fundamental voting rights). Voter explanations which mis-
lead the voters unconstitutionally abridge voting rights and render the passed revision invalid.
E.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Kusper, 372 N.E.2d 66 (II1. 1978), cert. denied sub
nom. Robinson v. Kusper, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). This case involved a suit seeking a declaratory
judgment concerning the validity of a statute which exempted from ad valorem personal property
taxation (for 1975 and subsequent years) all personal property held by a trustee for the exclusive
benefit of a natural person. Kusper, 372 N.E.2d at 68. However, an amendment to the 1870
Constitution, approved by the voters in November of 1970 (Article IX, § 5(c)), provided that all
revenue lost by the eventual abolition of ad valorem personal property taxes must concurrently be
replaced by statewide taxes affecting only those classes relieved of the burden of paying ad
valorem taxes. Id. The state Supreme Court held that this exemption for trustees from ad valorem
taxation - which would obviously reduce state revenue - was unconstitutional because the Gen-
eral Assembly failed to concurrently enact the required "replacement tax." Id. at 72. Another
issue on appeal, though, was whether the informational pamphlet which discussed the amendment
and was mailed to voters before the 1970 referendum was false and misleading and thus voided
the amendment. Id. at 74. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the replacement tax was not
void, that the pamphlet adequately explained the intent behind proposed § 5(c), and that there
was no infringement of fundamental voting rights because of misleading information. Id.
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ments is uniquely important313 and vital to state constitutional inter-
pretation. Where state voters ratify the work of a convention, it is
their understanding that guides judicial construction of ambiguous
provisions. 31" Convention debates and materials continue to be help-
There has also been litigation in several jurisdictions regarding the requirement that the title of
the proposed amendment printed on the ballot not be misleading to voters. See, e.g., Arkansas
Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 677 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Ark. 1984) (upholding removal of a
proposed amendment on the basis that the popular ballot name, "The Unborn Child Amend-
ment," showed partisan coloring and was misleading). But see Chancy v. Bryant, 532 S.W.2d 741,
745 (Ark. 1976) (refusing to overturn a popularly approved amendment on the grounds that the
ballot title was misleading because there were no specific constitutional or statutory provisions
regarding ballot titles and the amendment was amply publicized); see also Becker v. Riviere, 604
S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ark. 1980) (denying a petition to enjoin amendment of certification stating that
the popular name and ballot title need not be perfect but just "represent an impartial summary of
the measure"); Young v. Byrne, 364 A.2d 47, 52 (N.J. 1976) (stating that a ballot does not have
to contain the entire text of an amendment, but must only not be misleading); Ohio v. Celebrezze,
426 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ohio 1981) (suggesting criteria for judging the validity of a ballot); Oregon
Initiative Found. v. Paulus, 597 P.2d 827, 828 (Or. 1979) (certifying a proposed ballot because it
was "neither insufficient" nor "unfair" even though it was subsequently revised by the Attorney
General). Furthermore, in Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1984), a court ruled
that a proposed amendment (concerning a malpractice proposition) was defective because it vio-
lated the "single subject" rule - a typical state constitutional provision - which protects the
public (and the legislature) from voting based on misleading information. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. of
1970, art. IV, § 8(d) ("Bills ...shall be confined to one subject.").
313. Only two of the constitutions adopted before 1784, those of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, "were formally submitted to a vote of the people." 2 HOWARD, COMMENTARIES, supra
note 268, at 1185 (citing DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 62); STURM. MOD-
ERNIZING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 57-58. By the 1870s, about 50 constitutions had
been promulgated, mostly during the Revolutionary and Civil War periods, without a vote of the
people. Bartley, supra note 25, at 35. Nevertheless, only seven documents that became operative
between the Civil War and 1982 were not submitted to the electorate; and only three of these
became operative after 1900 - two in Louisiana (1913 and 1921) and the 1902 Virginia Consti-
tution. Sturm, American State Constitutions, supra note 44, at 57; see also Taylor v. Common-
wealth, 44 S.E. 754, 755 (Va. 1903) (upholding the validity of the state constitution despite its
promulgation in defiance of legislative instructions to submit it to.a popular vote because "officers
administering the government" (the Governor and the legislators) swore allegiance to it and the
people had "peacefully" accepted it by voting under its provisions); Bartley, supra note 25, at 35
(discussing the holding in Taylor). There was another deviation from the norm at the Illinois
Convention of 1847, which declared one article of the constitution in force without submitting it to
the people. ILL. CONST. of 1848, Sched. § 4 (amended 1970) (adopting Article XI of the 1848
document even though it was not submitted to a vote by the people). A similar action was taken
by the Kentucky Convention of 1892. See Miller v. Johnson, 18 S.W. 522, 526 (Ky. 1892) (Ben-
nett, J., dissenting). Popular ratification has become a standard feature of modern American con-
stitutions. See Bartley, supra note 25, at 35-36 (discussing the adoption of constitutions with and
without ratification by the people, and concluding that the constitutions of the 20th century have
"almost without exception been submitted to the people"). There is, of course, no federal counter-
part to the popular vote required today on questions of state constitutional revision or amendment.
314. Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 853 (III. 1979). In Hynes, for example,
the Supreme Court examined article IX, § 5(c), which states that "[o]n or before January 1,
1979, the General Assembly by law shall abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes and . ..
replace all revenue lost ...as a result of the abolition. ... ILL. CONST. of 1970, art IX, §
5(c). The court held that the assessment of any personal property taxes after January 1, 1979
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ful in putting an ambiguous provision's meaning in context, but the
initial judicial focus is on the understanding of the voters.315
V.
The commonmost method of federal Constitutional revision has
been amendments proposed by the legislature.31 The convention
would be unconstitutional, but not the collection of 1978 personal property taxes in 1979. Id. at
848, 856. This conclusion was based on an examination of unofficial publications informing voters
on the meaning of various sections of the constitution. Id. at 854. Viewing the provision in light of
the conditions at the time and the particular problem the convention sought to address, the voters
were held to have apparently understood that 1978 personal property taxes would still be paid. Id.
at 850. See also Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 39, at 510 (1984) (discussing the
differences between statutory and constitutional textual construction and explaining that "the
'common and ordinary meaning' in which the constitution's words must be construed, is the mean-
ing they would have had to the vast majority of ordinary voters, rather than to a group of highly
educated lawyers and legislators, as may sometimes be considered when construing statutes").
315. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d at 853-54. Extensive reference to the record of proceedings as persua-
sive authority in construing the 1970 Constitution had become the early rule in Illinois. Levine,
supra note 14, at 402. It was also the rule prior to 1970. See People ex rel Keenan v. McGuane,
150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied 358 U.S. 828 (1958). However, on occasion the Illinois Supreme
Court has been criticized for relying exclusively on the convention debates. E.g., Stephen A. Sei-
gal, The Future of Classified Real Property Taxation in Illinois: The Wake of Hoffman v. Clark,
II LoYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 21, 68 (1979). Today, Illinois practice is largely in conformity with that
of most states: all state courts must ascertain and carry out the intent of the voters in adopting
specific provisions. E.g., Baumbaugh v. San Diego County, 113 P.2d 218, 220-21 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1941) (examining information provided to voters prior to election and the instructions on the
ballot); School Dist. of Pontiac v. City of Pontiac, 247 N.W. 474, 477 (Mich. 1933) (examining
voter intent in construing an amendment). This is accomplished by looking at circumstances lead-
ing to the provision's adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished. Seigal, supra, at 68.
Thus, while arguments to the voters in support of or against a constitutional amendment may be
examined to aid in construction of doubtful language, such contemporaneously published argu-
ments are not controlling. E.g., California Inst. of Tech. v. Johnson, 132 P.2d 61, 63 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1942); McGuire v. Wentworth, 7 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932). Instead,
courts generally look to the debates of a convention and to the history of the times. Union Steam
Pump Sales Co. v. Deland, 185 N.W. 353, 355 (Mich. 1921); see also People ex rel. Bay City v.
State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 506 (1871) (examining and construing constitutional provisions by
consulting the "public history of the times").
316. All twenty-seven amendments to the United States Constitution have been proposed by
Congress. For a discussion of the history behind the adoption of the first twenty-five amendments,
see Weclew, supra note 65, at 174-87. Amendments are occasionally passed to rectify what Con-
gress believes to be erroneous constitutional interpretation. The Eleventh Amendment, for exam-
ple, was the direct result of the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793) which, with one dissent, held that a citizen of one state had the right to sue another
state in federal court. Ratified in 1798, the Eleventh Amendment forbade such suits, and in Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to also
prohibit suits by a citizen against his own state. The federal courts, however, have tended to
narrowly construe both the Eleventh Amendment and the Hans decision, and have increasingly
narrowed the scope of sovereign immunity. This was accomplished by: (1) determining suits
against the state from suits against an individual public officer; (2) developing distinctions be-
tween requests for prospective as compared to retroactive relief; and (3) distinguishing between
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was extensively used in the states at first, but it was too cumbersome
for small changes. The states soon adopted the process of legislative
initiation of amendments in addition to, or as a substitute for, con-
ventions. 17 The two methods of constitutional amendment were in-
troduced in the United States at about the same time. The general
use of amendment by legislative action originated in the South,"'
where this method actually preceded amendment by convention.319
While six states allow complete revision by the legislature, 20 a ma-
jority of states require a convention to substantially revise their con-
stitutions. 21 Distinctions between the action required to legislate as
compared to proposing a constitutional amendment have always ex-
isted. 322 Legislative proposals to amend a constitution are not con-
sidered an ordinary legislative function, and they are not ordinarily
subject to constitutional provisions regulating the introduction and
passage of ordinary legislative enactments.323
The Illinois legislature was severely handicapped in its ability to
who bears the burden of satisfying judgments against the state. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 176-77 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
Three other federal constitutional amendments also sought to overturn Supreme Court interpre-
tations of the U.S. Constitution: Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment overruled certain as-
pects of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Haw.) 393 (1856); the Sixteenth Amendment overturned
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and the Twenty-sixth Amendment
overturned Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). There are always large numbers of proposed
constitutional amendments pending in Congress at any given time. In March 1984, for example,
pending proposals ranged from topics such as school prayer, abortion, and a balanced budget
(thirty-four proposed amendments dealing with this subject werebefore the House of Representa-
tives) to such matters as establishing English as the nation's official language and abolishing con-
gressional immunity for traffic citations received on trips to and from the Capitol. Francis J.
Flaherty, The Amend Corner: 175 Attempts to Change the Constitution, NAT'L LJ. Mar. 26,
1984, at 3, 8. Other proposals would create radical changes. For example, one proposal sought to
abolish all personal income, and estate and gift taxes. Id. Few of the 175 proposed amendments
pending in 1984 were ever expected to proceed much further. Id.
317. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 120.
318. This practice originated in the constitutions of Delaware (1776), Maryland (1776), and
South Carolina (1778). Id. at 120-27.
319. Id.
320. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4 (1879); FLA. CONST. art. XI, 99 1, 5 (1968); GA. CONST
art. X, § 1 (1976); HAW. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1, 3 (1978); N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (1970);
OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2 (1859).
321. Colantuono, Comment, supra note 16, at 1479. The weight of authority is that where a
constitution specifically provides two means of alteration, reading the language of the legislative
amendment provision with that of the convention provision will often imply that a complete revi-
sion by the legislature is prohibited. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 261;
JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 573-74.
322. JAMESON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 573-74.
323. See, e.g., Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40, 44 (1934) (upholding an amendment even though
the procedural rules applicable to ordinary legislative enactment were violated).
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propose and effectuate constitutional change under the 1870 Consti-
tution. 24 This was due to several factors. The legislature could
amend no more than one article per session and could not amend
the same article more than once every four years32 5 - problems
largely ameliorated by the 1970 Constitution.326 Also, under the
1870 Constitution, the approval of two-thirds of the members
elected to each house was necessary to place an amendment before
the voters.3 27 The 1970 Constitution ameliorated this problem some-
what by reducing the necessary majority to three-fifths of the mem-
bers elected to each house.328 Potential amendments may now be
initiated in either house but must be read in full on three different
days in each house (the "third reading rule") 29 and must be repro-
duced before the final vote is taken.3 30 After approval by three-fifths
of the members, amendments are submitted to the voters at the next
general election occurring at least six months after legislative ap-
proval.3 31 Amendments may be withdrawn before they are submit-
ted to the voters by a vote of a simple majority of the members
324. The difficulties with the process of legislative initiation of constitutional measures
originated, as did the method itself, in the 1848 Illinois Constitution. See, e.g., infra notes 428-36
and accompanying text (discussing the "number and frequency" provisions).
325. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2 (amended 1970).
326. Id. The present provision disallows legislative submission of "proposed amendments to
more than three Articles of the Constitution at any one election." Id; ILL. CONST. of 1970, art.
XIV, § 2(c).
327. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2 (amended 1970).
328. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(a). In 1915, Illinois was one of only seventeen states
whose constitutions required that amendments be submitted by a two-thirds vote of the member-
ship of each house; nineteen states required only a majority vote and seven mandated a three-fifths
vote. DEALEY, supra note 15, at 141. The Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amendment
at the 1970 Convention decided to propose a reduction in the necessary legislative majority, from
two-thirds to three-fifths, after testing the proposed new majority against previous vote counts on
legislatively-proposed amendments (and convention calls). GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at
28. Since 1870, only 16 of 39 constitutional propositions that have been presented have passed.
But if the standard for passage had been "those voting on the issue," 21 measures would have
passed a two-thirds requirement, 29 would have passed a three-fifths majority, and 35 of 39 would
have passed a simple majority. Id. The Committee's proposal thus seemed to significantly reform
the amendment process. Id. However, the Committee continued the comparatively restrictive
super-majority requirement necessary to avoid ill-considered change by a momentary majority. Id.
329. The Committee on Suffrage and Amendment at the 1970 Convention developed this re-
quirement as one of several safeguards to insure that the General Assembly acted responsibly. Id.
at 30. This was one of the procedures designed "to slow down the legislative process, provide an
opportunity for re-consideration, and give the public time to review and respond" to proposed
measures. Id. Other similarly conceived requirements were the "withdrawal," "prompt submission
to the public," and "publication period" provisions. Id.
330. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(b).
331. Id. § 2(a).
19941
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 43:269
elected to each house. 32 The proposals must be published with ex-
planations at least one month prior to the election."'
The worst impediment to revision in the 1870 document, however,
was that a proposed amendment had to be approved by a majority
of those voting in the election, not just those voting on the amend-
ment.13 4 Time and again, this requirement made it difficult for an
amendment to gain voter approval.335 Significantly, there was no
332. Id.
333. Id. § 2(b). Where a constitution contains specific provisions regarding the publication of
proposed amendments, there must be substantial compliance with these provisions for amend-
ments to be validly adopted. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 159-60. Com-
pare State ex rel. Woods v. Tooker, 37 P. 840, 844 (Mont. 1894) (holding that publication three
months prior to election when constitutions required publication two weeks prior to election to be
insufficient and thus amendments ratified by popular vote were invalid) with State ex rel. Thomp-
son v. Winnett, 110 N.W. 113, [pp] (Neb. 1907) (holding publication which was one week short
of the required three months to be sufficient for purposes of statutory compliance) and Common-
wealth ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Griest, 46 A. 505, 511 (Pa. 1900) (stating that "strict compliance
with a time limit is not essential"); see also State ex rel. Morgan v. O'Brien, 60 S.E.2d 722 (W.
Va. 1948). In O'Brien, publication was required "at least three months before the election," but
inadvertently publication occurred only two months before the vote. Nevertheless, this was held to
be substantial compliance, and submission of the proposed amendment to the electorate was held
to be valid since it was not shown that the voters were misled or defrauded by the delay. Id.
334. This is an impediment to which Illinois clings even though it is insupportable today. See,
e.g., GRATCH & UBIK, SUPRA note 168, at 27 (noting that the Committee on Suffrage and Consti-
tutional Amendment at the 1970 Illinois Convention was in "total agreement" that the provision
made no sense and was probably unconstitutional). This sort of ratification requirement enjoys
little popular or political support nationally. By 1919, in all but Illinois and eleven other states, if
an amendment received a majority of the votes cast upon the question it was deemed adopted.
Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 183-84. What made Illinois's inflexibility even more severe than
those states with the same super-majority requirement was that, of the other eleven states, only
Tennessee, Indiana, and Illinois had other restrictions in addition to a super-majority voting re-
quirement. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 1,33-34; Bulletin No. 3, supra
note 120, at 184; Kopp, supra note 235, at 487; Comment, Constitutional Revision - Constitu-
tional Amendment Process, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 422, 427-28 (1979).
335. Of the thirty-seven proposals submitted between 1870 and 1970, only three were defeated
by the negative vote of a majority of those voting on the proposal while nineteen were defeated
because they failed to receive a "majority of those voting in the election." Bergstrom, supra note
121, at 469 (comparing Illinois's amendment efforts to those of various other states). Thus, this
sort of requirement acted as a serious impediment to amendment, arguably one far more burden-
some than can be justified by any need to protect abstract minorities, to act with "caution" in
fundamental matters, or to discourage trivial proposals. See, e.g., DODD, REVISION AND AMEND-
MENT. supra note 15, at 274-79 (suggesting that requiring a high threshold of votes for passage of
an amendment tends to discourage, illuminate, or defeat trivial or unimportant amendment pro-
posals). This has long been clear from the experience in other states as well. For example, in
Minnesota, a state with experience in popular approval of amendments by both super-majority
and ordinary majority requirements, the pattern is clear. From 1858 to 1898, when adoption was
measured by a majority of those voting on the proposition, 48 out of 66 proposed amendments (72
percent) were adopted. But from 1898 to 1946, when the more rigid rule was in place, only 26 out-
of 80 proposed amendments (32.5 percent) were adopted. FRANK P. GRAD, LEGISLATIVE DRAFT-
ING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIV., THE DRAFTING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS: WORKING
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problem between 1870 and 1891: the first five proposed amendments
to the 1870 Constitution were all adopted.33 6 But this success was
largely attributable to the "party circle" 'voting system that was
used between 1848 and 1891. Each political party printed its own
ballot which included the amendment and the party's decision to
vote for or against the amendment. 37 Voters who openly declared
their political affiliation and then used the party ballot were auto-
matically counted as having voted on any amendment in accordance
with the party's position by marking the "party circle. ' 38 8 Under
such a system, a majority of those voting in the election would most
likely also be a majority voting on the amendment.
However, in 1891, the so-called "Australian" ballot system came
into use.339 Spaces were provided at the bottom of a now publicly-
printed ballot for voters to mark "yes" or "no" on amendments. The
prospects for constitutional revision changed drastically once this
system was adopted. 40 Moreover, after 1899, amendments were
PAPERS FOR A MANUAL Ch. II1, 22-23 (1967). (National Municipal League 1967)'. It would be
putting the cart before the horse to suggest that the latter low rate of passage after 1898 was
attributable to the vast increase in "trivial" proposals.
336. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 262, at 566; CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 80, 89-90;
Bergstrom, supra note 133, at 469.
337. The form of ballot employed in Illinois during different periods has had a pronounced
influence on the results of the popular vote for amendments. Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at
177. Before 1848, the Illinois Constitution permitted viva voce voting. Id. When the voter ap-
proached the polls, he was asked to name his choice of candidates and to vote "yes" or "no" on
any pending measure as well. Since it was easier to vote than to refuse to answer, the vote on the
question of calling a convention in 1824 was almost equal to the total vote cast for candidates at
the same election. Id. When the printed ballot came into use in 1848, the printing of ballots fell
upon political parties, which largely printed ballots either in favor of or opposed to the measure.
Id. at 177-78. Thus straight party votes included the recommended action on the amendment
printed on the ballot. Most important, since "party circle" ballots made it possible for voters to
cast substantially the same number of votes on a measure as that cast for candidates, the framers
of the 1870 Constitution would have had little anticipation of the difficulty to be caused after 1891
by the unintended but de facto "super-majority" voting requirement that emerged. In fact, be-
tween 1891 and 1899, when proposed amendments were printed at the bottom of the new official
("Australian") ballot with blank spaces for "yes" or "no", less than 25 percent of those voting
expressed any opinion on measures. Id. Even though it hardly solved the problem of inflexibility,
at least when separate ballots came into use after 1899, the number of votes on measures immedi-
ately doubled. Id. By 1910, proposed amendments had to be on separate ballots in at least seven
states. DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 184, 279 (noting that it was thought
that this would focus more attention on these proposals).
338. Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 177.
339. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 303 (1891) (creating the "Australian" ballot and providing for
public printing of ballots with spaces at bottom to mark "yes" or "no" on constitutional
measures).
340. See supra note 337 (discussing the affect of changing the form of the ballot on the chance
of Constitutional revision). Between 1892 and 1896, for example, three amendments were submit-
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placed on separate ballots which were separately counted. 4 1 Conse-
quently, amendments could be more easily ignored, and since a ma-
jority of those voting in the election was still required for passage,
failure to vote on the separate ballot in effect became a "no" vote.3 2
The amendment itself could receive a majority of votes from those
voting on it yet still be defeated if persons who voted on other mat-
ters abstained from voting on the new separate ballot."4 " In essence,
maintaining the original innocuous language (written long before
ted - the first so-called "Gateway" amendment to liberalize the amending process (1892), a
labor law amendment (1894), and the 1896 "Gateway" amendment - but all were soundly de-
feated because approximately 79 percent of the voters failed to mark their ballots on the amend-
ment question. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 90; Bergstrom, supra note 121, at 469. See gener-
ally Legislative Reference Bureau, Bulletin No. 2: The Initiative, Referendum and Recall, in
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL BULLETINS 65 (1920) [hereinafter Bulletin No. 2] (outlining and ana-
lyzing the initiative, referendum, and judicial decisions as applied to state and local issues). One
commentator has suggested that the so-called "reform" of the Australian ballot actually contrib-
uted to the national decline in levels of participation in elections.
The presidential election of 1896 - that was the year it all began to go wrong. First
there was the Australian Ballot. Of a sudden, the citizen was deprived of his duty to
declare his choice in public before his peers. Henceforth we would skulk into the polls,
vote in secret and slip away uncounted and unappreciated. The object [of the publi-
cally-printed Australian ballot], of course, was to stop the "machines" from turning
out the "ignorant" vote, but curiously voter turnout generally began to fall off. In
earlier years, we recorded ourselves in high numbers in presidential elections (82 per-
cent in 1876), but we have been declining ever since. Last time out we barely cleared
the 50 percent mark.
Daniel P. Moynihan, Our Succession Crisis: Why More Reform Means Less Democracy, NEWS-
WEEK, Feb. 1, 1988, at 27.
341. Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 178.
342. There is, of course, some authority for the proposition that it is unreasonable to treat
inaction on an amendment as a vote against the amendment. E.g., Green v. State Bd. of Canvass-
ers, 47 P. 259 (Idaho 1896); Kopp, supra note 235, at 487. By 1968 only eleven states still re-
quired a majority voting at the election for ratification of a proposed amendment regardless of the
actual vote on the measure itself. Kopp, supra, note 235, at 487. For a more recent comparison of
various state requirements, see Arthur 0. Beach, Comment, Constitutional Revision - Constitu-
tional Amendment Process, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 422, 427-28 (1979).
343. Substantial numbers of those going to the polls have always abstained from voting on
amendments or convention calls. During the period from 1892 to 1896, nearly 79 percent of those
voting in each Illinois election failed to vote on constitutional amendments (3 proposed, none rati-
fied). CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 90; Bergstrom, supra note 133, at 469; Bulletin No. 2, supra
note 340, at 73. From 1899 to 1929, when constitutional amendments were printed on a separate
ballot, non-voting diminished between 25 percent to 40 percent (6 amendments proposed, 3 rati-
fied). From 1929 to 1949, Illinois constitutional amendments were simply printed on the left side
of the general ballot, yet more than half of those voting in the elections still failed to vote on the
constitutional provisions (none of the seven amendments proposed during this period were
adopted). Kopp, supra note 235, at 487. This general experience with the effects of ballot proce-
dures on voting patterns for amendments is also true in other states. See generally Note, Super-
majority Voting Requirements: Possible Constitutional Objections, 55 IOWA L. REV. 674 (1970)
[hereinafter Note, Super-majority Requirements] (reviewing super-majority requirements in
general).
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modern balloting systems) in the face of voter apathy had the effect
of creating a "super-majority" requirement.34 ' The constitutional in-
flexibility ultimately caused by this originally unforseen problem
was compounded early in the twentieth century when the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled, in 1917,115 that adoption of a proposed
amendment required a vote equivalent to a majority of all electors
voting at an election in which members of the General Assembly
are elected, not just a majority of the votes cast at that election for
members of the General Assembly. (Apparently, many voters at
general elections would not vote for members of the General Assem-
bly but only other officials of more local interest.) What is distres-
sing about this distinctly conservative act of constitutional interpre-
tation is that not only did the Illinois Supreme Court decline an
opportunity to ease the process of constitutional change, but in so
declining it chose to side with a small minority of jurisdictions.346
The Stevenson court failed to take proper account of legislative
history indicating that the "plain meaning" of this provision in 1870
manifested an intent different from the effect caused by that lan-
guage today. 347 The more flexible "majority on the question" inter-
pretation has long been the majority view. 48 Given Illinois's history
of excessive constitutional rigidity, this would also be the better
view should the issue arise again. The Stevenson interpretation had
the effect of making one of the most rigid and unworkable constitu-
tions3 ' 9 even more "unamendable" than necessary. 50 Further, the
344. There are generally two types of super-majorities: (I) those requiring a stated percentage,
usually three-fifths or two-thirds of those voting on the issue; or (2) those requiring a simple
majority of the highest total vote cast in the general election in which the issue is submitted. Note,
Super-majority Requirements, supra note 343, at 674.
345. People v. Stevenson, 117 N.E. 747, 749 (III. 1917). See also State ex rel. Witt v. State
Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 147 (N.M. 1968) (discussing how super-majority requirements foil
efforts at amendment and violate the Equal Protection Clause); State ex rel. Cope v. Foraker, 23
N.E. 491 (Ohio 1890) (striking down an amendment which received a majority of the votes from
those actually voting on it, but less than a majority of those voting at the election).
346. See infra note 358 and accompanying text (explaining that Illinois is in the minority).
This decision seems to imply a recognition by the court that the political environment in Illinois at
the time required a conservative ruling to increase the required super-majority in order to main-
tain stability. This was a decision which compounded, rather than ameliorated, what had already
been a condition of constitutional inflexibility.
347. See supra notes 229-34, 334-44 and accompanying text (discussing how the "majority of
those voting in the election" requirement impeded revision of the Illinois Constitution).
348. See supra note 334.
349. See Sears & Laughlin, supra note 119, at 439 (describing various state provisions for
constitutional revision and concluding that Illinois "is in the worst position of any state in the
Union" owing to its rigid and restrictive amendment provisions).
350. See State ex rel Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 152 (N.M. 1968) ("[W]e
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court did this even though the de facto dilution of votes for change
in virtually every area of constitutional choice which ultimately re-
sulted from the language in the original provision was neither fore-
seen nor intended. 351
There are, of course, virtues to super-majority requirements.
These include the protection of political minorities, 35 2 the safeguard
of a stable constitutional framework, the protection of private rights,
and the avoidance of hasty, ill-advised decisions.5 3 Nevertheless,
even though super-majority requirements of the sort found in Illinois
have been characterized as denials of equal protection or "rule by
the minority," '54 but they have yet to be successfully challenged.
Such schemes have also been questioned under Article IV, Section 4
of the federal Constitution, which guarantees each state a republi-
can form of government. 35  The schemes are especially questionable
because abstentions count, in effect, as votes against the measure
when, as a general parliamentary practice, those who abstain are
usually deemed to acquiesce.351 For example, in New Mexico ex rel.
Witt v. State Canvassing Board,357 the New Mexico high court
reasoned:
[It is] thus quite evident that to hold that three-fourths of those voting at
any given election is required to amend [the state constitution] would give
should not lose sight of the fact that to construe 'electors voting in the whole state' to in effect
mean 'all electors voting at the election' as distinguished from those voting on the particular
amendment, would have the effect of making the 'unamendable section' even more unamendable
351. Id. (citing State ex rel. Ward v. Romero, 125 P. 617, 621 (N.M. 1912)) ("Where the
spirit and intent of the instrument can be clearly ascertained, effect should be given to it, the strict
letter should not control if the letter leads incongruous results, clearly not intended.").
352. This purpose was made evident in the framing of the United States Constitution, which
requires a two-thirds majority in Congress to propose amendments, a two-thirds majority of the
states to call a Constitutional Convention, and a majority of three-fourths of the states to ratify an
amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. V. The framers feared that an "unfettered ma-
jority could irrationally and irresponsibly suppress a sizeable minority ... [so they] attempted to
protect the minority by requiring a greater proportion of the populace to be convinced of the
wisdom of the proposed action before allowing its enactment." Note, Super-majority Require-
ments, supra note 343, at 676.
353. Id. at 677-78. The idea is to "requir[e] a greater proportion of the populace to [become]
convinced of the wisdom of the proposed action before allowing its enactment." Id. at 676.
354. Id. at 676.
355. Id. at 685-92.
356. J. B. Glen, Annotation, Basis for Computing Majority Essential to the Adoption of a
Constitutional or Other Special Proposition Submitted to Voters, 131 A.L.R. 1382 (1941) (sup-
porting the conclusion that unless a Constitution or law declares or clearly implies the contrary,
qualified electors who do not present themselves to vote, or who do not vote on a proposition, are
presumed to assent to the will of those who actually cast their ballots).
357. 437 P.2d 143 (N.M. 1968).
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effect as having cast negative votes to those voters who at the election be-
cause of negligence, lack of interest, or some other unexplained reason failed
to register their votes on the particular proposition. No logical reason for
counting as opposed those who do not express their preference has been
suggested. "'
Accordingly, given "the dilution of voting strength possible under
the scheme and the fact that it is inconsistent with the principle that
those who speak should decide, it appears such state schemes [in-
cluding Illinois's] would ...be an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection." 59
Nor is it by any means clear that super-majorities (especially
"majority of those voting in the election" super-majorities) for state
constitutional amendment are lawful merely because explicit super-
majorities are required by many states for the purposes of limiting
indebtedness, raising taxes, funding education, or modifying the bill
of rights.360 These matters are traditionally and commonly restricted
in this way because of their extreme importance and the compelling
state interest in maintaining economic and social stability and fiscal
358. Id. at 153; see also Harris v. Walker, 74 So. 40, 41 (Ala. 1917) (holding that "the quali-
fied voters who voted at said election upon the proposed amendments" means a majority of those
voting on that particular amendment); Tinkel v. Griffin, 68 P. 859, 861 (Mont. 1902) (holding
that a majority of electors voting "clearly means a majority of those who vote" on an issue, and
not a majority of all electors voting); Davy v. McNeill, 240 P. 482, 490 (N.M. 1925) ("Ordina-
rily, the vote of voters who do not choose to participate in an election are not to be taken into
consideration in declaring the result."); King v. City of McAlester, 273 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla.
1954) (upholding a vote where the "question received a majority of the votes cast upon the pro-
position," although the number of votes failed to constitute a majority of the total amount of
members present to vote at the election); Wilson v. Wasco County, 163 P. 317, 319 (Or. 1917)
(holding that the "majority of those electors who actually vote upon a measure is controlling and
is in accord with general spirit" that the "will of the majority as expressed at the polls is supposed
to govern"); Ladd v. Yett, 273 S.W. 1006, 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (holding that "each pro-
posed amendment should be by the voters considered separately, and the result as to each is to be
determined from the votes cast for or against it, irrespective of the total number of votes that may
be cast at an election submitting several and distinct amendments to a city charter"). But see
Green v. State Board of Canvassers, 47 P. 259, 261 (Idaho 1896) (holding that inaction is a vote
against an amendment); People v. Stevenson, 117 N.E. 747, 751 (Ill. 1917) (requiring that a
majority of the electors voting at an election is "a majority of the votes of all the electors voting at
an election . . . and not . . . a majority of the votes cast"); State ex rel. Stevenson v. Babcock, 22
N.W. 372, 375 (Neb. 1885) (concluding that the convention framing the constitution obviously
"presumed that if an amendment was necessary and really desired by the people, a majority would
favor its adoption"); State ex rel. Cope v. Foraker, 23 N.E. 491, 491-92 (Ohio 1890) (stating that
the requirement of "a majority of the electors voting at such election" plainly indicates but one
construction, a "majority of all the electors voting at such election. ). These latter cases
represent the minority view.
359. See Note, Super-majority Requirements, supra note 343, at 689.
360. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
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integrity.3"'
The West Virginia Constitution, for example, requires the ap-
proval of 60 percent of the voters before political subdivisions can
incur bonded indebtedness or exceed constitutional tax rates.
362
When a county school bond proposal was defeated because it re-
ceived only slightly more than 50 percent of the vote, the proponents
sued, challenging the constitutionality of the requirement. 63 The
West Virginia Supreme Court found that the 60 percent require-
ment violated the federal Equal Protection Clause because "the
votes of those who favored the issuance of the bonds had a propor-
tionately smaller impact on the outcome of the election than the
votes of those who opposed issuance of the bonds."364 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Chief Justice War-
ren Burger, 365 because the West Virginia court's reliance on federal
voting rights cases was "misplaced": 66
Certainly any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate
power to the minority. But there is nothing in the language of the Constitu-
tion, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on
every issue .... The constitutions of many States prohibit or severely limit
the power of the legislature to levy new taxes or to create or increase
bonded indebtedness, thereby insulating entire areas from majority con-
trol. . . . [S]o long as such provisions do not discriminate against or au-
thorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the
[federal] Equal Protection Clause. . . .[W]e do not decide whether a State
may, consistently with the Constitution, require extraordinary majorities for
the election of public officers.867
361. Id.
362. W. VA. CONST. art. 10, § 8.
363. The litigation ultimately resulted in the opinion in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
364. Id. at 4.
365. Id. at 2-3.
366. Id. at 4.
367. Id. at 6-7, 8 n.6 (emphasis added); see also Westbrook v. Mihaly, 471 P.2d 487, 511 (Cal.
1970) (en banc) (noting that extraordinary majorities may be required in areas of compelling
state interest even though no evidence of such an interest was found with regard to the bond issue
question before the court); Bogert v. Kinzer, 465 P.2d 639, 640 (Idaho 1970) (upholding a two-
thirds majority requirement on a bond issue). Unfortunately, precisely because the case deals with
the traditionally vital state interest in fiscal responsibility, these remarks about super-majority
requirements for any and all constitutional change are far more similar to those that might be
required for a similar fundamental exercise of popular sovereignty - the election of public offi-
cials. Super majorities in these situations are dissimilar to those required for the narrow number
of "entire areas" traditionally immunized from simple majority action to serve compelling state
interests (like financial solvency). Thus, by declaring that it was not deciding "whether a state
...may require extraordinary majorities for the election of public officials," Lance, 430 U.S. at 8
n.6, the Court has impliedly avoided the issue of super majorities for amendment as well.
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In Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, the Court sus-
tained a concurrent majority requirement for referenda on new
county charters.368 Under New York law, a county charter had to
be approved by two separate majorities in the county - the urban
voters and the rural voters.3 69 In rejecting a "one person-one vote"
attack on that scheme, Justice Potter Stewart's opinion emphasized
that "[t]he equal protection principles applicable in gauging the
fairness of an election involving the choice of legislative representa-
tives are of limited relevance, however, in analyzing the propriety of
recognizing distinctive voter interests in a 'single-shot' referen-
dum. '3 70 "[The] differing interests of city and non-city voters in the
adoption of a new county charter" were sufficient to justify the
scheme.3 7' The Lockport decision, then, says that the state may rea-
sonably take into account the unique interests of the discrete, iso-
lated, and historically less numerous rural voters. Otherwise, vital
minority interests in local government would be ignored in the
majoritarian political process. The urban vote may be diluted with
regard to the common issue of revision of county government, but
this can be justified by the compelling nature of the sovereign inter-
est served - protecting the unique interests of the rural "class"
from the majoritarian abuses in the modern era.3 72 Lance173 was
also reasonable in sustaining the explicit super-majorities required
in many states for certain specific issues such as taxes, debt, educa-
tion, or individual rights. These highly crucial and sensitive areas of
governance cannot be left susceptible to erratic and serious interfer-
ence from the majoritarian political process. Voters for change in
these areas have traditionally had their votes diluted or limited by
state constitutions because of the state's important interest in pre-
serving social stability and fiscal integrity.374
Nevertheless, these decisions do not justify a practice of requiring
super-majorities for the election of political officials or for general
state constitutional revision. Rather than merely being referenda to
368. 430 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1977).
369. Id. at 261-62.
370. Id. at 266.
371. Id. at 271-72. "The ultimate question then is whether, given the differing interests of city
and noncity voters in the adoption of a new county charter in New York, those differences are
sufficient under the Equal Protection Clause to justify the classifications made by New York law."
Id. at 271.
372. Id. at 271-73.
373. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
374. Id. at 6.
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ensure sufficient support for policy changes sought by the (already
representative and accountable) legislature in sensitive aspects of
government, representative elections and state constitutional amend-
atory measures involve the most fundamental acts of direct popular
sovereignty. There are few individual liberties more important in a
republican democracy than the right of the sovereign to revise or
amend the fundamental charter of government. Consequently, there
is:
No rational basis to distinguish between voting for representatives [and]
voting on constitutional amendments. One is no more a necessary ingredient
of our democratic process than the other. Nor can it be said that an equal
voice in selection of the legislature is of greater importance to a citizen than
equality of weight in expression of views on our charter .
7
Therefore, even though there has been no definitive characterization
of the interests at stake from the Supreme Court, it would seem that
elections over state constitutional amendment or revision are quite
similar to choosing legislative representatives and that both interests
should be given similar protection. Significant restraints on the fun-
damental right of self-governance such as super-majority require-
ments - traditionally permissible only with regard to a narrow
number of highly crucial issues (in order to protect against political
instability or lack of fiscal integrity) - are not appropriate for voter
ratification of every constitutional change proposed by the legisla-
ture. Super-majorities further devalue the already generally dimin-
ished vote for fundamental constitutional change.37 6
The Illinois Supreme Court, anticipating Lance37 7 and Lock-
port, 78 also approved an explicit state constitutional super-majority
requirement for voter approval of increases in state indebtedness by
the legislature. In re Natural Resources Development Bond Act
3 79
concerned a failed 1968 referendum on a bond issue. The issue had
received the votes of a majority of those voting on the measure, but
the "yes" votes did not constitute a majority of the number of votes
cast at the election for members of the General Assembly, 8 ' the
super-majority expressly required for increasing debt under the
375. State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 150-51 (N.M. 1968).
376. See, e.g., supra notes 145-46, 228 and accompanying text (discussing the natural bias in
favor of the status quo).
377. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
378. Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
379. 264 N.E.2d 129 (II1. 1970).
380. Id. at 130.
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1870 Illinois Constitution.38' The Illinois court concluded that,
based on federal law: (1) votes may not be debased in selecting a
representative; (2) voters may not be excluded from other decision-
making elections absent a "rational basis"; and (3) there were no
"cases [indicating] that the Supreme court would impose a strict
'one man-one vote' rule on the approval of bonded indebtedness."382
The court held that states may constitutionally require a showing of
popular consent greater than a simple majority in elections other
than selecting a representative where "an issue is of such impor-
tance to require it. . . . [or if the super-majority requirement
bears] a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."383
The court cited the 1870 Constitutional Convention debates for
the view that the intent was to "place certain restrictions upon the
General Assembly relative to the appropriation of State funds be-
cause there was a strong skepticism about unlimited state indebted-
ness."384 But what is not discussed in Natural Resources is that
while this objective might justify requiring a legislative super-major-
ity to incur indebtedness, or perhaps a state-wide referendum to
check legislative action, it would not necessarily make reasonable a
super-majority requirement for voter ratification of the debt legisla-
tion. 85 As for the reasonableness of demanding ratification by a ma-
jority of those voting at the election for "members of the General
Assembly," the Court's reasoning is somewhat obscure:
[It] is the General Assembly that has the responsibility to appropriate funds
from the bond issue as the need arises. It is reasonable that the Convention
determined there should be a tie-in between the vote on the referendum and
the election of the members of the General Assembly who have the duty to
appropriate the sums so approved. We believe that limitation of indebted-
ness is a legitimate State purpose and that the reference to the General
Assembly vote bears a rational relationship to this purpose.a86
It is not clear that the Convention "determined" any such thing,
even if this "tie-in" were rational. The court also appeared to mis-
construe the way in which votes for "change" are diluted under
"majority in the election" super-majority schemes.38 7 Citing none of
381. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art, XIV, § 18 (amended 1970).
382. In re Natural Resources, 264 N.E.2d at 132.
383. Id. at 132-33.
384. Id. at 133.
385. Id.
386. Id. (emphasis added).
387. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text (discussing "negative minorities").
1994]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
the reasoning or authority that may have been available at the time
on this question,38 the court dismissed the claim of infringement of
fundamental voting rights by irrationally concluding that:
[We] can perceive of no inequality of voting power as between different
individuals. Each individual has the right to cast one vote for a State legis-
lator and for the bond issue. No question of debasement or dilution is pre-
sent because all voters are in an identical position upon entering the voting
boothss9
Fortunately, however, the members of the 1970 Constitutional
Convention did not miss the point. Apparently satisfied that a new
"three-fifths" legislative majority requirement would provide ade-
quate protection against unreasonable and excessive debt, the 1970
Constitution removed the "majority voting in the election for Gen-
eral Assembly" provision for voter approval.8 90 A majority of those
voting on the question is now an alternative to the legislative super-
majority vote as a means of incurring indebtedness. 91 Consequently,
since Natural Resources was effectively overruled by the 1970 Con-
stitution, that decision contains no view of law or legislative history
that would support sustaining an even more restrictive super-major-
ity requirement for voter ratification of all legislatively-proposed
constitutional amendments.
Super-majority ratification requirements for all state constitu-
tional amendments would not originally have been placed in the
1870 Constitution in furtherance of any important minority or state
interests.3 92 These interests, as with caution over indebtedness, were
388. E.g., Westbrook v. Mihaly, 471 P.2d 487, 495-500 (Cal. 1970).
389. In re Natural Resources, 264 N.E.2d at 134. (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Westbrook,
471 P.2d at 498 (stating that it is not necessary that those who are disadvantaged constitute an
objectively identifiable class prior to the election because such a class can be "defined by the act of
voting affirmatively on a bond issue"); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (hold-
ing that restrictive election laws requiring new political parties seeking a ballot position to first
obtain petitions totaling 15 percent of the last election, as opposed to the 10 percent requirement
imposed on established parties, was invidiously discriminatory and violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (holding that a state can impose reason-
able residence requirements for voting but it cannot deny the ballot to a bona fide resident merely
because he is a member of the armed services); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (noting that a voting right is more than the right to mark a piece of paper; it
includes the "right to have the ballot counted... [a]t full value without dilution or discount").
390. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IX, § 9(b). It should be remembered that the usual voter ap-
proval requirement for an amendment is either a three-fifths majority of those voting on the ques-
tion or a majority of those voting in the last election for members of the General Assembly. Thus,
an approval of an indebtedness question is easier than approval of a non-indebtedness question.
391. Id.
392. There is always the argument, of course, that the intent of the framers in 1870 is irrele-
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already protected by the super-majority requirement intentionally
imposed for legislative passage of proposed amendments to be later
submitted for voter ratification. Super-majorities for voter ratifica-
tion of all amendments seem a superfluous and unconstitutional im-
pediment to the fundamental right to exercise sovereignty. 9 Fi-
nally, it is inconceivable that the people would have provided for a
super-majority for voter approval of legislative amendments when
they provided for simple voter majorities for the approval of entire
constitutions. 94 Thus, the constitutionality of a super-majority re-
quirement for voter approval of legislatively-proposed constitutional
measures in Illinois is in serious doubt.
On several occasions, the people of Illinois have attempted to
remedy the harshness of the "majority voting in the election" re-
quirement for ratifying amendments. The Gateway Amendment,
vant. After all, the 1917 Stevenson decision was subsequently ratified by the people, who then
added an explicit super-majority requirement through the Gateway Amendment in 1950 (a two-
thirds voting majority) and finally "liberalized" the requirement in the 1970 convention (to a
three-fifths voting majority). However, the purpose for the proposal and ratification of these super-
majority requirements was a compromise specifically seeking to lessen the extreme rigidity caused
by the implicit super-majority requirement for voter approval of amendments unforeseen in 1870,
but in existence since 1899 and sustained in Stevenson in 1917. It was certainly not because there
was a consensus that had identified a need to ameliorate a past experience with trivial, reckless, or
abusively majoritarian revision efforts. In fact, the constitutionality of the more liberal super-
majority requirement in the 1970 Constitution arose as an issue in the Committee on Suffrage and
Constitutional Amendment even before the full convention debate on the proposal. GRATCH &
UBIK, supra note 168, at 28-30. The committee staff counsel's research focused primarily on
whether this super-majority as applied to voter action violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but he
found no law to support that proposition. Id. Subsequent to the convention, the Illinois Supreme
Court decided In re Natural Resources Dev. Bond Act, 264 N.E.2d 129 (III. 1970), where it
upheld Article IV, § 18-- which required ratification of bond indebtedness by "a majority of the
votes cast for the members of the General Assembly at such elections" - under the U.S. Consti-
tution. This seemed to confirm the correctness of the Committee's decision to recommend the
continued use of a super-majority requirement, albeit one that was easier to meet. However, the
Natural Resources court supported "the constitutionality of extraordinary majorities in situations
exhibiting a compelling state interest" and stated that if "bond issue questions exhibit [such] a
sufficient interest, it follows that a three-fifths standard for constitutional revisions would be per-
missible." GRATCH & UBMK supra note 168, at 29 n.20.
It may not "follow" that such a majority is constitutional for votes on questions of constitutional
amendment or who should be elected to public office. Super-majorities for bond issues are a tradi-
tion, and they are narrowly tailored to accomplish the important state interest of fiscal integrity
with regard to state financial or economic matters. Explicit super-majorities for all revision, on the
other hand, have no clear historic tradition and serve no important purpose. This is especially so
given the existence of a legislative super-majority to guarantee calm deliberation and adequate
support for fundamental change. Voter super-majority requirements deny equal protection of the
fundamental individual right of suffrage where the weight of a vote against change is far heavier
than the vote for change. See also supra notes 354-59 and accompanying text.
393. See supra text accompanying note 376.
394. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § I (amended 1970).
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passed by the voters in 1950,111 allowed approval of an amendment
by a majority of those voting in the election or by two-thirds of
those voting on the amendment itself.398 This facilitated the passage
of amendments to some extent. Only three amendments were ap-
proved during the fifty-nine year period between 1891 and 1950. 897
Between 1952 and 1966 alone, however, fifteen amendments were
submitted and six were approved; but only two of the six were ap-
proved with the help of the Gateway Amendment. 98 Under Gate-
way, a continuing "political veto" was still held by each of what
were fairly equally divided "one-thirds" of the state population with
distinct and different economic and political views: Chicago, "the
suburbs," and "downstate." '399 Consequently, the potential for revi-
sion generated by Gateway was still inadequate.
The 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention modified this super-
majority provision again so as to allow approval of amendments by
either a majority of those voting in the election or by "three-fifths"
of those voting on the amendment. 00 Between 1970 and the present,
only nine amendments were proposed by the legislature, and five of
these failed to pass.0 1 Only four relatively unimportant, uncon-
troversial "legislative" provisions prevailed: an amendment to re-
duce the time allowed for the redemption of certain kinds of prop-
erty to be sold for nonpayment of taxes (approved by voters in
395. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 123-26.
396. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 262, at 565.
397. See generally GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 211, at 6-11 (1974) (discussing constitutional
revisions proposed from 1848 to 1966).
398. Id. at 10-11; BRADEN & COHN, supra note 262 at 568; GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 211,
at 10-11; see also GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 17 (noting that the Gateway Amendment
did not produce the hoped-for liberalization).
399. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the post-"Gateway" revision process between 1952
and 1966, and for a perceptive analysis of electoral behavior which "added scholarly weight to the
arguments" urging a call for the Sixth Constitutional Convention in 1968, see THOMAS KITSOS.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE VOTER, 1952-1966, COMMISSION PAPERS OF THE INSTI-
TUTE FOR GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1968) (cited in CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at
136-37); GRATCH & UBIK. SUPRA note 168, at 17.
400. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(b). The Suffrage and Constitutional Amendment
Committee's original proposal was for a simple three-fifths vote on the question. The convention,
however, acting as a committee of the whole, added the old "majority voting in the election test,"
in order make clear to the public that a liberalization of the process as compared to 1870 was
intended. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 47.
401. The five that failed passage were: (I) an amendment which would have limited the Gover-
nor's amendatory veto to changes in matters of form and correction of technical errors, (2) an
amendment eliminating the requirement of abolition of all remaining personal property tax, and
(3) three separate proposed amendments which would have allowed the General Assembly to give
veteran's organizations a property tax exemption.
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1980),402 two amendments to expand the category of suspects who
may be denied bail (approval by voters in 1982 and 1986),4a and
the victims Bill of Rights Amendment (approved in 1992).404
In sum, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 has been the second least
amended of the 50 state documents currently in force.40 5 This is not
unimportant; there are a number of problems with such inflexibility.
First, legislatures will tend to be reluctant to propose to voters
amendments concerning important reforms or changes in basic gov-
ernmental structure or policies unless it is clear that they will be
noncontroversial enough to garner the super-majority required. Sec-
ond, the super-majority provides the legislature with the alternative
possibility of submitting amendments to the people only when the
legislature wants to have ratified its own inaction on difficult ques-
tions, like judicial reform or educational financing. 40 6 The failure of
an amendment to attract the required super-majority of voters be-
comes a post hoc rationalization for legislative inaction. Third, of
course, is the resulting discouragement of judicial independence in
matters of constitutional interpretation caused by the near impossi-
bility of reform in judicial selection methods and the lack of a vehi-
cle for expression of popular acceptance or rejection of expansive
interpretation.,07
The 1970 Constitution retained another problematic requirement
first imposed as a "reform" by the 1950 Gateway Amendment:
amendment questions had to be placed before the voters on a sepa-
rate ballot.40 8 The separate ballot requirement was intended to pro-
402. S.J. Res. 56, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1980 I11. Sess.
403. S.J. Res. 36, 82d Gen. Assembly, 1982 I11. Sess; S.J. Res. 22, 84th Gen. Assembly, 1986
I11. Sess.
404. ILL. COST. of 1970, art. I, § 8.1 (adopted Nov. 3, 1992).
405. May, supra note 11, at 162 (indicating that Illinois's constitution was the least amended
of any of the state documents at the time of publication). Ar present, only Indiana's constitution
has been amended fewer times. By 1969, Illinois had made only fourteen changes in the one
hundred years since the 1870 constitution; New York, on the other hand, had made 168 amend-
ments to a document only 74 years old at the time. CORNWELL ET AL., POLITICS OF REVISION,
supra note 23, at 4.
406. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the "education" amendment).
407. See supra discussion at notes 39-45.
408. The Illinois Constitution requires "separate ballots" for referendum questions on: (1)
whether to call a convention, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § l(c); (2) whether to approve revi-
sions or amendments proposed by a constitutional convention, Id. § l(g); and (3) whether to
approve amendments proposed by the General Assembly, Id. § 2(b). Voting machines or other
electronic or mechanical systems cannot be used since general provisions calling for the use of
such machines must give way to the specific provision for the separate "Blue Ballot." See 10 ILCS
§ 5/16-6 (1993). Proposed amendments were on separate ballots in at least seven states as early
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mote increased voter interest and participation on constitutional is-
sues,4 0 9 even though this goal is not always reflected in judicial
interpretation of this provision.41 0 It is not clear that the separate
ballot has met drafters' expectations. For example, when the'Gate-
way Amendment itself finally passed it passed on a separate blue
ballot, but primarily because the election was preceded by a well-
organized political and educational campaign.41' The importance of
such campaigns cannot be over-emphasized. 12 Withoutsuch a con-
certed campaign, Gateway's provision for separate ballots for revi-
sion probably would not itself have passed even though it was on a
separate ballot. Ironically, the failure of this so-called "reform" -
calculated to ease constitutional change - would have left Illinois
with at least the possibility of reinstating the obsolescent but, in ret-
rospect, more efficacious party circle ballot system for constitutional
as 1910. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 184, 279.
409. The colored separate ballot was intended to increase voter awareness of the proposition
and stimulate voter participation. Id.; CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 123-26, 143. Actually, it was
colored pink in Minnesota, the state from which Illinois borrowed the idea, but undesirable conno-
tations caused the Illinois legislature to change the ballot color to blue. CORNELIUS, supra note
114, at 123-26, 143. Since 1952 the "Blue Ballot," even when unidentified with specific issues, has
been considered a symbol of reformist government in Illinois. As a matter of convention, therefore,
a vote for the "Blue Ballot" is considered a vote for government reform. Id.
410. Although separate ballots were intended to help promote greater voter participation, this
goal is not often reflected in judicial construction of the statutory or constitutional election provi-
sions that pertain to separate ballots. This is no doubt due to the use of the "plain meaning rule"
in those few cases that have arisen regarding such ballots. For example, when "nonpartisan" bal-
lots are required, separate paper ballots must be used. Consequently, amendment questions may
not be placed on voting machines where they would be more likely to gain public attention. People
ex rel. Barrett v. Barrett, 201 N.E.2d 849, 851 (Il. 1964). Also, a statute directing that a voter
mark his ballot on constitutional amendments with a "cross" was held to require the voiding of
ballots marked either with a "check" or the word "yes." See Scribner v. Sachs, 164 N.E.2d 481,
490 (I11. 1960) (holding that the legislature has the power to provide by law the usual, ordinary,
or necessary details required for the holding of an election). The legislature, not the court, was
thought to be the appropriate body to revise this statute, if necessary, to permit alternative mark-
ings. Id. at 491; see also State ex rel. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d
561, 566-67 (Fla. 1980) (holding that the legislature has the duty to legislate to ensure ballot
integrity and a valid election process).
411. The General Assembly revised the election laws to allow the proposition to be submitted to
the voters on a separate blue ballot. 10 ILCS § 5/16-6 (1993). At each polling place, every voter
was to be handed a blue ballot, informed of its purpose, and instructed to return it to the election
judge regardless of whether the ballot was marked or not. CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 97. The
idea of giving specific "notice," emphasizing the importance of voting on an amendment, was
modeled after a similar device used in Minnesota, whose constitution also requires a majority of
those voting in the election for approval of an amendment. MINN. CONST. art. IX, §1. For a
discussion of the campaign for the passage of the Gateway Amendment, see CORNELIUS, supra
note 114, at 95-98.
412. CORNELIUS. supra note 114, at 123-26.
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revision. 13 Adoption of the Gateway Amendment, however, prohib-
ited a return to the party circle ballot. 1
Once an amendment is approved by the required number of voters
and is adopted by the proper canvassing authorities," 5 it becomes
an operative part of the Illinois Constitution. The reasonable impli-
cations from adopted amendments are also incorporated directly
into the constitution. 1 For instance, the adoption of a constitu-
tional amendment empowering the legislature to establish a local
government has been held sufficient to authorize the legislature to
413. The Illinois legislature sought to revive "party circle" ballots in the 1946 Gateway
Amendment, but the bills that would have accomplished this, Senate Bills 514 and 516, were
vetoed by then-Governor Green. Kenneth C. Sears, Constitutional Revision and Party Circle
Bills, 14 U. CHIC. L. REV. 200, 214 (1947). Under this plan, the constitutional amendment would
have appeared separately on the ballot. If a voter marked the party circle, she was counted as
voting the party's position on the proposition unless she "scratched" by voting specifically on the
proposition as it appeared on the left side of the ballot. Id. at 210. Bills of this kind were intro-
duced in Illinois initially in 1935. Id. at 213. As early as 1897, New Jersey had employed a
similar ballot. In 1898, in response to the 1875 Alabama Constitution's "majority of those who
vote in the election" requirement, the Alabama legislature submitted a proposal providing that
ballots should have "for amendment" printed on it and that one would have to strike it to vote
against the amendment. Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 194. The amendment carried and was
held constitutional. May v. Mayor and Alderman of Birmingham, 26 So. 537, 539 (Ala. 1899).
But with the adoption of the new Alabama constitution in 1901, such a scheme became impossi-
ble. Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 194. From 1901 to 1912, Nebraska and Ohio at various
times successfully tried essentially the same "party circle" ballot that was originally used in Illi-
nois. Id. at 194-95. Professor Howard has intimated that "party circle" ballots might invite chal-
lenge as "palpably deceptive or misleading," citing as an example what came to be known as the
"trick" ballot, which was used when Virginia citizens voted on calling the convention of 1901-02.
2 HOWARD. COMMENTARIES, supra note 268, at 1174. It had the words "For Constitutional Con-
vention" printed on it; to vote against the convention, one had to scratch out the words. Unmarked
ballots were therefore counted as votes for the convention. Id. But as was the case in Alabama, the
use of the somewhat related forms of "party circle" ballots in Ohio and Nebraska were both
upheld. State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 110 N.W. 1113, 1118 (Neb. 1907); Ohio ex rel.
Sheets v. Laylin, 68 N.E. 574, 575 (Ohio 1903).
414. Kopp, supra note 235, at 487.
415. Unless a Constitution provides otherwise, an amendment does not become effective until
the vote has been canvassed and the result announced. E.g., People ex rel. Lynch v. Board of
Supervisors, 100 I11. 495, 501 (Ill. 1881); In re Joslyn's Estate, 75 N.W. 930; State v. Kyle, 65
S.W. 763, 767 (Mo. 1901); Real v. The People, 42 N.Y. 270, 276 (1870); see also DODD. REVI-
SION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 204 (suggesting that "[u]nless a constitution specifically
provides otherwise, the better rule . . . [is] that an amendment does not become effective in any
case until the vote has been canvassed and the result announced"); JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 543-45 (noting that where an amendment has been submitted to
the people, states generally require that the vote then be canvassed and subsequently announced to
the people, although states may differ as to which "mode of announcing the result" they adopt).
But see Schall v. Bowman, 62 II1. 321, 322 (1870) (holding that an amendment becomes a part of
the organic law upon adoption by the people).
416. See People ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 193 N.E. 192, 194 (Ill. 1934) (holding that there is a
presumption that an act ratified by the people is valid).
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also delegate authority to that new local government to legislate on
local matters. 17 The legislature, in other words, would then be able
to engage in what was previously an unconstitutional procedure for
the enactment of laws - delegating legislative authority to local
governments.
One last impediment to amendment by legislative initiative im-
posed by the 1870 Illinois Constitution was that amendments could
be proposed to only one article of the constitution at the same ses-
sion, and to the same article only once every four years.418 This was
417. Id. at 195. In Soble, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a statute delegating to the City
Council of Chicago the authority, otherwise held by the state legislature, to fix municipal court
fees. Id. There was agreement that this previously unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
was now within the purview of a constitutional amendment empowering the legislature to establish
local municipal government in Chicago. Id. at 194. The General Assembly, it was held, could
lawfully delegate to that local government the obviously necessary and proper concurrent power,
among others, to set fees for local municipal services. Id. at 196. This authority was impliedly
given to the legislature by the constitutional amendment. If the legislature could now constitution-
ally create a local government, it seems clear that it should also be able to grant to that city or
village the necessary power to legislate with reference to specific matters that are purely local to
that locality, like fees for city services. Id. See also People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 403
N.E.2d 242, 250 (I1. 1980) (holding that a municipality may execute the objective of the General
Assembly, but it must stay within bounds of the act); North Maine Fire Protection Dist. v. Village
of Niles, 365 N.E.2d 733, 737 (I1. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that the power to determine munici-
pal boundaries, granted to judges under a statute was a proper delegation of power). Other juris-
dictions have also upheld as constitutional the delegation of state legislative powers to municipali-
ties and municipal officers. See, e.g., Bushnell v. Sapp, 571 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo. 1977) (noting
that giving a city the option to bring police cars within no-fault coverage did not constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth. of Georgia,
231 S.E.2d 720, 724-725 (Ga. 1976) (providing that amounts to be paid to a municipal electric
authority pledged by political subdivisions were general obligations and did not constitute uncon-
stitutional delegations of power to a municipality or the taking of property without due process);
Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (holding that a municipality's
requirement that, as a condition for approval of a subdivision, a dedication of a portion of subdivi-
sion property for parks and playgrounds or contribution of cash to be used for such purposes was
not an unconstitutional delegation of power to the municipality); In re Egg Harbor Assoc., 464
A.2d 1115, 1119 (N.J. 1983) (holding that "in its discretion, the Legislature may delegate this
[state's police power] to municipalities or to state agencies"); DePetrillo v. Coffey, 376 A.2d 317,
319 (R.I. 1977) ("[The General Assembly may delegate to municipal corporations ... all pow-
ers . . . which are incidental to municipal government and of purely local concern."); Redevelop-
ment Agency of San Pablo v. Shepard, 75 Cal. 3d 453, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that
delegating legislative authority to an administrative agency is not unconstitutional and noting that
"the validity of any particular exercise of such powers can be determined in the light of the
purpose and intent of the legislation considered in the context of the market-place conditions to
which the agency's action relates"). But cf New Milford v. SCA Servs. of Conn., 384 A.2d 337,
340 (Conn. 1977) (holding that legislative power was unconstitutionally delegated since there
were no adequate standards for controlling the action of local officials in granting or denying
permits); Indiana Univ. v. Hartwell, 367 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
legislative power was improperly delegated since it gave uncontrolled discretion).
418. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 14, § 2 (amended 1970). There was a prohibition in the 1848
Constitution against the legislature proposing amendments to more than one article at a time, but
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one of the most conservative and inflexible provisions in the country
at that time41 and obviously limited the extent of possible re-
form.420 When speaking of the 1848 Constitution at the 1870 Con-
stitutional convention, Delegate John Dement said:
there was no requirement for a four-year waiting period between changes to the same article (the
1818 Constitution did not even provide for legislatively-proposed amendments).
419. The 1870 Convention proposed a "one article every four years" limitation notwithstanding.
the fact that no other constitution in the United States had such a limitation. These extremely
conservative restrictions were much debated at both the 1848 and the 1870 conventions. Illinois
Supreme Court Justice and 1847 Convention delegate Walter B. Scates opposed giving the legisla-
ture this power to propose amendments to the constitution altogether, as "they would never let it
alone, but at every session would be tinkering at it." CORNELIUS, supra note 114, at 41 (citing
COLE. supra note 100, at 200). But others doubted that this procedure would be used very often
- especially given the sizeable majorities needed at each step of the process and the "one article
at a time" restriction. Id. Several respected delegates in 1870 argued that the legislature and the
people certainly could be trusted to carefully decide changes to two articles generated by one
session, but the attempt to allow two amendments at the same session failed by a vote of 24 to 21.
Id. at 62. Compared to changes made in the amending procedures in other states during the 1840s
and 1850s, Illinois's 1848 provisions were already especially rigid. Id. Now, without more than a
debate over the speculative aspects of human nature to support it, this peculiar rigidity not only
continued unabated but was reinforced in the 1870 Constitution. By 1919, Illinois was one of only
twelve states with restrictions on the number, frequency, or character of amendment proposals.
Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 183 (the others were: Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont); see also
DODD. REVISION AND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 132-33 (describing the various restrictions
on amendment proposals and concluding that five states, including Illinois, "are so strict as to
prevent the ready adaption" of any proposal). Illinois was also one of only eight states to limit the
number of amendments to be submitted at one time. DEALEY, supra note 15, at 141.
420. Except to the extent that it was held that an amendment which explicitly changes one
article can still, by implication, constitutionally amend other articles. People ex rel. Engle v. Ker-
ner, 205 N.E.2d 33, 37 (II1. 1965); see also City of Chicago v. Reeves, 77 N.E. 237, 238 (I11.
1906) (noting that the limitation on amending more than one article was intended to "prohibit the
proposal of express amendments to more than one article . . . at the same session, and was not
intended to prevent implied amendments"); People ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 193 N.E. 192, 194 (1934)
(establishing a city municipal court is germane to the plan contemplated by the amendment au-
thorizing the establishment of a local city government); see also People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 74
P.2d 167 (1903) (stating that a "no more than six articles" provision would be within the bounds
of the state constitution). Thus, one amendment containing several propositions may also be con-
sidered just "one" amendment. One judge has noted that:
If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment all cover matters neces-
sary to be dealt with in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended,
shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced in that
part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole,
then there is but one amendment submitted. But, if any one of the propositions, al-
though not directly contradicting the others, does not refer to such matter, or if it is
not such that the voter supporting it would reasonably be expected to support the
principle of the others, then there are in reality two or more amendments to be sub-
mitted . ...
Kerby v. Luhra, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (Ariz. 1934). Finally, an "amend only one article at the same
session" limitation can be evaded by proposing additional amendments at special sessions. 1912
I11. Att'y Gen. 1102.
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[The] persons whose attention was directed to abuses in the judiciary de-
partment of the State, would not propose an amendment unless to that arti-
cle. Others who viewed the objections to the executive or the legislative arti-
cles as more serious, insisted that those were the articles that should first be
amended - or one of those articles; and the consequence was the General
Assembly could not unite a majority of two-thirds in favor of any one
amendment.""
Yet this situation persisted under the 1870 Constitution. The objec-
tive of that Convention was to avoid creating false super-majorities
for proposals based on "log rolling," which would have resulted if it
was possible to amend different articles at the same session. How-
ever, an equally serious danger resulted after 1870 - deadlocks and
intransigence by the advocates of competing proposals prevented
any change at all.422
The 1950 Gateway Amendment, in a significant improvement,423
allowed the General Assembly to propose amendments to "three Ar-
ticles of the Constitution at any one election. 424 Implied revisions
to other articles - which might in effect raise the total number of
articles amended to more than three - would also be constitutional
under the new less-restrictive provision. 2 The 1970 Constitution re-
tained this "three article" restriction.42 6 The change in Gateway has
not, however, accounted for any expanded constitutional growth
since 1950.
There continue to be no restrictions imposed as to the subject
421. 2 DEBATES, supra note 197, at 1315.
422. Id.; Bulletin No. 3, supra note 120, at 175.
423. See Kopp, supra note 235, at 487.
424. ILL. CoNsT. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(c).
425. People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 205 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Ill. 1965). In Engle, the prohibition
against the proposal by any one General Assembly of amendments to more than three articles was
held not to be violated when an increase in the number of legislators caused by one 1954 amend-
ment to the legislative article, necessarily and impliedly also amended the article on revision by
simultaneously increasing the number of legislators required to call a constitutional convention
and the number of delegates at such a convention under that article. Id. Other states also allow
implied changes to articles of the state constitution not explicitly amended. See, e.g., Brosnahan v.
Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 286-87 (Cal. 1982) (validating a proposition to add a "Victims' Bill of
Rights" even though it amended or repealed, by implication, various statutory provisions not spec-
ified in the text of the provision); People ex rel. Elders v. Sours, 74 P. 167, 178 (Colo. 1903)
(upholding a provision that limited or modified other articles in the state constitution since a
limitation on the legislature (amending one article at a time) deals with the proposal of express
amendments, not amendments by "necessary implication"); Floridians Against Casino Takeover v.
Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337, 341 (Fla. 1978) (concluding that once the constitutional
restraint is perceived as "functional as opposed to locational, substantial effect by the proposal
upon any other section or article of the Constitution becomes irrelevant").
426. ILL CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(c).
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matter of amendments.2 7 The only other limitation on legislative
amendatory measures is that no amendment shall be proposed by
the General Assembly between the time a convention is called and
the time the electors vote on any revision or amendments proposed
by the convention.428 The purpose of this provision is to preyent the
legal confusion which could result from the proposal of such an
amendment if, at the same time, the convention submitted an
amendment which conflicted with or varied from the proposed
amendment. In addition to the legal confusion over which amend-
ment would actually be in effect, an amendment proposed by the
legislature during this time could also lead to voter confusion. 2 In-
deed, this kind of legislative interference occurred during the 1970
convention.430 While the convention was meeting and its Revenue
and Finance Committee was debating a proposal on the same issue,
the General Assembly began consideration of a proposed amend-
ment to the 1870 Constitution that called for abolishing the per-
sonal property tax as it applied to individuals.4 31 Before the conven-
tion could finish its work, which included a provision phasing out ad
427. There are no "subject matter" restrictions on amending the Federal Constitution either,
except that "no State ... shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art.
V. This limitation is "permanent and unalterable." Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331,
348 (1856). It has been suggested that the Senate's equal state suffrage provision should be inter-
preted as a broad guarantee that state powers will never be absorbed by the federal government.
See, e.g., William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV.
223, 229 (1919) (noting that there is "one express limitation placed upon the amending power in
article V" that no amendment shall take away any function which is essential to essence of a state
and legislative power must be "deemed one of those functions"). It has also been suggested that
there might be implicit, enforceable limits based on the Constitution's principal goal of protecting
human dignity - such as the exclusion of a potential amendment creating a racial hierarchy.
E.g., Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 754-57
(1980). Some scholars feel that amendments should be limited to correcting "discovered faults in
the structure of government. Provisions reflecting only transitory values or momentary responses
to particular substantive problems have not been incorporated into the Constitution. By embody-
ing only that which is lasting, the Constitution has remained durable through periods of social,
economic, and political change." Note, The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry Into Ap-
propriateness, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1603 (1983). But the Supreme Court has, of course, never
taken the opportunity to invalidate a Congressional amendment measure.
428. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2(c).
429. See 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 557-58
(1970). This provision was added by amendment to the initial committee proposal on the conven-
tion floor in order to prevent "an antagonistic or jealous legislature [from undermining] ...the
significance and clarity of convention amendment proposals by presenting to the voters its own
proposed amendments . . . .[especially] [i]f its proposed amendments covered the same subjects
.GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 46.
430. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 168, at 46.
431. Id.
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valorem personal property taxes, the legislative proposal was placed
on the ballot for the November 1970 election. Anticipating voter
approval of the legislative proposal, the convention, in Article IX,
section 5(b), provided that any ad valorem personal property taxes
abolished before the effective date of the new constitution would not
be reinstated."" Fortunately, both proposals to remove the personal
property tax were approved: the General Assembly's amendment re-
pealed the tax as it applied to individuals, and Article IX, section
5(b) of the 1970 Constitution prohibited its reinstatement. 83
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal history of state constitutional revision and amendment
in Illinois, and perhaps in other states with little if any independent
interpretation of their state constitutions, correlates closely with
popular attitudes which, throughout most of Illinois's history, have
been consistently antagonistic toward fundamental change. This
may explain the relative difficulty with which the state constitution
can be amended. This constitutional inflexibility in turn encourages
a relative lack of growth of independent and expansive state consti-
tutional interpretation. Historically disunified, factious, and individ-
ualistic societies breed popular caution in matters of fundamental
change; a mistrust of simple majority rule. This popular attitude is
reflected in historically rigid constitutions in these states. This rigid-
ity usually results in a low level of judicial independence from the
political branches of government. The constitutional perpetuation of
political "accountability" to the other branches in the service of so-
cial harmony and economic stability makes the judiciary cautious
about independent, expansive interpretation of individual rights
provisions.
Of course, a conservative approach to state constitutional adjudi-
cation in response to the popular reticence on matters of fundamen-
tal change might simply suggest principled judicial "democratic ac-
countability." After all, it may be appropriate in states like Illinois
for the judiciary to avoid experimentation through interpretation
and for the legislature to fail to exercise its power to propose mean-
ingful and progressive constitutional measures. This perpetuates the
usual role of government in an individualistic political culture -
432. Id.
433. Id.
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that of referee or neutral manager.
The problem with this posture on the part of public officials,
though, is the stifling of public advocacy and debate on issues of
fundamental constitutional change that follows from this lack of
leadership. Absent meaningful opportunities for popular decision-
making on issues of government structure or power, 34 or on the re-
lationship between government and its citizens, there is little oppor-
tunity to signal the legislature or the judiciary that changes in
demographics and political culture now require a more active or dif-
ferent role for government in constitutional growth. Certainly, the
mass of Illinois citizens who are neither lobbyists for special inter-
ests nor otherwise actively in communication with their legislators
will still undergo changes in shared goals, ideals, or attitudes toward
government. 35 Thus, to allow for or encourage necessary growth of
state constitutional law, there must be, at least initially, a sufficient
ease and frequency of textual revision,436 if for no other reason than
to provide evidence of popular amenability toward change. A suc-
cessful effort to bring the flexibility of the Illinois constitution into
line with the prevailing national experience and norms would do
much to signal the judiciary that there is popular consent to height-
ened experimentation with expansive constitutional interpretation.
Such an effort may have an even greater effect than continual argu-
ment before the Illinois Supreme Court about the progressive behav-
ior of other state courts. Otherwise, in the absence of options for
reasonable and easy constitutional amendment, and given the con-
tinuing failure of reform efforts toward increasing judicial indepen-
434. There are provisions in the laws for placing "advisory questions of public policy" on the
ballot - see 10 ILCS §§ 5/28-9 to -13 (1993) - but these are even more onerous than the
limited right to petition for changes in Article IV provided for in Article XIV, § 3 (1970).
435. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 20, at 116:
Under certain circumstances, cultural values change because of changing social sta-
tus. There is some evidence that, as some people move upward into the middle- to
upper-middle-class range, they may adopt at least some of the values of the moralistic
political culture. . . . Thus it may be that as parts of Illinois are transformed into
suburban areas and settled by people from individualistic culture areas, they also ac-
quire cultural patterns more common to the moralistic political culture.
Id.
436. One scholar notes:
[C]learly the inference [of approval or disapproval of existing constitutional com-
promises] . . . is only valid if certain conditions are met. For an onerous or unfair
procedure could thwart amendment long after desire for change became widespread
and intense. . . . Hence, use and non-use of the amending power will not really indi-
cate consent unless the procedure is fair and neither too difficult nor too easy.
SUBER. supra note 9, at xv.
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dence, state courts may be justifiably reluctant to usurp sovereign
power and engage in expansive interpretation or "nonformal"
amendment.
The Illinois amendatory provisions, however, are even more in-
flexible now than may have originally been intended - even given
the need to maintain stability in an unusually contentious and dis-
unified political environment. Minor but important changes in the
present process for textual amendment might be a useful initial step
toward constitutional growth. By eliminating several burdensome
but unnecessary restrictions, like the superfluous "super-majority"
requirement for the popular ratification of amendments, the people
of Illinois could attempt to stimulate more frequent, desirable struc-
tural or policy changes in response to changes in political culture
and social aspirations. This sort of effort to amend constitutional
text would indicate a turn in popular attitude toward constitutional
growth by judicial interpretation as well. One solution might be the
imposition of a constitutional scheme of limited, indirect initiative.
This advance would not unduly impinge upon the legislative process
or negate its virtues. The compromises and careful deliberation that
are inherent in the system of representative democracy might even
be promoted and enhanced. Otherwise, Illinois public officials are in
the unfortunate position of being potentially unaware of the publi-
cally-perceived need for fundamental social change, and they will be
disinclined to engage in change in any event because the vehicles for
constitutional change are so rigid that they are not practical. The
vehicles for constitutional change (the processes of textual amend-
ment or the attitudes toward judicial interpretation) are not them-
selves modified because there seems to be no popular inclination to-
ward fundamental change.
Consequently, because of ramifications they hold for the ability of
public officials to meet new challenges and for the future develop-
ment of independent interpretation in state constitutional law, ap-
propriately reasonable and facile procedures for periodic textual al-
teration and a modern balance between popular and legislative
involvement in revision are essential if a constitution and the gov-
ernment and laws it promotes are to remain viable.
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